Effects of intellectual capital and corporate governance on performance of Islamic financial institutions by Nawaz, Tasawar
1 
 
 
Knowledge Resources, Corporate Governance, and Ethical Banking 
 
 
Effects of Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance on Performance of 
Islamic Financial Institutions 
 
 
 
Tasawar NAWAZ 
BA, MSc (International Economics with Distinction), MBA (International Business 
with Distinction) 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Heriot-Watt University 
School of Management and Languages 
 
 
April 2015 
 
 
“The copyright in this thesis is owned by the author. Any quotation from the thesis or 
use of any of the information contained in it must acknowledge this thesis as the source 
of the quotation or information." 
2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, the knowledge management literature has exhibited relatively few new 
empirical contributions, in contrast to the flurry of such work in the ethical financial 
sector. The purpose of this research study was three fold. The primary objective was to 
examine, to what extent, Intellectual Capital (hereafter referred to as IC) and Corporate 
Governance (hereafter referred to as CG) features affected the performance (both 
accounting-and market-based) of 64 Islamic Financial Institutions (hereafter referred to 
as IFIs) operating in ten different geographical locations for the period 2007-2011, 
while controlling for firm-specific characteristics. The second objective was to analyse 
the effects of IC and CG features on the performance of the sampled IFIs before and 
after the financial crisis. Finally, the research aimed to explore the effects of IC, CG and 
firm-specific characteristics on the performance of fully-fledged Islamic banks 
(hereafter referred to as FFIBs) and Islamic Shariah-windows (hereafter referred to as 
Windows). 
The study used the quantitative research method in which secondary data, comprising of 
the annual/financial statements of the selected IFIs, was used to extract data. The 
population of this study was IFIs both FFIBs and Windows operating worldwide.  This 
study’s sample of IFIs was selected based on the Bankscope database while data, related 
to the governance-specific variables such as board-size, non-executive directors, role 
duality, Shariah supervisory board, and size of the audit committee, was collected  by 
hand using the annual reports of each IFI. Value Added Intellectual Coefficient 
(hereafter referred to as VAIC) was used as a methodological tool to analyse the data. 
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 The following are the key findings of the research. Firstly, IC was associated positively 
with the sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance. Secondly, IC was 
associated with positively with the sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-based 
performance at all times i.e. in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Hence, IC was the main 
defence line for the sampled IFIs. Thirdly, the classical model of CG did not seem to 
explain the sampled IFIs’ performance. Finally, this study reports that the Islamic 
finance industry is not homogeneous since not all the financial institutions offering 
Shariah compliant products are FFIBs. They can be divided further into FFIBs and 
Windows, in which FFIBs have relatively stronger market valuation as compared to 
Windows. 
This study makes a contribution to the existing literature on IC, precisely to IC 
performance literature, by providing the evidence about the role of IC in determining 
the performance of the ethical banking model. Equally, this study contributes to the 
literature on Islamic banking and finance as well as the performance of IFIs by 
measuring the effects of intangible resources on performance. Likewise, the study 
contributes to the literature on IC and corporate governance by combining both concepts 
in one study. Another contribution of this study is that it considered IC and CG 
performance in the pre- and post-financial crisis periods; this provides a novel insight 
into the role knowledge resources i.e. IC in times of financial meltdown. Finally, it 
points out that the Islamic finance industry is not homogeneous as such since not all 
IFIs are FFIBs. Instead, there exists a distinction within the industry. 
Besides the contribution to the literature, this research is of interest to policy makers 
and, on a practical level, Islamic banking and finance regulators may use the insights, 
provided by this study, as a basis for further discussion in determining the role of IC and 
CG-features in a Shariah-complaint banking model. Rating agencies may use this 
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information when evaluating the real value of an IFI. Likewise, IFIs can use this 
information to identify and have a better understanding of their competitive advantage 
in the market. Finally, investors may consider this information while making their 
investment decisions. 
The study was not free from constraints and limitations. The main limitation lay in its 
methodological tool (Value Added Intellectual Coefficient, VAIC) for measuring IC.  
The VAIC model  was challenged by many studies (see Chang, 2007; Ståhle et al., 
2011). Nonetheless, there exists no single method of measuring IC.  The VAIC method 
uses quantitative data and, therefore, the use of VAIC is justified because this study 
used secondary data and, hence, was quantitative in nature.  Arguably, this was reliable 
and validated since it was drawn from the audited data disclosed in the annual 
reports/financial statements of the selected IFIs. 
The study offers a novel insight into the ethical banking business model and draws 
attention to the increasingly important role that knowledge resources i.e. IC play in it. 
The study calls for a radical departure from the existing orthodox CG model, 
particularly for cohesive organisations such as Islamic banks, which are based on trust. 
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC WORDS 
Allah The Name of the Creator of the Universe and all that it contains 
according to Islam. Derives from the word "Ilah" which means 
"the One deserving all worship", the One to Whom all hearts 
submit in love, fear, reverence, desire, trust and sincerity, and to 
Whom all limbs submit in all forms of worship such as prayers, 
supplications, sacrifices, invocations, etc. 
Al-wadia / Al-
wadi'ah 
This refers to deposits in trust, in which a person may hold 
property in trust for another, sometimes by implication of a 
contract. 
Amana/ 
Amanah 
Literal meanings are reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty, honesty. 
Technically, an important value of Islamic society in mutual 
dealings; anything, which is in possession of a person who is not 
the owner of it for safekeeping. In case of unintended loss to the 
thing, he is not obliged to pay compensation. 
Ameen / Amin Custodian or guardian or trustee. 
Bai / Bay’ Sale. Commonly used as a prefix in referring to different types of 
sales. A comprehensive term that applies to sale as well as many 
other transactions that are not strictly referred to as sales in 
positive law; bilateral contract; exchange. 
Fard Obligatory. An act which is obligatory on Muslims. 
Fatwa/ Fatwah 
(Plural: Fatawa) 
A religious decree, a legal verdict given on a religious basis. The 
sources on which a fatwa is based are the Holy Quran, and all 
other authenticated Ahadeeth. 
Fiqh Muslim jurisprudence; it covers all aspects of life, religious, 
political, social or economic. In addition to religious observances 
(prayer, fasting, zakat and pilgrimage) it covers family law, 
inheritance, social obligations, commerce, criminal law, 
constitutional law and international relations, including war. The 
whole corpus of fiqh is based primarily on the Quran and the 
Sunnah and secondarily on ijma and ijtihad. 
Gharar Uncertainty, hazard, chance or risk, ambiguity and uncertainty in 
transactions. Technically, the sale of something which is not 
present at hand or the sale of something where the consequences or 
outcome is not known. It can also be a sale involving risk or 
hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to be or 
not, such as fish in water or a bird in the air or an event where 
assurance or non-assurance is subject to chance and  thus not 
known to parties of a transaction. Can also mean uncertainty or a 
hazard that is likely to lead to a dispute in a contract. 
Hadith 
(Plural: Ahddith) 
A report on the saying, deed or tacit approval of the Prophet, peace 
be on him. 
Hajj Hajj means pilgrimage to Mecca (a city located in Saudi Arabia) 
and other holy places. Hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is a duty on 
every Muslim who is financially and physically able to carry it out, 
at least once in his lifetime. There is a specific period for Hajj, 
namely one week from the 8th day of the Islamic month of Dhul 
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Hijjah to the 13th day of that month in the Islamic lunar calendar. 
Halal / Halaal Things/acts lawful in Islamic law –permissible. The concept 
of halal has spiritual overtones. In Islam there are activities, 
professions, contracts and transactions which are explicitly 
prohibited (haram) by the Quran or the Sunnah. Barring them, all 
other activities, professions, contracts, and transactions etc. are 
halal. This is one of the distinctive features of Islamic economics 
vis-a-vis Western economics where no such concept exists. In 
Western economics, all activities are judged on the touchstone of 
economic utility. In Islamic economics, other factors, mostly 
spiritual and moral are also involved. An activity may be 
economically sound but may not be allowed in the Islamic society 
if it is not permitted by the Shariah. 
Haq Legal right. 
Haram An act or product which is unlawful or prohibited in Islam. 
Hawala Endorsement, assignment, or avail. Literally means a bill of 
exchange, promissory note, cheque or draft. Technically, a debtor 
passes on the responsibility of payment of his debt to a third party 
who owes the former a debt. Thus the responsibility of payment is 
ultimately shifted to a third party. Hawala is a mechanism for 
settling international accounts, by book transfers. This obviates, to 
a large extent, the necessity of physical transfer of cash. 
Hibah Gift. 
Ijara/ijarah Literally means, letting on lease. Technically, sale of a definite 
usufruct in exchange for a definite reward. Commonly used for 
wages, it also refers to a contract of land lease at a fixed rent 
payable in cash. It is an arrangement under which an Islamic bank 
leases equipment, a building or other facility to a client against an 
agreed rental. The rent is so fixed that the bank gets back its 
original investment plus a profit on it. 
Ijma' Consensus of opinion of Muslim jurists on a specific matter, 
consensus of the jurists on any issues of fiqh after the death of the 
Prophet. 
Ijtehad / Ijtihad Literally means, an effort, exertion, industry, or diligence. 
Technically, endeavour of a jurist to derive or formulate a rule of 
law on the basis of evidence found in the sources. A scholarly 
effort through which a jurist/scholar derives Islamic law on the 
basis of Quran and Sunnah. 
Istisna’a/ 
Istisna 
This is a kind of sale where a commodity is transacted before it 
comes into existence. It means, to order a manufacturer to 
manufacture a specific commodity for the purchaser. If the 
manufacturer under takes to manufacture the goods for him with 
material from the manufacturer, the transaction of Istisna’a comes 
into existence. But it is necessary for the validity of istisna’ that 
the price is fixed with the consent of the parties and that necessary 
specification of the commodity (intended to be manufactured) is 
fully settled between them. 
Joalah/ 
Joaalah 
The undertaking of one party (the Jael, bank or employer) to pay a 
specified amount of money to  another party in return for rendering 
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a specified service in accordance with the terms of contract. 
Maiser Gambling. Literally means getting something too easily. 
Mal Wealth. 
Modharabah A contract between financier and working partner. A profit and 
loss sharing contract in which one party provides capital and the 
other party manages the enterprise. In ease of loss the provider of 
capital bears the financial loss while the worker loses his labor. In 
case of profit both parties share it in agreed proportions. An 
agreement between two or more persons whereby one or more of 
them provide finance, while the others provide entrepreneurship 
and management to carry on any business venture whether trade, 
industry or service, with the objective of earning profits. They 
share the profit in an agreed proportion. The loss is borne only by 
the financier's in proportion to their share in total capital. 
Mudharaba/ 
Mudarabah 
The term refers to a form of business contract in which one party 
brings capital and the other personal effort. The proportionate 
share in profit is determined by mutual agreement. But the loss, if 
any, is borne only by the owner of the capital, in which case the 
entrepreneur gets nothing for his labour. The financier is known as 
"rab-al-maal" and the entrepreneur as "mudarib". As a financing 
technique adopted by Islamic banks, it is a contract in which all the 
capital is provided by the Islamic bank while the business is 
managed by the other party. The profit is shared in pre-agreed 
ratios, and loss, if any, unless caused by negligence or violation of 
terms of the contract by the "mudarib" is borne by the Islamic 
bank. The bank passes on this loss to the depositors. 
Murabaha Literally means, a sale on profit or cost plus profit or sale at stated 
cost price and mark-up or sale at a specified profit margin. The 
term is, however, now used to refer to a sale agreement whereby 
the seller purchases the goods desired by the buyer and sells them 
at an agreed marked-up price, the payment being settled within an 
agreed time frame, either in instalments or lump sum. The seller 
undertakes all the management needed for the purchase and also 
bears the risk for the goods until they have been delivered to the 
buyer. 
Musharkah The term refers to a financing technique adopted by Islamic banks. 
It is an agreement under which the Islamic bank provides funds 
which are mingled with the funds of the business enterprise and 
others. All providers of capital are entitled to participate in the 
management but not necessarily required to do so. The profit is 
distributed among the partners in pre-determined ratios, while the 
loss is born by each partner in proportion to his contribution. 
P.B.U.H. These letters are abbreviations for the phrase Peace Be Upon Him 
which is the translation of the Arabic expression Alaihis Salam or 
A.S., which is an expression that is said when the name of a 
prophet is mentioned. This expression is widely used by English 
speaking Muslims. 
Qardh  Hasan A loan extended without interest. A gracious loan without interest 
in which the benefit to be derived is gifted by the owner to the 
beneficiary without this charitable act, the use of the money for a 
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period would be considered an unjustified excess transferred to the 
beneficiary also called Ribaal-nasiah. 
Qardh/Qard A loan given for a good cause in the name of Allah, in hopes of 
repayment or reward in the Hereafter, debt. 
Quran The Holy book containing the actual words of Allah revealed to 
the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). This Holy Book of 
the Muslims consisting of the revelations made by God to the 
Prophet Muhammad, during his Prophet hood of about 23 years. 
The Quran lays down the fundamentals of the Islamic faith, 
including beliefs and all aspects of the Muslim way of life. These 
are supplemented or further elaborated by the Sunnah. The Quran 
consists of 30 parts (ajza), 114 chapters (surahs), and 6,666 verses 
(ayahs). 
Rabb al-maal Investor or owner of capital. A person who invests in Mudarabah/ 
Musharkah. 
Rahn Pledge or mortgage 
Riba Riba literally means increase, addition, expansion or growth. It is, 
however, not every increase, or growth, which has been prohibited 
by Islam. In the Shariah, Riba technically refers to the premium 
that must be paid without any consideration. According to the 
jurists of Islam this definition covers the two types of Riba, 
namely: Riba Al Fadhl and Riba Al Naseah. 
 
Riba aI-Fadl: 
An extension of Riba to trade, because while trade is allowed, not 
everything is permitted in trade. The prohibition of Ribaal-fadl 
closes all back doors to Riba through trade. Unlawful excess in the 
exchange of two counter-values where the excess is measurable 
through weight or measure. According to some Ahadith (Sayings 
of the Holy Prophet) if six things i.e. gold, silver, wheat, barley, 
dates and salt are exchanged against themselves, they should be 
spot and be equal and been specified. If these conditions are not 
found, this transaction will become Riba Al Fadhl. 
  
Riba al' Nasiah: 
Literally means increase or addition of debt and it refers to the 
premium that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along 
with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or an 
extension in its maturity. It is thus equivalent to interest. the 
addition of the premium which is paid to the lender in return for 
his waiting as a condition for the loan and is technically the same 
as interest. 
Shari’ah Islamic Jurisprudence. Divine law consisting of Quran 
and Sunnah and on justification. 
Shukuk/ 
Sukook 
Check, certificate of debt, certificates of investment; plural of 
Shak. 
Sunnah Any saying of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) or his act 
or any act of his companion endorsed by him. After the Quran, the 
Sunnah is the most important source of the Islamic faith and refers 
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essentially to the Prophets example as indicated by his practice of 
the faith. The only way to know the Sunnah is through the 
collection of Ahddith. 
Takaful Islamic Insurance. A scheme of mutual support that provides 
insurance to individuals against hazards of falling into unexpected 
and dire need. 
Ummah Refers to the whole Muslim community, irrespective of color, 
race, language or nationality, which carries no weight in Islam. 
Ushr Ten per cent (in some cases five per cent) of agricultural produce 
payable by a Muslim as a part of his religious obligation, like 
Zakat, mainly for the benefit of the poor and the needy. 
Venture Inventory / Property risked contract. 
Wadi'ah Contract of deposit; bailment. 
Wakalah Agency. 
Wakil Agent. 
Wali Guardian. 
Waqf Endowment. A charitable trust in the name of Allah, usually in 
perpetuity, and usually for the purposes of establishing the Deen of 
Islam, teaching useful knowledge, feeding the poor or treating the 
sick. 
Zakah / Zakat 
 
Compulsories levy on every Muslim who has wealth greater than 
the amount of Nisab. The amount payable by a Muslim on his net 
worth as a part of his religious obligations, mainly for the benefit 
of the poor and the needy. 
Zakah al-Fitr A small obligatory head-tax imposed on every Muslim who has 
the means for himself and his dependents. It is paid annually. 
Zakah Al-Mal The Muslims wealth tax. One must pay 2.5% of one’s yearly 
savings above a certain amount to the poor and needy Muslims. 
The Zakah is compulsory on all Muslims who have saved (at least) 
the equivalent of 85g of 24 carat gold at the time when the annual 
Zakah payment is due. 
Zakatul 
Huboob 
Zakah of grain/corn. 
Zakatul Madan Zakah of minerals. 
Zakatur Rikaaz Zakah of treasure/precious stones. 
Zakatu-rid 
Tijaarah 
Zakah of profits of merchandise. 
Source: Adopted from Meezan Bank (Pakistan), http://www.meezanbank.com/glossary.aspx  
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Chapter 2:  Overview of the Research 
 
2.1 Background 
Sullivan (2000), referring to the traditional economic model, opined that land labour 
and capital were the basic resources for a company to operate. Nevertheless, the rapid 
development of knowledge-economy is shaking the foundation of several economic 
sectors, particularly the financial services industry. Such a drastic transformation 
threatens the survival of some existing incumbent Conventional Financial Institutions 
(hereafter referred to as CFIs). Contemporarily, it introduces new prospects and 
potential equity providers such as IFIs to the market.  In order to compete effectively in 
today’s knowledge-intensive era, financial institutions may need to embrace a new set 
of strategic priorities (Li, 2001). Correspondingly, organizations worldwide have 
recognized that intangible resources are essential to achieving and sustaining superior 
performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). IC has been acknowledged as the 
most significant source of value creation and competitive advantage of the modern 
organizations. Research on IC has been one of the most prolific research domains in the 
management literature in the last two decades. Studies, focusing on high-tech industries, 
such as IT (Hsu and Wang, 2012), have shown a significant association between IC and 
CG. Lately, studies have shown a sustained interest in the services sector and financial 
intuitions in particular (El-Bannany, 2008; Murthy and Mouritsen, 2011; Mention and 
Bontis, 2013; Kubo and Saka 2002) in comprehending how IC impacts on performance. 
However, studies, conducted within the financial sector, have shown mixed evidence 
about the relationship between IC and the overall performance of financial institutions. 
 IC is a strategic asset which helps an organization to maintain its profitability 
and to sustain competitive advantage in the market. IC is highly significant to IFIs since 
the whole phenomenon of Islamic banking is based on the intangible ideology of 
Shariah –the Islamic divine law. Therefore, knowing how IFIs’ IC stock affects its 
performance i.e. profitability and market valuation, is of paramount importance. 
Knowing if higher IC efficiency has a substantial effect on the likelihood of an IFI’s 
survival and how such an effect varies during a time of financial turmoil is an important 
detail for governing bodies in particular. 
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Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) stated that the innovative capability of a firm 
was tied closely to its stock of IC. Accordingly, firms are viewed as the distributed 
knowledge systems composed of individuals who embody knowledge (Un and Cuervo‐
Cazurra, 2004). Therefore, IFIs require subsequently higher degrees of intellectual 
capabilities and specifically the human intellectual capital for endorsement of product 
innovation. Equally, a somewhat sophisticated structural mechanism is essential to 
transform the intellectual ideas into tangible assets. Such an environment is provided by 
the structural capital; this enables an organization to create and leverage knowledge. 
Here, structural capital refers to both tangible aspects such as building, furniture, 
computers, and other facilities and intangible aspects i.e. copyrights, patents, software, 
databases etc. Strong structural capital has, also, a supportive culture which encourages 
employees to try and learn new knowledge. At the same time, financial capital is, also, 
essential to running the business like a well-oiled machine. Hence, in the Islamic 
finance industry, value creation is a combination of human, structural and financial 
capital and it is important to examine which of the three components contributes most to 
the IFIs’ value creation. 
Equally, the significance of effective CG mechanisms and corporate 
performance have been documented, also (John et al., 2008;Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Angelides and Thomas, 2011; Erkens et al., 2012). Several key CG indicators corporate 
are said to be associated with the profitability and market value of banks. For instance, 
Peni and Vähämaa (2012) opined that, to a large extent, the recent financial meltdown 
of 2007–2008 was attributable to the banks’ excessive risk-taking. Likewise, 
Brunnermeier (2008) suggested that firms’ risk management and financing policies had 
a significant effect on the degree to which firms were affected by the economic crisis. 
Kashyap et al. (2008) argued that the firms’ financing and risk management policies  
were the ultimate outcomes of ‘cost-benefit trade-offs’ made by governing bodies;  they  
suggested that corporate performance was affected by the adopted governance 
mechanism (Erkens et al., 2012). On the one hand, extensive empirical literature (Sierra 
et al., 2006;Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Webb Cooper, 2009) 
suggested that effective CG mechanisms had positive effects on the performance of 
conventional banks.  On the other hand, the empirical evidence from the Islamic finance 
industry (Grais and Pellegrini 2006, Matoussi and Grassa 2012) was limited and 
shallow. 
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Given the shallow evidence in the literature, the issue of the impacts of IC and 
CG-features on the performance of financial institutions, the extent of these impacts, 
and how they might vary across time horizons were the issues addressed in this study. 
Particularly, this research aimed to examine empirically the effects of IC and CG-
features on IFIs’ accounting performance (based on ROA) and market performance 
(based on Tobin’s Q) of during the period 2007 to 2011, while controlling for firm-
specific characteristics. 
 
2.2 Problem Statement 
Although the effects of IC on a firm's performance was researched over the last decade 
or so, empirical evidence on its actual contribution to the dynamics of the value creation 
process remained scarce in certain sectors such as Islamic banking and finance and, 
also, in term of geographical regions i.e. emerging (developing) economies. 
Particularly, studies, conducted within the financial sector, showed mixed evidence 
about the relationship between IC and the business performance of financial institutions. 
Therefore, it was imperative to study the link between IC and the business performance 
of the financial institutions. Likewise, empirical evidence on the relationship between 
CG features and firm performance was, also, inconclusive. Since most IFIs are based in 
the developing economies, they are neglected often by the researchers. Until now, there 
existed no study as such which examined the effects of IC and CG-features on the IFIs’ 
performance. This left a gap in the literature.  This research study aimed to fill this gap 
and to open new avenues for future researchers. 
 
2.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 This research’s primary objective was to examine, to what extent, IC and governance 
CG affected the performance of 64 IFIs operating in ten different geographical locations 
for the period 2007 to 2011, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics. 
Specifically, it sought to answer the following research question: 
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Research Question 1: To what extent, do IC efficiency (human capital, 
structural capital and capital employed) and corporate governance features affect 
the accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of IFIs for the 
period 2007 to 2011? 
The research’s second objective was to analyse the effects of IC and CG features on the 
sampled IFIs’ performance before and after the financial crisis. Specifically, it sought to 
answer the following research question: 
Research Question 2: To what extent do, IC efficiency (human capital, 
structural capital and capital employed) and corporate governance features affect 
accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of IFIs before 
and after the financial crisis? 
Finally, the research aimed to explore the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific 
characteristics on the performance of FFIBs and Windows. Specifically, it sought to 
answer the following research question: 
Research Question 3: To what extent, do IC efficiency (human capital, 
structural capital and capital employed) and corporate governance features affect 
accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of fully-fledged 
Islamic banks and Shariah-windows for the period 2007 to 2011? 
 
2.4 Contributions of the Study 
Since research on Islamic finance is still at an early stage, the study on the extent of IC 
efficiency in IFIs makes a significant contribution to new knowledge. Hence, there is no 
study as such which focuses on the effects of IC or CG features on the IFIs’. Therefore, 
this study’s key contribution is that it is amongst the early studies measuring the effects 
of IC and CG-features on the IFIs’ profitability and market valuation. The study aims, 
also, to enrich the literature in management accounting (in the context of Islamic 
finance) in particular, and accounting generally. 
The reported research departs from other research studying the impact of IC on 
firm performance at a national level and does not control for CG features.  This study 
addressed this omission from the literature in that it investigated the impact of IC and 
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CG features on the performance of sampled IFIs located in ten different countries 
worldwide. 
Since this study is amongst the early work examining the association between 
IC, CG-features and IFIs’ performance, its potential contribution is considerable.  This 
study’s findings will have several implications for IFIs since it will provide the Islamic 
finance industry with an opportunity to analyse critically the contribution of each 
component of VAIC viz. Human Capital Efficiency (hereafter referred to as HCE), 
Structural Capital Efficiency (hereafter referred to as SCE) and Capital Employed 
Efficiency (CEE) in creating value. The study highlights, also, the importance of IC 
features as the key factor which can enhance an IFI’s ability to maintain its profitability 
and competitive position in the market. The results may provide, also, guidance on what 
kind of firm-specific features i.e. firm-size, listing-status, type of auditor, and operating 
region enhances the influence of IC and CG-features on IFIs’ performance. 
Equally, the study aims to contribute guidelines for academics in the field of 
accounting and finance, particularly Islamic banking and finance, in planning syllabuses 
and curricula for their courses. Hence, the study hopes to contribute empirically and 
academically. In relation to the potential contributions stated above, it is hoped that this 
study will become a source of motivation for more academic and non-academic research 
in the field of Islamic finance and management accounting. 
 
2.5 Research Methodology 
The study used the quantitative research method in which secondary data comprising of 
annual/financial statements of selected IFIs was used to extract data. The population of 
this study was IFIs both FFIBs and Windows operating worldwide.   The selection of 
this study’s sample of IFIs was based on the Bankscope database which  had a unique 
collection of micro-level banking information for different countries and was used 
widely for international studies and policymaking (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998). Data related to the governance-specific variables, such as board-size, non-
executive directors, role duality, Shariah supervisory board, and size of the audit 
committee was not readily available on the Bankscope database. The reason for using  
annual reports was because they were “the most widely distributed of all publicly 
produced documents of an organization, and management has complete editorial control 
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of the discretionary disclosure of information in this document (Campbell, 2000, p. 
85)”. Given this study’s longitudinal objective, the time period, established for the 
survey of annual financial data, was set between 2007 and 2011. There are three basic 
reasons to support the selection of this time period. Firstly, a new generation of Islamic 
finance, which is more innovative and diverse, has emerged during the first decade of 
the 21
st
 century as the doctrine is undergoing a new aggiornamento. This is urged 
mainly by the factors such as globalization of economies, dramatic changes in political-
economic environment and Islamic insurgence (Nawaz, 2013a; Nawaz, 2013b). 
Secondly, Islamic finance has documented its stability during the recent global financial 
crisis (Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Baele et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013)  and the Islamic 
finance industry is expected to enjoy the same trends in the upcoming years (Ernst and 
Young, 2013; Johnes et al., 2014). Lastly, the West trialed, also, the potential of the 
Islamic way of banking during this period. The UK regulator –the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), for example, granted five banking licenses for the Islamic retail and 
investment banks between 2004 and 2008 (Kay, 2004; Wilson, 2005; Nawaz 2013a). 
All such factors contributed equally to making the Islamic financial industry an 
attractive area for potential research. Hence, the significance of the study was justified. 
A final sample, comprising of 64 individual IFIs and 320 firm-year observations for the 
fiscal years 2007 to 2011 was obtained after eliminating IFIs with insufficient financial 
and/or corporate governance information.  The statistical software package (STATA 
Version 13.1) was used to analyse data.  The research model was developed as an aid to 
identifying the research variables and to help in testing the research hypotheses 
developed from the research questions. 
 
2.6 Scope and Constraints of Study 
This is an exploratory research study and encompasses Islamic finance, IC and CG 
features. It was carried out in the context of Islamic financial institutions operating in 
ten different geographical locations worldwide for the period 2007 to 2011. The scope 
of the research, including effects of IC, CG-features, and firm-specific features on the 
IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance, was based on ROA and Tobin’s Q 
respectively. This was to find out whether IC and CG-features had any effects on IFIs’ 
performance of during the period under study. Secondary data was used; this consisted 
mainly of Bankscope database and a review of annual reports. 
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 The study was not free from constraints and limitations. This study’s main 
limitation lay in its methodological tool (value added intellectual coefficient, VAIC) for 
measuring IC.  Many studies challenged the VAIC model (see Chang, 2007; Ståhle et 
al., 2011). Nonetheless, there existed no single method of measuring IC.  The VAIC 
method uses quantitative data and, therefore, VAIC’s use was justified because 
secondary data was used in this study and, hence, was quantitative in nature. Arguably, 
this data was reliable and validated since it was drawn from the audited data disclosed 
in annual reports/financial statements of the selected Islamic financial institutions.  
Chapter 9 discusses other inherent constraints. 
 
2.7 Summary of Significant Findings 
The key findings of the research are as follows: 
1. IC has a significant positive relationship with the accounting performance of IFIs, 
based on ROA. 
2. IC has a significant positive relationship with the market performance of IFIs, based 
on Tobin’s Q. 
3. CEE, HCE, listing status, and firm-opacity are pivotal in determining the IFIs’ 
accounting and market-based performance. 
4. IC helps to sustain profitability of IFIs, measured by ROA at all times i.e. pre- and 
post-crisis period and, therefore, IC is the main value driver for IFIs. 
5. Islamic finance industry is not homogeneous as such since not all institutions, which 
offer Shariah-compliant products, are FFIBs. IFIs can be classified as FFIBs (FFIBs) 
and Shariah-windows1 (Windows). 
                                                 
1
Shariah-windows take different forms. A lively example of Shariah-windows is of HSBC-Amanah, 
which is wholly owned subsidiary of HSBC group but claims to operate distinctly from its mother 
company. Likewise, Maybank Islamic Berhad is a wholly owned subsidiary and the Islamic banking arm 
of Maybank Group. Maybank Islamic Berhad is incorporated in Malaysia, however, it offers through its 
branches Shariah-compliant products and services in several countries such as Bahrain, Pakistan, United 
Kingdom etc.. Another example is Lloyds ‘Islamic Account’ offered by Lloyds Bank, in which Shariah 
approved money management is offered to the clients. The account bears no credit or debit interest and 
has no minimum balance requirement. All such banks are treated as Shariah-windows since they evolve 
simultaneously in Islamic banking but their core business activity is conventional banking business. 
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6. FFIBs possess strong profitability and market valuation at all times. Further 
profitability of FFIBs is manifested by CEE, HCE and firm-complexity, whereas FFIBs’ 
market performance is manifested by CEE, HCE, firm-size, and board-size. 
7. Profitability of Windows is manifested by HCE, whereas firm-size and listing status 
play a pivotal role in determining the market valuation of Windows at all times. 
8. Corporate Governance (CG) features lend little help to sampled IFIs in sustaining 
profitability and market valuation. 
 
2.8 Organisation of Thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters in total. Results are discussed in the context of 
existing relevant literature and empirical studies. 
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents the literature review in 
the area of IC. The chapter provides an insight into the literature on IC.  Firstly, it traces 
the roots of the IC concept by presenting a review of definitions and classification 
frameworks of IC and knowledge management as well as highlighting the importance of 
IC for business enterprises in creating competitive advantage. Then, there is a review of 
empirical studies on IC to date. The Chapter concludes by identifying the research gap 
in the current literature. Additionally, Chapter 2 reviews critically various methods of 
measuring the performance of IC. Appropriate methods for measuring both accounting 
and market performance of IFIs are selected and justified. 
 Chapter 3 describes the phenomenon of Islamic banking and finance. 
Additionally, it establishes, also, the relationship between various sub-components of IC 
viz. human IC, structural IC and financial capital and Islamic way of banking. 
Chapter 4 describes the theoretical framework and presents the research 
hypotheses to be tested. There are three main research hypotheses to be tested in 
relation to the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific characteristics on the IFIs’ 
performance in achieving the first research objective. The fourth research hypothesis is 
related to the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific characteristics on the IFIs’ 
performance before and after the financial crisis, thus, addressing the second research 
objective. The fifth research hypothesis is related to the effects of IC, CG and firm-
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specific characteristics on the performance of FFIBs and Windows; this is the third 
research objective. 
Chapter 5 describes the research method adopted in this study and the research 
design relating to the collection of data, the source of data and the method of analysis. 
The chapter explains this study’s research strategy, sampling method and sources of the 
data respectively. The chapter describes, also, the proxies and measurement of the 
dependent and independent variables and concludes by describing the procedures in 
analysing the panel data for regression models. 
Chapter 6 reports the findings for this study’s first research objective which is to 
investigate the effects of IC efficiency and CG characteristics on the IFIs’ performance, 
while controlling for firm-specific characteristics for the period 2007 to 2011. The 
research considers, also, the effect of IC elements viz. HCE, SCE and CEE respectively 
on the IFIs’ performance (i.e. accounting performance based on ROA and market 
performance based on Tobin’s Q). 
Chapter 7 presents the finding related to the second research question. It 
explains the effects of IC and CG mechanisms on IFIs’ performance before and after the 
financial crisis by dividing the period into pre-crisis (2007–2008) and post-crisis (2010–
2011). 
Chapter 8 reports the findings for this study’s third research objective which was 
to investigate the effects of IC efficiency and CG characteristics on the performance of 
FFIBs and Windows, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics for the period 
2007 to 2011. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes this research and discusses findings from the 
empirical analysis, presented in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, and discusses, also, this study’s 
contributions; suggests recommendations; and highlights the limitations of the research. 
Lastly, it suggests potential areas for future research. 
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Chapter 3:  Intellectual Capital 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a root map of Intellectual Capital Research (ICR) in which the 
various definitions and concepts of IC, sub-components of IC and milestones in the ICR 
are discussed in particular. The chapter provides a comprehensive concept of the IC 
phenomenon as well as the research focus, particularly in services industries e.g. 
banking and finance. Empirical studies on IC, in the context of non-financial and 
financial sectors, are reviewed critically and the research gap is identified. Furthermore, 
different methods of measuring IC performance are reviewed critically and the 
appropriate IC performance measure for this study is selected and justified. 
 
This chapter’s objective is to provide an insight into the literature on IC.  Firstly, in 
section 2.1, it traces the roots of the IC concept by presenting a review of definitions 
followed by classification frameworks of IC in section 2.2. Paradigms of IC are 
explained in section 2.3 and methods of IC measurement are discussed in section 2.4.  
Then, this is followed by a review of empirical studies on IC to date and, in section 2.6, 
the chapter concludes by identifying the research gap in the current literature while 
section 2.7 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
3.1 Intellectual Capital Defined  
The conceptual roots of IC have been rapid and far-reaching (Bontis, 2001). Generally,  
IC means more than just “intellect as pure intellect” but rather incorporating a degree of 
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“intellectual in action” (Hudson, 1993, p. 15). There is no generally accepted definition 
of IC. However, many definitions of IC have been suggested. The underlying concepts 
in these definitions include the notions that IC is something knowledge based, captured 
in an identifiable form, and useful in organizations. 
Stewart and Ruckdeschel (1998) posited that every business relied increasingly 
on knowledge and old-fashioned experience. Added together, this knowledge is IC and 
it can be defined as the sum of everything everybody in the company knows that will 
give the company a competitive edge in the market. According to Hall (1992, p. 136) 
“intangible assets are value drivers that transform productive resources into value added 
assets”. Sveiby (1997) described IC as the knowledge, experience, employee intellect 
and knowledge resources stocked up in an organization's databases system processes, 
culture and philosophy.  
 The value-creating capability of IC is at the crux of these definitions. 
Accordingly, the literature identified various capabilities of IC. Value creation, profit 
generation and knowledge for competitive advantage were among the most commonly 
referred capabilities of IC found in the extent literature and they are discussed further in 
the following section. 
 
3.1.1 IC as Value Creator 
Various authors stressed the value creating capability of IC. For instance, Hall (1992), , 
stated that “intangible assets are value drivers that transform productive resources into 
value added assets (p. 136)”. Wriston (1993, p. 1) argued that “the new source of wealth 
is not material, it is information, knowledge applied to work to create value”. Likewise, 
Brooking (1996) classified  IC as market assets, human-oriented assets, Intellectual 
Property (IP) assets and infrastructure assets that, when combined with an 
organization’s  other productive resources, would lead eventually to value creation and 
increased productivity of a firm (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
Also, later research supported this idea that “intellectual capital is the collection 
of intangible resources and their flows where intangible resource is any factor that 
contributes to the value generating processes of the company” (Bontis et al., 1999, p. 
397).  Heisig et al. (2001, p. 60) opined that "intangibles are defined by their value 
drivers". Rastogi (2003, p. 230) suggested that “IC may properly be viewed as the 
34 
 
holistic or meta-level capability of an enterprise to co-ordinate, orchestrate, and deploy 
its knowledge resources towards creating value in pursuit of its future vision”. 
 
3.1.2 IC as Profit Generator 
On the other hand, many researchers highlighted, also, the profit generation potential of 
intangibles. Stewart and Ruckdeschel (1998) treated IC as intellectual material i.e. 
knowledge, information, intellectual property, experience that could be put to use to 
create wealth. Brennan and Connell (2000, p. 1) considered IC  to be the “knowledge-
based equity of a company” and hence,  “IC is knowledge that can be converted into 
profit (p. 34)”. There is another argument that intangibles or IC assets are non-physical 
claims subject to future benefits. For, instance Lev (2000, p. 5), used the terms 
intangibles, knowledge assets and intellectual capital all referring essentially to the same 
thing “a non-physical claim to future benefits”. 
 
3.1.3 IC Knowledge as Competitive Advantage 
Klein and Prusak (1994) viewed IC as packaged useful knowledge whereas Hudson 
(1993, p. 16) stated that “intellectual capital is the combination of genetic inheritance, 
education, experience and attitudes about life and business”. Likewise, Guthrie and 
Petty (2000) stated that knowledge management is about the management of the 
intellectual capital controlled by a company. Similarly, de Pablos (2003, p. 63) stated 
that "Knowledge based resources that contribute to the sustained competitive advantage 
of the firm form intellectual capital”. Hence, IC is “the possession of knowledge and 
experience, professional knowledge and skills, good relationships, and technological 
capacities, which when applied will give organizations competitive advantage (CIMA, 
2001, p. 2)”. 
Over the past two decades, a common terminology of IC developed and different 
approaches in defining IC were introduced. Over the years, various researchers used 
several terms and concepts of IC to define IC. The term 'intellectual capital' is found 
most commonly in the legal and management literature while the term 'knowledge 
assets' is adopted by economists and 'intangibles' is common in the accounting 
literature. 
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3.2 Components of Intellectual Capital 
Most IC studies agreed that IC was not a unidimensional construct but resided at 
various levels (individual, internal- and external-organization). For example, human IC 
can be viewed as resting in the people employed by an organization (at an individual 
level) while structural IC is latent within the company (at the organizational level). 
The task of constructing a taxonomy of IC implies, also, defining it. Theoretical 
research  by has various authors e.g. Robinson and Kleiner (1996), Roos et al. (1997) 
and Edvinsson and Malone (1997) attempted to define and classify IC, and Sullivan 
(2000) suggested  two categories of IC. 
Robinson and Kleiner (1996) suggested some examples of human capital such as 
know-how, decision-making capabilities, problem solving skills, and learning and 
structural capital i.e. patents, licenses, trademark copyrights, and trade secrets. 
Furthermore, they posited that firms, which had more of these skills and utilised them to 
create value, would be rated as high value firms in the marketplace. 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic Breakdown of Intellectual Capital 
  
Source: Robinson and Kleiner (1996) 
Roos et al. (1997) supported the above view and classified IC into thinking (human 
capital) and non-thinking (structural capital) parts. Sullivan (2000, p. 227) supported, 
also, the view of Robinson and Kleiner (1996)  who equated  IC to knowledge.  
Furthermore, Sullivan (2000, p. 20), suggested that  IC contained basically “knowledge, 
lore, ideas and innovations and subdivides IC into human capital and intellectual assets, 
where human capital refers to people and their knowledge, know-how that are not 
directly commercializable and intellectual assets (new ideas and innovations) that can 
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be transformed into commercializable assets, in which firms have rights of ownership. 
Hence, in Sullivan's view, it is to the advantage of the firms to transform the new 
knowledge and know-how of their human capital into commercializable assets such as 
tangible goods or services and supporting intellectual assets (administration and 
infrastructure)”. 
In the same vein, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development2 (1999) described IC as the economic value of two categories of 
intangible assets of an organization: 
(i) Organizational (Structural) capital; and 
(ii) Human capital 
Edvinsson and Malone (1997) defined IC as the possession of the knowledge, applied 
experiences, organizational technologies, customer relationships, and professional skills 
that provide a competitive edge in the market and an insight about future earning 
capabilities. They viewed IC as being comprised of two primary components: human IC 
(e.g. based around employees who leave the organization at the end of a working day); 
and structural IC (e.g. the embodiment, empowerment, and supportive infrastructure of 
human IC). Due to its diverse components, structural IC is divided further into customer 
IC and organizational IC, in turn, this divides into innovation IC and process IC (e.g.  a 
firm’s relationships with its customers and suppliers). Edvinsson used this defined 
structure for measuring IC at Skandia3 AFS. Similarly, Sveiby (1997, p. 10-11) divided 
IC into three similar dimensions: employee competence; internal structure; and external 
structure. The author posited that: 
 
                                                 
2
Intellectual capital is described as the economic value of two categories of intangible assets of a 
company: organizational capital (e.g. hardware, proprietary software systems, databases, organizational 
structure, distribution networks, supply chains, patents, trademarks and everything else of organizational 
capability that supports those employees productivity) and human capital i.e. human resources within the 
organization and resources external to the organization comprises the combined knowledge, skill, 
innovativeness and ability of the company’s individual employees, company’s values, culture and 
philosophy (OECD, 1999). 
3
Skandia AFS is a Swedish insurance company. Its relevance to the literature of intellectual capital is due 
to the fact that it published the world’s first ever intellectual capital report in 1994. 
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“Employee competence involves capacity to act in a wide variety of situations to 
create both tangible and intangible assets. …internal structure includes patents, 
concepts, models, and computer and administrative systems. …the external structure 
includes relationships with customers and suppliers. It also encompasses brand 
names, trademarks, and the company’s reputation or image”. 
Meritum (2002, p. 63) offered a definition of IC; this defines individually all three 
major elements of IC: (1) human capital which employees take with them when they 
leave the firm; (2) structural capital which stays within the firm at the end of work; and 
(3) relational capital which are all resources linked to the firm’s external relationships. 
Table 2.1 shows a summary of the definitions for the three intellectual capital 
categories. These three forms of IC can be leveraged to create competitive advantage 
and value for stakeholders. At the same time, while the terms, used to describe IC are  
on occasion different, they refer basically to: human capital, the knowledge embedded 
in people; structural capital, the knowledge embedded in the organization and its 
systems; and relational capital, the knowledge embedded in customers and other 
relationships external to the organization (Guthrie et al., 2012, Dumay and Garanina, 
2013). 
 
Table 2.1 
Definition of IC in Three Categories 
Human 
Capital 
The knowledge that employees take with them when they leave the firm. 
Includes the knowledge, skills, experiences and abilities of people. Some 
of this knowledge is unique to the individual, some may be generic. 
Structural 
Capital 
The knowledge that stays within the firm at the end of the working day. 
Comprise the organizational routines, procedures, systems, cultures, 
databases, etc.. Some may be legally protected and become Intellectual 
Property Rights, legally owned by the firm under separate title. 
Relational 
Capital 
All resources linked to the external relationships of the firm, with 
customers, suppliers or R&D partners. Comprises that part of human and 
structural capital involved with the company’s relations with stakeholders 
(investors, creditors, customers, suppliers, etc.) plus the perceptions that 
they hold about the company. 
Source: Meritum (2002) 
Synthesizing the above discussion, there is a broad consensus that IC contains human 
IC, structural IC, and relational IC (See, inter alia, Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson and 
Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; de Pablos 2003). These three forms of IC work together 
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(Stewart, 1997) to enable a firm to transform its knowledge and skills into 
competitiveness and wealth (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Rylander et al., 2000). The 
following section discusses the three broadly accepted elements of IC. 
 
3.2.1 Human Intellectual Capital (Human IC) 
The combination of factors, possessed by a firm’s individuals and the collective 
workforce, is referred to as human IC. This encompasses knowledge, skills, and 
technical ability; personal traits such as intelligence, energy, attitude, reliability, and 
commitment; ability to learn including aptitude, imagination and creativity; and desire 
to share information, participate in a team, and focus on the goals of the firm 
(Abeysekera 2008a). Several authorities recognised human IC as the central component 
of IC (e.g. Roos et al., 1997, Sullivan 2000) reasoning that its extraction created the 
firm’s accumulation of capital (Gates and Langevin, 2010). 
The literature on organizational learning points out that organizations do not 
create knowledge either in or of themselves, but employees do (Chang 2007). Hudson 
(1993, p. 16) treated human IC as “a combination of four factors; genetic inheritance, 
education, experience, and attitudes for creating business value and solving business 
problems”. For example, Stewart and Ruckdeschel (1998, p. 86) viewed human IC  as 
representing what people thought and in their own words;  
“Money talks, but it does not think; machine perform, often better than any human 
being can, but do not invent …primary purpose of human capital is innovation, 
whether of new products and services, or of improving in business processes”. 
Likewise, Edvinsson and Malone (1997) and Sveiby (1997) established that human IC 
incorporated employees’ skills, knowledge and experience which were required to act in 
different situations to create tangible and/or intangible assets. 
Given its nature, human IC is inseparable from its bearer (Mention and Bontis, 
2013) and is neither owned nor fully controlled by the firm (Bontis, 2001). In the same 
vein, Roslender and Fincham (2001) maintained that human IC was a subset of IC  
which encompassed the stock of attributes that a firm’s employees provided in 
exchange for wages and salaries. Human IC includes a range of familiar constituents 
such as training and skills; experience and expertise; ingenuity; commitment; teamwork 
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etc.; attributes referred to previously as human assets or human resources.  Furthermore, 
this view  was supported by the work of Mayo (2001, p. 33)  in  which human IC  was 
referred to as “the people themselves, loaning their personal human capital which 
constitutes their individual capabilities, personal knowledge, experience and 
commitment to the organization”. 
Such individual knowledge, expertise and skills in (Mention and Bontis, 2013, p. 
289) “represent valuable intellectual resources and a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage, provided that firms are able to effectively manage and leverage this 
knowledge and expertise embedded in individuals”. Li et al. (2008)  were of the view 
that human capital was “thinking and doing capital”; this captured the employees’ 
creativity, their knowledge, skills and professional experience. Bontis et al. (2000)  
were concerned that the knowledge, which employees brought  and took with them 
when they joined or  left the firm, could result in the loss of corporate memory and, 
hence, become a threat to the organization. Nonetheless, all intellectual assets are 
maintained and grown by people and without them will wither away (Mayo 2001). 
Hence, people (human IC) are a unique form of asset. They possess their own personal 
capital which they can withdraw from an organization at any time. It is important to 
recognise that human capital is not limited only to employee’s capabilities to solve 
customers’ related problems. Human IC is a broader concept which, in a metaphorical 
way, is a pool of capabilities embedded in an organization’s internal sources (personnel) 
and external sources (i.e. suppliers, distributers and contractors). Consequently, it is 
necessary to ensure that human IC is managed effectively in order to reproduce and 
ideally increase competitive advantage. 
The role of human intellectual capital in the creation of value is well 
acknowledged in the literature. Human IC encompasses all knowledge and 
competencies of a firm’s workforce and by structuring the management and sharing of 
this knowledge, a firm can develop key competencies  which are  difficult to replicate 
and, thereby, gain a sustainable competitive advantage (Gates and Langevin, 2010). 
 
3.2.2 Structural Intellectual Capital (Structural IC) 
Structural capital in Edvinsson and Malone (1997, p. 35) might be described best as 
“the embodiment, empowerment and supportive infrastructure of human capital”. 
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Likewise, Zéghal and Maaloul (2010) posited that structural IC constituted the 
supportive infrastructure that enables human IC to function in an organization. Saint-
Onge (1996) stressed, also, the relationship between human IC and structural IC and 
treated it as a “double-arrow dynamic”, that is, human capital is what builds structural 
capital, and the better the structural capital, the better  the human is likely to be. Thus, 
structural IC can be defined as the knowledge that is created by an organization and 
cannot be separated from the entity (Joshi et al., 2013). Also, Edvinsson and Malone 
(1997) recognized that structural IC was everything else of organizational capability  
which supported employees productivity. 
Structural IC includes all the non-human storehouses of knowledge in 
organizations comprising of all the structures, procedures, routines, administrative 
systems, cultural aspects, and databases that permit an organization to codify, organize, 
and diffuse internally the knowledge and experiences generated by the human IC 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Gates and Langevin, 2010). Stewart and 
Ruckdeschel (1998, p. 108-109) viewed structural IC as: 
 “Knowledge that doesn’t go home at night… It belongs to the organization as a 
whole. It can be reproduced and shared… technologies, inventions, data, 
publications,… [and] strategy and culture, structures and systems, organizational 
routines and procedures…”. 
This implies that subsumed under structural IC is everything that stays within the 
boundary-line of an enterprise at the end of a working day. It consists mainly of 
infrastructure assets and intellectual property which help the organization to exploit the 
IC. It includes all non-human storehouses of knowledge in organizations ranging from 
tangible assets protected by law such as copyrights, patents, databases, trademarks, 
computer and software to corporate culture, trust amongst employees, transparency, 
management processes, information system and all other elements that allow for better 
productivity of employees (de Castro and Sáez, 2008;Joshi et al., 2013). 
 
3.2.3 Relational Intellectual Capital (Relational IC) 
Also referred to as customer capital (Bontis 1998), relational IC is the depth 
(penetration), width (coverage), attachment (loyalty) and profitability of customers 
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(Saint-Onge, 1996). Relational IC integrates the knowledge about relationships with the 
firm’s external partners such as customers, suppliers and local communities (Gates and 
Langevin, 2010); this creates value for the firm through improved market shares, paced 
supply networks, quality assurance and loyalty. 
Mention and Bontis (2013, p. 291) simplified relational IC to be “the ability of a 
firm to create relational value with its external stakeholders. Organizations gain 
manifolds when they build relational IC, e.g. customer and brand loyalty, customer 
satisfaction, market image and goodwill, power to negotiate, strategic alliances and 
coalitions”.  However, Joshi et al. (2013, p. 267) warned that “it is not just important to 
create relational IC. The successful organization should be able to maintain its relational 
IC as well”. 
In other words, customer capital represents the potential which an organization 
has due to ex-firm intangibles (i.e. knowledge embedded in customers, suppliers or 
related industry association) which enables companies to understand what customers 
want in a product or a service which is better than their competitors.  In turn, this means 
working closely with the customers and, then, the company will be more competitive 
than its competitors. 
 
3.3 Paradigms of Intellectual Capital 
IC can be viewed mainly from two different aspects: IC reporting; and IC measurement. 
The following sections discuss the aforementioned. 
 
3.3.1 IC Reporting 
One of the criticisms facing financial accounting framework is that it is inadequate and 
fails to communicate the most important assets and resources of today's business. The 
traditional financial reporting system, based on tangible assets and evaluation of a firm 
performance with tangibles, fails to reflect a wide range of value-creating intangible 
assets, giving rise to increasing information asymmetry between firms and users 
(Rylander et al., 2000, Barth et al., 2001, Holland 2003).  In order to reduce the 
information asymmetry, firms can choose voluntarily to disclose information on 
immaterial assets. 
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 Cañibano et al. (2000) urged for greater voluntary IC disclosure as an 
ehancement of financial reports. The proponents of voluntary IC disclosure argued that 
IC disclosure  was beneficial for several reasons (Williams, 2001; Burgman and Roos, 
2007): 
(i) It mitigates the information asymmetry problem and, hence, the agency problem. 
(ii) It has positive effects on the firm’s external reputation, trust and confidence 
from all stakeholders in the firm’s management. 
(iii) Such disclosure strategy assists a firm to reduce its perceived risk because an 
open disclosure strategy supposedly results in a better assessment of future 
wealth creation capabilities. 
(iv) IC disclosure reduces the firm’s cost of capital.  
In response to the call for increased IC disclosures, a number of studies on the nature 
and extent of IC disclosure in corporate annual reports were conducted in almost all 
parts of the world (see Appendix 2.1 for a summary of these studies). 
 
3.3.2 Measurement of Intellectual Capital 
Specific focus on the measurement of IC was concerned with the creation of 
frameworks, indices and guidelines to support the initial concepts (Sveiby, 1997; Bontis 
et al.; 1999), although none of the above  was developed in accordance with accounting 
principles. Yet, it encouraged the researchers to develop frameworks for IC 
measurement. As a result, various attempts  were made to develop metrics that informed 
strategy formulation and implementation; improved disclosure; benchmarked 
performance; and prediction on future business performance (Marr and Chatzkel 2004). 
Young et al. (2009) opined that intangible assets (IC) were valuable assets which 
determined a firm’s future. Therefore, it is important to measure IC so that the 
information from the measurement can be used in strategic decision making.  However, 
Bukh (2003) stated that IC  was a fragile construct and it  was very complex to measure. 
Catasús et al. (2007) suggested that we had entered into an age of organizational 
measurability whereby measurements had a strong bearing on today's knowledge-
intensive society. Increasing attention on the pivotal role played by IC in the value 
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creation process has resulted in many concepts and measurement models being 
suggested to measure intangibles. 
 
3.3.3 Intellectual Capital and Performance Measurement 
Performance measurement, in Kalbers and Fogarty (1993, p. 75), is a 
“mystery…complex, frustrating, difficult, challenging, important, abused and misused”. 
Nonetheless, it is vital for any firm to measure the performance of all its critical success 
factors to benchmark its market position and to identify its competitive resource base. 
Additionally, performance measures serve as tangible evidence useful not only for 
assessing how well the firm is executing its strategy but, also, for empirically testing the 
strategy (Choi et al., 2013). Markets around the globe have witnessed an industrial shift 
from being capital-intensive to knowledge-based with more intangible resources. The 
traditional performance measures fail to measure and monitor multiple dimensions of 
performance since they concentrate almost exclusively on financial aspects of the 
organisations (Berger and Bouwman, 2013 Dotzel et al., 2013, Chen et al., 2014). 
Therefore, new techniques are necessary to measure the value of intangibles and their 
impact on a firm's performance. 
Traditional firms of the nineteenth into the twentieth century based their 
business on physical capital whereas modern firms of the twenty-first century are based 
on knowledge. Knowledge is today what once were land, manual work and money 
(Pulic, 2004). The traditional mind-set is still buying low and selling high;  this is why 
costs  are subtracted from income so that earnings  can be calculated. The new approach 
defines a business as the organisation that adds value and creates wealth through 
knowledge (Drucker, 1995). That knowledge is embedded deeply in the employees who 
convert it into more or less value depending on their capabilities (Pulic, 2000). In order 
to manage that value creation, modern measuring tools are needed. Drucker (1992) puts 
the ever-increasing measurement dilemma: 
"…a traditional measure is not adequate for business evaluation. A primary 
reason why traditional measures fail to meet new business needs is that most 
measures are lagging indicators. The emphasis of accounting measures has 
been on historical statements of financial performance. They are the result of 
management performance, not the cause of it". 
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In a world where relentless technological change and shortened assets are of profound 
importance, non-financial indicators are essential for characterizing an organization's 
future financial performance (Amaratunga et al., 2001). The traditional financial 
measures fall short in assessing the performance of such firms with high intangible 
resources. Therefore, new techniques are necessary to measure the value of intangibles 
and their impact on a firm's performance. 
 
3.4 Methods of Measuring Intellectual Capital (IC) 
There is no universally accepted method for measuring IC. Nonetheless a few dozen 
measurement methods of IC can be identified in the relevant literature (Andriessen, 
2004; Pike and Roos, 2004; Sveiby 2010). 
Sveiby (2010) listed a total of forty-two methods of measuring intangibles. 
Among them  were the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), the technology 
broker (Brooking, 1996), the Skandia navigator (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997), the 
intellectual capital index (Roos et al., 1997), the intangible asset monitor (Sveiby, 
1997), the economic value added (EVA
TM
) (Stewart and Ruckdeschel, 1998), and the 
VAIC
TM
 (Pulic, 2000; Pulic, 2004). 
There  were early attempts by Luthy (1998) and Williams (2001) to classify the 
various methods of IC measurement. Sveiby (2005) extended the work of  Luthy (1998) 
and  Williams (2001) and suggested that IC measurement approaches fell into four 
categories. This classification tends to involve: the Direct Intellectual Capital (DIC) 
methods; the Market Capitalization Methods (MCM); Return on Assets methods 
(ROA); and the Scorecard Methods (SC). Abeysekera (2008b) proposed, also, a similar 
classification. However, these classifications did not include VAIC
TM
 methodology. 
Chan (2009a) added this approach into the existing classification and rearranged them 
accordingly: 
 Market Capitalization approach (MCM); 
 Direct IC Measurement approach (DIC); 
 Scorecard approach (SC); 
 Economic Value-added (EVATM) approach; and 
 VAICTM Methodology (the Austrian approach) 
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The aforementioned approaches are reviewed and discussed in the following section. 
 
3.4.1 Market Capitalization Approach 
The market capitalization or market to net book value (Sveiby, 1997; Dzinkowski, 
2000) is the most popular and widely known indicator for measuring and reporting IC 
(Abeysekera, 2008b). The market capitalization approach suggests that a firm’s IC can 
be obtained by subtracting the firm’s net asset value from its observable market value. 
Market capitalization approach is based on the accounting paradigm of historical cost 
and balance sheet evaluation. Due to the high volatility in the markets, this approach 
may have problems since a firm’s market value varies on daily basis, and may be 
subject to speculation in the capital market. Firms, with higher-stocks of intangible 
assets, are supposed to possess greater IC because there is a wider gap between their 
market and net book value (Sveiby, 1997). 
Furthermore, the market capitalization approach does not assist managers to 
understand easily what IC is, how it exists or how it influences the dynamics of a 
business  since it does not identify immediately the components of IC (Guthrie et al. 
2001; Sveiby, 2005; Bontis, 2001; Chan, 2009a). Tobin's Q, developed by the Nobel 
Laureate economist, James Tobin, in the 1950’s, IC-Index by Roos et al. (1997), and the 
Market-to-book value approach introduced by Stewart and Ruckdeschel (1998) are the 
most prominent examples of such approaches. 
 
3.4.1.1 Tobin's Q 
The 'Q' was developed by the Nobel Laureate economist, James Tobin, in the 1950’s. 
Tobin’s Q ratio is the ratio of  a firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets 
(Chung and Pruitt, 1994). If the former is higher than the latter, the firm is making a 
higher than normal returns on its investment. Traditionally, technology and human IC 
were associated with high q value. 
The strength of this measure is that it addresses a significant weakness in the 
traditional accounting framework, namely, the measuring of assets using historical costs 
(Stewart and Ruckdeschel, 1998; Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Dzinkowski, 2000; 
Abeysekera, 2008b). 
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 Starovic and Marr (2003) noted that Tobin's Q was argued to be more accurate 
than the market-to-book method because it used replacement rather than historic costs. 
Nonetheless, finding these replacement costs is more difficult than referring simply to a 
balance sheet. Similar to the market or value-based approach, the use of the market 
value as one of its key measures is its weakness. Thus, this measure cannot provide an 
accurate figure for individual intellectual assets.  Its real value lies in trend analysis: if 
the q is falling, either the company is not managing its intellectual assets effectively or 
investor sentiment has moved against it  as cited in Sofian (2004). This argument  was 
supported by Abeysekera (2008b) who asserted that, since the assumptions underlying 
Tobin’s Q indicator  were anachronistic (as they related to the industrial era) and were 
more relevant to tangible than to intangible assets, its use was likely to result in a false 
indication of  a firm’s IC value . 
 
3.4.1.2 Intellectual Capital (IC) Index 
In Bontis (2001, p. 47) “IC-Index is an example of ‘second generation’ practices that 
attempt to consolidate all the different individual indicators into a single index, and to 
correlate the changes in intellectual capital with changes in the market”. Roos et al. 
(1997, p. 80) asserted that the second generation practices still sought  
"To improve the visualization of the value-creating processes of the company so 
that they can be managed comprehensively [but] in effect create a bottom-line 
for IC. This synthesis allows managers to assess the IC situation of a company 
holistically, whereas the first generation practices give information only on the 
single components of intellectual capital”. 
Similar to most other measures of tangible assets “an IC-Index relies on value 
judgements, in the choice of weights, indicators, and even the assumption that IC is 
present and important in company operations” (Bontis 2001, p. 49). Although this 
charge of subjectivity in Andriessen (2004, p. 312) “can also be made of certain 
traditional accounting methods and assumptions”, Roos et al. (1997, p. 83) argued that 
“at least IC measurement and especially a consolidated measure such as the IC-Index 
makes a larger part of the organization visible and open to valuation”. 
On a final note, “because the IC-Index takes past performance into account, it is 
subject to one-off special events, which can have a strong influence on moving the 
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index up or down for some years after the event” as quoted in Bontis (2001, p. 49). In 
contrast, Roos et al. (1997, p. 92) opined that “the IC-Index allows mangers to finally 
understand the effects a particular strategy has on the IC of a company and compare two 
alternatives to understand which one is preferable from an IC point of view”. 
 
3.4.2 Direct IC Measurement Approach 
In this approach, a direct monetary value is assigned to estimate what a firm may 
consider to be individual components of the intangible assets pool (Chan, 2009a). These 
assets are identified and obtained from a series of audit questionnaires. The reporting 
may either take the form of a dollar value or be aggregated as coefficients. Technology 
broker by Brooking (1996) and Citation-weighted patents by Bontis (2001) are some 
examples of the direct IC measurement approach. 
This approach was criticised due to its qualitative nature of the determination 
and identification of  the so-called key intangible assets; this might be highly subjective 
(Bontis et al., 1999; Sveiby, 2005). Bontis (2001)  was of the view that, in the absence 
of a generally agreed upon definition of IC, the DIC measurement approach seemed 
unlikely to become a universal method enabling uniform measurement and comparison 
of companies. 
 
3.4.2.1 Scorecard Approach 
Scorecards are used to generate indicators and may not require the assignment of a 
financial value to the IC components. The qualitative nature of these methods coupled 
with the lack of standardization could be argued to be a potential challenge facing their 
general adoption (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Bontis, 2001; Sveiby, 2005). 
 
3.4.2.2 Economic Value-added Approach (EVATM) 
EVA
TM 
was intended to be a comprehensive measure for studying the performance of 
the whole business. Chan (2009a) argued that, if we accepted the assumption that a 
firm’s increase in EVA resulted only from the effective management of its knowledge 
assets and nothing else, then EVA might seem a reasonable proxy for measuring IC. 
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This is a challenging assumption to accept because tangible assets contribute, also, to 
the wellbeing of an organization as indicated by the resource-based view (Barney, 
1991). IC alone may not function without the support of tangible assets such as stock, 
machinery and financial capital. 
 
3.4.2.3 VAICTM Methodology 
Rather than the historical and objective approach which has characterised financial 
reporting to date, valuation of intellectual capital requires immediate and imprecise 
measures (Chang, 2007). The value added intellectual coefficient (VAIC
TM
), devised by 
the Austrian Intellectual Capital Research Centre (AICRS) under Professor Ante, (Pulic, 
2000) measures the efficiency of key resources in companies. The VAIC methodology  
was widely used internationally and robustly tested (Pulic and Bornemann, 1997; Pulic, 
2000; Pulic, 2004; Ho and Williams, 2003; Goh, 2005; Kamath, 2007; Muhammad and 
Ismail, 2009; Chang and Hsieh, 2011; Joshi et al., 2013) and regarded as a promising 
mechanism for measuring IC. 
Unlike traditional accounting focuses on controlling costs, the VAIC introduces 
a novel concept of ‘corporate intellectual ability' (Pulic, 2004). It refers to the total 
value creation efficiency of a company due to two key resources: 
(i) Capital Employed: consists of financial capital and physical assets; and 
(ii) Intellectual Capital: consists of human IC and structural IC 
 
Figure 2.2: the VAIC
TM
 map 
Source: (Pulic, 2004) 
The basic assumption is that IC alone cannot operate independently without the support 
of, for example, financial and physical capital (Pulic, 2002; Tseng and James Goo, 
2005, Biondi and Rebérioux, 2012). Simply stated, corporate intellectual ability, as 
measured by the VAIC coefficient, is an indicator of a firm’s overall efficiency or 
Capital Employed 
Financial Capital Physical Capital 
Intellectual Capital 
Human Capital Structural Capital 
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ability to use the total resources of capital employed and IC in creating value for the 
company. A higher VAIC value suggests better management utilization of a firm's value 
creation potential (Pulic 2004).  The VAIC
 
methodology provides information about the 
value creation efficiency of tangible and intangible assets within a company. 
The VAIC model assigns explicit economic values, value added (VA) and 
capital employed (CE) to human capital (HC) and structural capital (SC) and, on this 
basis, generates an unambiguous VAIC index. The corporate intellectual ability or 
VAIC is defined as: 
VAIC
TM
 = HCE + SCE + CEE 
Where, 
 ICE = Intellectual Capital Efficiency 
 HCE = Human Capital Efficiency, 
 SCE = Structural Capital Efficiency, and 
 CEE = Capital Employed Efficiency  
The VAIC
 
model measures and monitors the total value creation efficiency in a firm. 
More precisely, the VAIC indicates the total efficiency of value creation from all 
resources employed and reflects the efficiency of value created by the IC employed. 
Thus, VAIC is a relational index in which produced added value is compared to capital 
employed and human capital (i.e. employee expenses). When structural capital is zero 
or negative, VAIC may take zero of negative values. In practice, it is calculated as sum 
of the ratios of value added to capital employed and human capital as employee 
expenses (Ståhle et al., 2011). 
 Ho and Williams (2003) and Chan (2009a) advocated the use of VAIC 
methodology and opined that “necessarily, the verifiability of the data gathered for the 
measurements and compilation of the indicators is likely to receive as much attention as 
the general acceptability of the conceptual model and derivation on which the 
methodology is based. For example, all the data needed for the computation of VAIC 
may be found in a firm’s audited financial reports. This enhances the objectivity of the 
computation, and is easily verifiable (p. 36)”. 
The VAIC model uses values from profit and loss statements and statements of 
financial position “to measure if there is any value adding occurring in a firm that can 
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be attributed to and stemming from its development of IC (Joshi et al. 2013)”. The 
strengths of VAIC  are that (Roos et al., 1997; Bontis et al., 1999; Sullivan, 2000; Firer 
and Williams, 2003; Goh, 2005; Tseng and James Goo, 2005); 
- It is easy to calculate; 
- It is consistent; 
- It provides standardized measure, thus, allowing comparison between industries 
and economies; 
- Data are provided by financial statements that are more reliable than 
questionnaires; 
- It does not require sophisticated accounting knowledge and expertise to use or 
understand; 
- It uses component factors that match well with many commonly accepted 
definitions of IC; and 
- It can be applied to any size of organization. 
The VAIC model of efficiency measurement was challenged by recent studies. Chang 
(2007) modified VAIC methodology by adding R&D expenditure and intellectual 
property (IP) components into VAIC whilst measuring IC. Chang (2007) reasoned that 
the sub-component of VAIC –SC efficiency might be incomplete since it did not take 
into consideration R&D expenses and intellectual property. Nowadays, R&D 
expenditures and intellectual property assets (Brooking 1996) play important roles in 
business. Therefore, those R&D expenses and intellectual property assets should be 
viewed as asset-like investments (Chang, 2007). Various authors outlined the 
advantages and limitations of VAIC as an IC measurement tool (see inter alia Bontis et 
al., 2000; Pulic, 2000; Ho and Williams, 2003; Pulic, 2004; Andriessen, 2004; 
Maditinos et al., 2011; Ståhle et al., 2011); these are summarized in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 
Strengths and weaknesses of VAIC
TM
 Methodology 
 
Advantages of VAIC
TM
 Methodology 
 
Limitations of VAIC
TM
 Methodology 
“VAIC methodology highlights the week areas 
requiring intervention (Pulic 2000). 
VAIC fails to measure IC in firms with negative book 
value or negative operating profit (Chu et al. 2011). In 
other words VAIC model does not generate valuable 
analysis in companies which have their input more 
than their output, and as a result, their productivity is 
low. 
VAIC produces quantifiable, objective and 
quantitative measurements without the requirement of 
any subjective grading and awarding of scores or 
scales. It aids further computation and statistical 
analysis of a large sample size that may run into 
thousands of data items collected over a period of 
time. 
The VAIC may not sufficiently identify the 
synergistic effects for value creation from interactions 
of different forms of capital (Andriessen 2004). 
Although the model depicts clearly how much each 
component (among human capital, structural capital, 
and capital employed) contributes to value-added. 
However, there may be interactions among the 
components of IC (Bontis et al. 2000), and so it may 
not be possible to calculate exactly the contribution to 
value creation from each resource. For instance, 
advances in IT or computer automation (which is an 
element of structural capital) could sometimes 
enhance labour productivity (which might then be 
interpreted as an increase in human capital 
efficiency). Therefore one may not be able to isolate 
the weighting of each factor in facilitating an increase 
in HCE, SCE, or CEE. 
VAIC provides indicators that are relevant, useful and 
informative to all stakeholders, but not just 
shareholders, and with which they may also identify 
and compare the key components of IC in order to 
assess company performance. 
VAIC approach involves an unsettled conception of 
IC capitalization via its components of human and 
structural capital (Ståhle et al. 2011). 
VAIC uses financially oriented measures so that any 
indicators, relations or ratios computed may be used 
for comparison along with traditional financial 
indicators commonly found in business, which are 
based on monetarily derived units or measures. 
VAIC methodology disregards the level of company 
risk, which is one of the most important factors 
determining company and IC value (Maditinos et al. 
2011). 
VAIC uses relatively simple and straightforward 
procedures in the computation of the necessary 
indexes and coefficients, which may be simple to 
understand, especially for management and business 
people who are accustomed to traditional accounting 
information. 
R&D and Intellectual property (IP) both are omitted 
from VAIC model. R&D expenditure and IP are 
positively related with firms’ market value and 
profitability, suggesting R&D expenditure and IP may 
capture additional information on IC (Chang 2007). 
VAIC produces a form of standardized measurement. 
The indicators or indexes computed may be 
consistently applied to and used for comparison 
across divisional, company, industry and national 
level. In other words, benchmarking may therefore be 
possible. 
 
VAIC makes use of public or published financial data 
so that it may enhance the reliability of the 
measurement, and improve data availability. 
VAIC provides an IC measurement system that is 
consistent with the stakeholder view and resource-
based view by using a value added approach. 
VAIC treats human capital or employees as the most 
important source of IC, which is consistent with all 
major IC definitions found in the literature.” 
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The above-mentioned critics initiated a debate as to whether the VAIC method was 
appropriate for measuring IC. Nonetheless, at this point in time, there exists no perfect 
method for measuring IC. These critics suggested, also, that future researchers ought to 
consider the introduction of other control factors and efficiency determinants; this might 
help in producing more precise and accurate results. 
Despite the inherent limitations of VAIC as a method of measuring IC discussed 
above, the simplicity, subjectivity, reliability and comparability of VAIC make it an 
ideal measure for the context of the present research as this study is intended to make an 
original contribution to the existing IC literature by analysing the IC performance of 
IFIs operating in various geographical locations around the globe. The study aimed, 
also, to compare the IC performance of various types of IFIs i.e. FFIBs and Windows 
competing in the same markets. 
 
3.5 Empirical Studies on Intellectual Capital 
The empirical IC research can be divided into IC disclosure and IC measurement. The 
available literature on both streams is reviewed in the following sections. 
 
3.5.1 IC Reporting 
A significant amount of IC research is cross-sectional and has been concerned with 
gauging the extent to which it exists in organizations. It explains that IC is present in 
firms, where there is an association between IC elements and that IC has to be 
contextualized by other resources including physical and financial ones. Analysing 
firms' annual reports in various parts of the world, cross-sectional research has 
examined organizations’ IC disclosure patterns (Murthy and Mouritsen 2011). 
 
3.5.2 IC and Performance 
 IC is acknowledged widely as “the most important source of value creation and 
competitive advantage (Mention and Bontis, 2013, p. 286)”. Competitive success is 
based now less on the strategic allocation of physical and financial resources and more 
on the strategic management of IC (Al-Ali, 2003; Tseng and James Goo, 2005; Holland 
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2010). However, the empirical evidence on the actual contribution of IC to the 
dynamics of the value creation process remains scarce in certain sectors i.e. Islamic 
banking and finance and geographical regions i.e. emerging economies.  Furthermore, 
Guthrie et al. (2012) contested that value  was no longer measured solely on the basis of 
financial outcomes and they suggested that value of activities that developed knowledge 
resources  ought to be taken into account when measuring a firm value. They reasoned 
further that such an approach would help us to understand how people, internal 
processes and external relationships contributed to value creation, leading us to the 
challenge how to identify, measure and report on the value of our knowledge resources. 
Research on the relationship between IC and performance has focussed on 
various industries such as IT (e.g. Wang and Chang, 2005; Chang, 2007; Seleim et al., 
2007); biotechnology (Hermans and Kauranen, 2005); pharmaceuticals (Sharabati et al., 
2010; Pal and Soriya, 2012); and manufacturing (Tseng and James Goo, 2005). Given 
the expanding services sector, there has been an increasing interest in this sector in 
general and, also, in the financial institutions specifically (see inter alia Murthy and 
Mouritsen, 2011, Mention and Bontis, 2013, Chen et al., 2014).  The  banking sector 
has experienced a dynamic and competitive environment due to globalization of 
economies and has grown as a knowledge concentrated sector (Mavridis, 2004). Marr 
and Adams (2004) argued that intangible assets were embedded in physical assets and 
considerable interactions between both types of assets created value. Likewise, Goh 
(2005) and Murthy and Mouritsen (2011) recognised the importance of physical capital 
but, nevertheless, argued that it was IC which determined the quality of services 
provided to customers, particularly in the banking sector. Moreover, the banking sector 
is a model sector for research on IC issues because the basic nature of the banking 
business is knowledge intensive (El-Bannany, 2008) and the entire banking sector staff 
is intellectually more identical (Kubo and Saka, 2002) and consistent than perhaps any 
other service or business industry in any economy (Chen et al., 2014). However, 
studies, conducted within the financial sector, have shown mixed evidence about the 
relationship between IC and the banks’ overall performance. 
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3.5.2.1 Empirical Studies on IC Performance Measurement in Non-financial 
Sectors 
Murthy and Mouritsen (2011, p. 626) maintained that “interactions between the 
elements of IC are noteworthy, yet, there are many variations on this model in the 
literature. Sometimes not all IC elements play a role because certain combinations of 
elements will favour either a human cantered or a technology cantered organization”. 
Therefore, Johnson (2002, p. 419) suggested that “it may be counter-productive to 
measure all intellectual capital because sometimes the elements are highly involved in 
mediating managers’ concerns but not always with similar and predictable effects”. 
Correspondingly, Käpylä et al. (2012), in an attempt to examine the overall performance 
of a knowledge society, constructed a multidimensional performance measurement 
system to measure the national IC of Finland. The study demonstrated the importance of 
IC and stressed that IC ought to be measured from different perspectives such as 
strategic, dialogic and societal and not rely on a single measure. 
Hermans and Kauranen (2005) empirically tested the impacts of IC to the 
anticipated future sales of SMEs within the biotechnology industry in Finland. The 
authors adopted a definition of IC (MERITUM Project, 2002) that theoretically regards 
IC as a composite of human IC, structural IC, and relational IC. The empirical evidence 
was gathered from 72 bio-tech firms through telephone interviews. The study found that 
the interactions between the three categories of IC explained two-thirds of the variance 
in the anticipated future sales of the sample firms. The study concluded that a well-
balanced combination of human IC, structural IC, and relational IC implied value 
creation potential and high anticipated future sales. Tseng and James Goo (2005) 
investigated how to apply the concept of IC to value creation. The authors classified IC 
constructs into human IC, organizational IC, innovation IC and relational IC and 
employed IC perspective, resource-based view and a financial perspective to investigate 
the Taiwanese manufacturing sector. The study concluded that human IC exerted a 
positive influence on organizational, innovation and relational IC, with the latter two 
directly affecting corporate value. 
 Cuganesan (2005) investigated how IC information was related loosely and 
fluidly to managerial and corporate concerns. Based on a single in-depth case-study, the 
author found ties between the elements of IC to be transient. Likewise, Seleim et al. 
(2007) confirmed that the relationship between human capital and firms' performance 
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after empirically surveying the Egyptian software industry. These claims were 
supported further by Sharabati et al. (2010), who empirically tested the association 
between all three main components of IC viz. human IC, structural IC, relational IC and 
business performance within the Jordanian pharmaceutical firms. Evidence was 
gathered though a survey extended to 132 managers representing Jordan’s association of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. The study demonstrated that human capital had a 
positive and significant direct impact on business performance. 
Although there was no denial about the significance of these studies in the early 
literature on IC, these studies did not provide, however, any surprising results. Most of 
these studies focused on high-tech industries, where both human and organisational IC 
was expected to be the main value driver and these studies found the same. Secondly, 
these studies were county specific and, hence, generalising the findings of these studies 
is not practical. Lastly, these studies did not explain if IC had any impact on the 
economic performance of these firms. Nonetheless, there were a handful studies which 
measured the effect of IC on the business performance of various organisations.  The 
following section reviews these studies in chronological order. 
 
3.5.2.2 Empirical Studies on IC Performance Measurement in Financial Sector 
The classical authorities on IC research stressed that it was vital for knowledge-rich 
firms to measure their IC efficiency (Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson and Malone ,1997; 
Roos et al., 1997; Stewart and Ruckdeschel, 1998). The empirical examination of the 
relationship between IC and firm performance is particularly important in the banking 
sector  since the financial sector  has a concentration of intellectually rich knowledge 
(Chen et al., 2014).  The financial sector is considered to be the backbone of any 
country's economy whereby banks are considered to be the financial lubricant runners 
as they provide intermediation services to stimulate economic growth. Berger et al. 
(2010) explained that banks  accepted deposits from those in surplus and transferred 
these resources to those in deficit i.e. the borrowers and, hence, play a vital role in 
resource allocation
4
. Arguably, the economic growth of a country can be influenced by 
                                                 
4
Chen et al. (2014, p. 563-4) cited that “traditional theoretical models of banks as financial intermediaries 
indicate that they help in reducing the friction of transaction costs (e.g. Benston and Smith, 1976) and 
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the performance of its banks. Hence, the performance of an economy’s other business 
organisations are dependent upon the services provided by the banking sector. 
Therefore, it is important to examine to what extent banks are capable of utilizing their 
intangible or intellectual assets. 
The banking sector around the globe has grown as knowledge concentrated 
sector since it has experienced a dynamic and competitive environment due to 
globalisation of economies, technological changes and deregulation. Driven by the 
globalisation of goods and financial markets, bank activities have changed greatly 
(Wilson et al., 2010). In response to these radical changes, banks have developed 
various business models in response to the increasing competition. In the International 
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC 2011, p. 1), the business model is defined as “the 
organisation’s chosen system of inputs, business activities, outputs and outcomes that 
aims to create value over the short, medium and long term”. These models consist of 
“various integrated, interacting elements designed for value creation and matched to 
their competitive environment (Chen et al. 2014, p. 564)”. Stewart and Ruckdeschel 
(1998) opined that value creation in the banking industry depended more on intangible 
assets than the physical assets and often these assets were recognized as IC (Bontis 
1998). 
In the last decade, a handful of studies reported empirical evidence on IC 
performance of the financial sectors around the globe. Figure 2.3 illustrates the focus of 
IC performance studies in the financial sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
information asymmetry by acting as delegated monitors between lenders and borrowers (e.g. Diamond, 
1984)”. 
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Figure 2.3 
Summary of IC Performance Studies in the Financial Sector 
 
Sources: Researcher 
An early research by Pulic (Pulic, 1997, 2002 & 2004) on Austrian, Croatian, and 
Australian banks revealed the importance of IC in the financial sector. The research 
results highlighted the fact that there was a strong interaction between IC and 
organizational corporate success. Pulic's research demonstrated that banks with higher 
expenditures on IC components were more profitable and had better financial 
performance. Pulic and Bornemann (1997)  were the first to study the impact of IC in 
the banking industry. Their study measured the IC performance of the 24 largest 
Austrian banks for the year 1993-1995. They concluded that the increase of efficiency 
in IC was the simplest, cheapest and most secure way to ensure sustainable success and 
the most important resource of corporate success. Pulic (2002) measured the IC 
performance of Croatian banks for the year 1996-2000 using VAIC
TM
 as a 
methodological tool. The study revealed significant differences in the banks’ ranking 
positions based on efficiency and performance. 
Focus of IC Performance Studies 
Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Europe and Australia 
(Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Croatia, Italy, Finland, Greece, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, UK) 
 
e.g. Pulic and Bornemann (1997); Pulic (1997, 
2000 & 2002); Kujansivu and Lonnqvist 
(2004); Bontis, 1997; Cabrita and Jorge (2005); 
Saenzs (2005); Yalama and Coskun (2007); 
Williams (2000); Williams (2001); El-Bannany 
(2008): Australia, e.g. Pulic (2004); Murthy and 
Mouritsen (2011); Joshi et al. (2010 & 2013). 
 
Asia and Middle East 
(Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, 
Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Thailand) 
e.g. Mohiuddin et al. (2006); Kamath (2007);  
Sharma and Mani (2012); Mondal and Gosh 
(2012); Mavridis (2004); Bontis (1998); 
Bontis et al. (2000); Goh (2005); Abdul Latif 
and Fauziah (2007); Hazlina and Zubaidah 
(2008); Nik Maheran et al. (2009); Ting and 
Lean (2009); (Makki and Lodhi (2008); 
Rehman et al. (2011); Latif et al. (2012); 
Appuhami (2007); El Bannany (2011). 
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In Japan, Mavridis (2004) analysed 141 Japanese banks for the period 2000 to 
2001. The author focused on the actual status of human capital (HC) and physical 
capital (CE) and its impact on the 'intellectual' added value-based performance. The 
study found a significant positive relationship between value added and CE. 
Furthermore,  Mavridis (2004) revealed that the best performing banks  were those who 
mainly had good results in utilizing their IC particularly, human capital and less in the 
usage of their financial capital. In another study, Mavridis and Kyrmizoglou (2005) 
investigated the effect of  HC and  CE  on the Greek banking sector using VAIC method 
for the period 1996 to1999.  They reported that, as compared to CE, HC was more 
important as compared to value creation for banks. Likewise, in Spain, Sáenz (2005) 
found a clear positive relationship between HC indicators and market-to-book ratio. 
However, the study found no association between HC indicators and financial returns. 
In the similar vein, Goh (2005) measured the IC performance of Malaysian 
commercial banks for the years 2001 to 2003, using VAIC
TM
 methodology. The result 
showed that value creation capability of Malaysia’s commercial banks was largely 
attributed to human capital efficiency. This means investment in human IC yields a 
relatively higher return than investments in physical and structural IC. The author 
demonstrated, also, that foreign banks were more efficient than Malaysia’s domestic 
banks but, in terms of value creation, domestic banks outperformed their foreign 
counterparts. A later study by Ting and Lean (2009) endorsed these claims. The authors 
examined the relationship between IC and financial performance of Malaysian financial 
institutions for the years 1999-2007. Using the same methodological tool, the empirical 
findings revealed that a significant positive relationship between VAIC and return on 
assets. Moreover, the study found that the profitability of the sampled banks was 
manifested mainly by HC and CE efficiency whereas a negative association between SC 
efficiency and financial performance was observed. 
 Accordingly, it was concluded that VAIC indicated efficiency in creating 
corporate value or the extent of corporate intellectual ability. In other words, an increase 
in value creation efficiency has a positive influence on a firm’s profitability. Therefore, 
it is necessary to maximize the utilization of resources, specifically IC, for financial 
institutions in order to maximize profit. 
In contrast, Cabrita et al. (2007), surveyed 53 affiliated members of the 
Portuguese Bankers Association using a questionnaire and provided empirical evidence 
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that IC  was substantively and significantly related to the organizational performance in 
the Portuguese banking industry. Such strong association between IC efficiency and 
banks' performance was witnessed and reported, also, from Turkey and Thailand. In 
Turkey, Yalama and Coskun (2007) examined the impact of VAIC on bank's 
profitability and revealed that IC was a more important factor than CE (physical and 
financial capital) for banks listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market. In Thailand, 
Saengchan (2008) studied the relationship between IC capability and financial 
performance of Thai commercial banks for the period 2000 to 2007. The study 
confirmed that IC acted as a major source of corporate advantage to Thai banks since 
efficiency of IC was associated strongly with the banks’ profitability. Also, the study 
concluded that IC ought to be recognized as one of the major investments in driving the 
firm’s sustainable growth. These findings were  consistent with those of BA Ranjith 
Appuhami (2007), who found that firms’ IC  had a significantly positive relationship 
with its investors’ capital gains and shares. The findings enhanced the knowledge base 
of IC and development of competitive advantages in emerging economies like Thailand. 
In India, Kamath (2007) estimated and analysed the VAIC measuring the value-
based performance of Indian banking sector for the years 2000 to 2004. The results 
showed that foreign banks were the top performers in HC efficiency while public sector 
banks were the top performers in CE efficiency. The study reported, also, vast 
differences in the performance of Indian banks in different segments. The author 
concluded that India’s public sector banks seemed to have created the huge baggage of a 
large and inefficient work force which does not contribute anything to overall value 
creation. In the UK, El-Bannany (2008) applied variables to study the IC performance 
of UK banks for the years 1999-2005. The study found that investments in IT systems, 
banks' efficiency, barriers to entry and efficiency of investments in IC variables had a 
significant impact on IC performance. In a cross-border comparison, Young et al. 
(2009) studied the Asian banks of eight economies and found that  CE and HC were the 
main factors  which had created value for the banks. 
Mondal and Ghosh’s (2012) later study suggested that firms' IC was vital for 
their competitive advantage. However, the study found little evidence on the 
relationships between a bank's IC and financial performance indicators namely: 
profitability and productivity. The authors demonstrated, also, that, when the measure of 
IC was classified into major components, HCE played a major role in enhancing the 
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banks’ returns. This suggests that an increase in HC investment enhances the banks 
financial performance and is consistent with the earlier findings of Goh (2005) in 
Malaysia. Also, Sharma and Mani (2012) did a comparative analysis of the HCE of 
India’s private and public banks for the years 2005-2010 and found that, in the period 
under study, public banks made good progress in HCE performance. These findings 
were consistent with those of Mohiuddin et al. (2006) who examined the IC 
performance of 17 commercial banks in Bangladesh from 2002 to 2004. Their key 
finding was that all the banks in the study had higher HCE than other capital 
efficiencies. Joshi et al. (2010) reported similarly that Australian banks had relatively 
higher HCE than CEE efficiency and SCE efficiency. Joshi et al.’s recent study (2013) 
in the same sector re-confirmed these claims. Likewise, Mention and Bontis (2013) 
argued that, based on the questionnaire survey of both the Belgian and Luxemburg 
banking sectors, human IC contributed both directly and indirectly to business 
performance in the banking sector. 
While the above studies were quantitative in nature, there were some recent 
studies which were qualitative in nature.  For instance, Murthy and Mouritsen (2011) 
analysed the relationship between IC and financial capital using a case study approach. 
The authors stated that the relationships between IC and financial capital were 
challenging to specify because they were complementary rather than causal. 
Furthermore, financial capital is not only an effect but, also, an important input because 
the development of IC takes place through the firm’s budgeting processes. Whereas 
Chen et al. (2014, p. 585) concluded that “an appropriate combination and interaction of 
intangibles and tangible/financial resources provides the means to improve the 
processes of financial intermediation, information intermediation and risk management 
in banks”. The study sorted evidence via interviews with analysts and bank managers 
based in the UK. 
 
3.6 Research Gap 
In summary, the mentioned above studies examined the impact of IC and its 
components on business performance as measured by the firm’s market valuation, 
profitability, productivity, return on equity, etc.. These studies reported a varying degree 
of linkages between IC and performance. Moreover, there was mixed evidence about 
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the relationship between IC and the firms' overall performance was documented. The 
empirical evidence on contributions of three IC components viz. human capital (HC), 
structural capital (SC) and physical capital (CE) respectively in the total Value Added 
(VA) was, also, shallow. Hence, further research is needed to examine such 
relationships in order to gather concrete empirical evidence in support of the claim that 
IC is associated positively with business performance. Although a significant number of 
studies examined the effect of IC on firms' performance, most studies are, as yet, 
country specific. It would be interesting to compare different financial sectors across the 
globe and empirically examine their efficiency in utilizing IC to create value. In the 
absence of any empirical study on Islamic finance, examining the effects of IC on 
performance of such institutions may enhance further our knowledge in this potential 
and, as yet, unexplored area. 
Other emerging factors related to the methodology, sources of data acquisition 
and control variables. Some researchers adopted surveys/questionnaires or case study 
techniques for data collection while others used a combination of questionnaires and 
supplemented it with financial data analysis. However, most of the studies relied 
exclusively on financial data and used VAIC as a measurement tool for independent 
variables with a varying degree of dependent and control variables. These studies 
adopted different regression models to examine the impact of IC on firms' business 
performance i.e. profitability (measured by ROA/ROE) and market valuation (measured 
by market-to-book value and Tobin’s Q). In a nutshell, authors tended to hypothesise 
that IC was associated positively with business performance but the empirical evidence 
was insufficient to support this argument. Nevertheless, it is clear that VAIC is a 
popular method of IC measurement when using secondary/numerical (financial) data. 
The widespread use of the VAIC model across continents and various industrial sectors 
supports this argument. 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter documented an insight into the literature on the concept, creation, leverage, 
and commercialisation of IC. The chapter highlighted how IC was an important 
resource which ought to be managed in order to sustain or achieve competitive 
62 
 
advantage. The relationship between IC and knowledge management was highlighted, 
also. Hence, providing a foundation upon which this research would be built. 
Additionally, the chapter provided a review of empirical studies on IC by 
dividing them into 1) IC disclosure studies and 2) IC performance studies. Most of the 
empirical literature, reviewed in this chapter, reflected the general state of IC disclosure 
and measurement which had been researched during the last two decades. The literature 
review, covered particularly in this chapter, related to IC performance studies; these 
allowed some conclusions to be drawn and the research problem and research gap in the 
existing literature to be identified. 
Empirical studies remained to focus mainly on high-tech industries i.e. IT, 
pharmaceutical etc. and paid only scant attention to the financial services sector. 
Furthermore, the studies, conducted in the context of conventional financial institutions, 
provided mixed evidence on how IC affected the performance of these institutions. 
Therefore, it is imperative to study the link between IC and business performance of the 
financial institutions. Equally, much of the extant research on IC focused on nations 
with a strong tradition of knowledge intensity i.e. European countries, Australia and the 
Americas. Most of the IFIs operate in the developing economies. Consequently, there 
exists no study as such that examines the effects of IC on IFIs’ performance. This left a 
huge gap in the literature which this study aimed to fill. 
 In conclusion, given the divergent views in the literature, the issue of the effects 
of IC and CG-features on the economic performance of financial institutions, the 
magnitude of these effects, and how they might differ across time horizons i.e. pre and 
post the financial crisis boils down to an empirical question. This is one that the 
researcher confronts in this study. Against this background, the next Chapter establishes 
the missing connection between IC and the Islamic way of banking. 
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Chapter 4:  Mechanics of Islamic Banking and Finance 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In order to comprehend the relationship between IC and Islamic finance, one must 
understand firstly the mechanics of Islamic finance. Hence, this chapter’s primary 
objective is to define the phenomenon of Islamic banking and finance by tracing its 
roots in the Islamic religion. Secondly, the chapter explains the functioning of an 
Islamic bank by defining the basic principles of Islamic banking and finance, and 
exposes the difference between the Islamic and conventional banking systems. Finally, 
it describes the key modes of Islamic finance and emphasises the relationship between 
Islamic banking and IC 
 
Section 3.1 highlights the Islamic worldview while section 3.2 defines the phenomenon 
of Islamic banking and finance. Section 3.3 describes the instruments of Islamic 
finance. Section 3.4 reviews the existing literature and section 3.5 identifies the research 
gap. The final section provides the summary of this chapter. 
 
4.1 The Islamic Worldview 
Abdullah and Nadvi (2011, p. 269-70) opined that “a worldview is generally understood 
as a set of beliefs about fundamental aspects of Reality that ground and influence all our 
perceiving, thinking, knowing, and doing”. In contrast, the Islamic worldview is 
“basically a theistic and ethical worldview which contrasts sharply with the secularist or 
atheistic alternatives”. There is no bifurcation or the world or duality in the Islamic 
worldview. The Islamic worldview is based on three pillars 1) Allah (the God –one and 
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only); 2) Qur’an –the world of Allah; and 3) Hadith –the sayings, approvals, and actions 
of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in his lifetime (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2002). 
The individual and societal life of a Muslim is governed by certain sets of rules 
defined in Shariah
5
. Islam makes no distinction between religion and daily life. 
According to the Islamic belief, the Qur’an is a complete code for human life. The 
guidelines, provided in Shariah, are not subject to religious matters alone; it gives 
advice on all aspects of human life. Therefore, Islam may be perceived as comprising of 
three basic elements or sets of rules. The first set of rules –known as Aqida (faith) is 
subject to the core relationship between man and his Creator (Allah/God). It is 
concerned with all forms of faith and belief by a Muslim in Allah alone and His will. 
Like any ordinal structure, the stability and strength of Islam is founded on five pillars 
(see Ayub, 2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011) namely: Shahada
6
 (the Profession of Faith), 
Salat
7
 (Daily Prayer), Zakah
8
 (Almsgiving), Sawm
9
 (Fasting), and Hajj
10
 (Pilgrimage). 
The second set –Akhlaq (morals and ethics) is concern with behaviour, attitude, and 
work ethics according to which a Muslim lives in society. The third and final set of 
rules is concerned with transforming and manifesting the faith and beliefs into action 
and daily practices –formally known as Shariah. 
 
 
                                                 
5Formally ‘Shariah Islami’ah’ but generally abbreviated to Shariah or Shaira. An Arabic word, it literally 
means “the way to the source of life”. Shariah is referred to as a legal system in keeping with the code of 
behavior called for by the Qur’an and Sunnah (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001, p. 37). 
6
The profession of faith is the prerequisite for membership of the Muslim community. In order to embrace 
Islam, one must profess and act upon this belief in the Oneness of Allah known as Tawhid and the 
prophet-hood of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 
7
Refers to the five-time daily prayers (at different intervals of the day) an adult Muslim is obliged to 
perform, preceded by ritual cleansing or purification of the body. 
8
A religious levy or obligation; it is an Arabic word which literally means to purify. 
9
The conduct of fasting during Ramadan (entire month) which is the 9
th
 month of the 12-month Islamic 
lunar year. 
10
Hajj refers to the pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca (situated in Saudi Arabia). Unlike 
aforementioned obligations (pillars), which every Muslim must perform, Islam obliges those who have 
the financial and physical ability to perform Hajj at least once in a lifetime. Hajj must take place during 
the 12
th
 lunar month – Dzuhajjah, where certain set and detailed sequence of rituals must be practiced 
over the span of several days in and around the city of Mecca. 
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Figure 3.1 
Islamic Worldview and Sources of Shariah 
 
Source: Adopted from Haniffa and Hudaib (2002) 
Shariah, being the practical aspect, provide guidelines on everyday life.  Furthermore, it 
is divided into two components.  The first is Ibadat (worship); this is subject to the 
practicalities of ways to perform rites and rituals. It recognizes the relationship between 
man-and-God –to be judged in the hereafter.  The second is Muamalat (transactions or 
man-to-man activities). This includes rules to govern social, political, and economic 
activities. The conduct of economic activities within the economic system, which 
includes the rules for commercial, financial and banking system means that Islamic 
banking is a part of this system. Hence, banking and finance activities can be traced 
through the economic activities, back to daily life dealings, to Shariah and, finally, to 
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4.1.1 Shariah – the Intangible Ideology of Islamic Finance 
The entire structure of Islamic banking and finance is built around the spirit and 
principles of Shariah; the practice of Islamic banking is covered in the empirical 
chapters. In Visser (2013), Shariah is an Arabic word which means literally “the way to 
a watering place” or “the path that leads to the spring (p. 10)”. Figuratively, it means a 
clear path to be observed and followed by the whole Ummah
11
 as manifested  in the will 
of Allah
12
  and as revealed to mankind through His Messenger, the Prophet Mohammad 
(PBUH). Shariah is simply a code of law or divine injunctions  which regulate the 
conduct of human beings in their personal and collective lives (Ayub 2009). 
Before tracing the origin of Shariah ideology, its relevance to the Islamic 
religion, its sources and its objectives, it is imperative to identify the sources of 
knowledge in Islam. In Ahmed (2011b), sources of knowledge in Islam were divided 
into revealed and derived. The former is classified further into the recited revelation 
(Qur’an) and the non-recited revelation (Sunnah). Both Qur’an and Sunnah constitute 
the primary sources of Islamic principles and rulings. In contrast, the latter is developed 
by human intellect through the process of exertion or independent reasoning. Together 
these sources are discussed under the intellectual sources of Shariah. 
 
4.1.1.1 Sources of Shariah 
Shariah is the Islamic law which springs from various sources. These sources can be 
subdivided into primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include Qur’an and 
Sunnah while Ijtihad (independent reasoning), Ijma (consensus), and Qiyas (analogical 
reasoning) are said to be the secondary sources. 
 
                                                 
11
 The Arabic term referring to the nation of Islam whereby each member has to submit that sovereignty 
belongs to Allah alone. It also refers to “a vast homogeneous commonwealth of people who have a 
common goal and destiny and who are guided by a common ideology in all matters spiritual and temporal 
(kettell, 2011, p. 3)”. 
12
 This is nn Arabic word that stands for God. The most concise definition of Allah can be traced in the 
Qur’an (112:1-4) “Say, He is Allah , [who is] One. Allah, the Eternal Refuge. He neither begets nor is 
born. Nor is there to Him any equivalent." From an Islamic standpoint, everything (all the wealth) 
belongs to God and man is only a trustee. Further the Qur’an (20: 6) states, “To Him (God) belongs that 
is in the heavens and all that is on the earth, and all that is between them, and all that is under the soil”. 
Shariah explicitly emphasize on the fact that Allah is the Law Giver and the Ummah enjoys a derivative 
rule-making power and not an absolute law-creating prerogative (Ayub, 2009). 
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Primary Sources of Shariah  
The primary source of the divine law Shariah is the revelation of the holy Qur’an13 and 
Sunnah
14
 (Ayub, 2009). Qur’an is considered to be more accurate and authentic than 
Sunnah the second primary source of Shariah (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). The major 
difference between Qur’an and Sunnah is that “Qur’an is the word of God and it was 
recorded in writing from beginning to the end during the lifetime of the Prophet, and he 
ascertained that Qur’an was preserved, as he received it, through divine revelation”. 
Sunnah is retained mainly in the memory by his companions which leaves a doubt on 
their authenticity. The record of such sayings is called Hadith
15
, an authentic tradition 
(Hassan and Lewis, 2007) or oral tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as 
narrated by his companions (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011).  Furthermore, if any Hadith 
goes contrary to Qur’an, it is not considered to be as authentic while Visser (2013) 
posited that the Qur’an  was decisive in respect of authenticity and, therefore, had to 
take priority over Sunnah. Although the Qur’an offers the primary rule of life, it does 
not address many matters where guidance for practical living is necessary. In such 
cases, the obvious solution was to follow the customs of the Prophet. At several such 
conflicting occasions, the Prophet himself gave judgments reflecting the application of 
rules, principles and injunctions already enunciated in the Holy Qur’an. 
 
Secondary Sources of Shariah 
There are three secondary sources of Shariah; these are, namely, Ijtihad (independent 
reasoning), Ijma (consensus), and Qiyas (analogical reasoning). 
 
 
                                                 
13
One-tenth of the total 6200 versus in Qur’an are related to law and jurisprudence, about 500 verses  are 
purely subject to the legal injunctions (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011, p. 16). Thus, Qur’an is considered to be 
the complete code of life by Muslims since it provides guidance for all aspects of life and is not limited 
only to religious aspects. 
14
Sunnah is a normative practice and an established course of conduct referring to the sayings of and 
actions done and/or approved by the Prophet (Ayub, 2009). 
15
A saying conveyed to humans through hearing of or witnessing an event. From an Islamic standpoint, 
Hadith refers to all that is narrated from the prophet, his sayings, his acts or doings and whatever he 
tacitly approved, plus all the reports that describe his physical attributes and character (see Ayub, 2009). 
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Ijtihad (Independent Reasoning) 
Ijtihad
16
 plays a critical role. It refers to the independent individual (Visser, 2013). It is 
an attempt, made by the Shariah intellectuals, to extract solutions to emerging issues 
and problems (Ayub, 2009) and is the vehicle  through which rules of behaviour, not 
explicitly addressed to problems which arise as human societies evolve, are determined 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). Therefore, Ijtihad is an exercise of one’s reasoning to arrive 
at a logical conclusion on a legal issue undertaken by the Jurists in order to deduce a 
conclusion as to the effectiveness of a legal precept in Islam (Ayub, 2009). Likewise, 
Qiyas, the interpretation or individual logical reasoning, must not contradict with any of 
the above mentioned sources. 
Religion is a very sensitive issue. Any amendment of addition resulting from an 
ill-advised interpretation of Qur'an or Sunnah could lead the followers to violate the 
teachings of Islam. Therefore, it is necessary for the jurist to be well qualified, 
experienced and possesses expertise required for a quality independent reasoning. These 
traits are stressed by the various authors to be the one at the core of human IC. For 
instance, Edvinsson and Malone (1997) and Sveiby (1997) established that human IC 
incorporated skills, knowledge and experience of individuals who are required to act in 
different situations in order to create tangible and/or intangible assets. Shariah 
interpretation requires, also, superior philosophical skills and, therefore, the jurist must 
be creative. This is yet another aspect of human IC, argued by Li et al. (2008), who  
were of the view that human capital was “thinking and doing” capital which captured  
the creativity of individuals, their knowledge, skills and professional experience. 
 
Ijma (Consensus) 
Ijma
17
, which means consensus or in-agreement, is the first secondary source of 
Shariah. It occurred only after the demise of the Prophet Muhammad since he alone 
during his lifetime was the highest authority on Shariah (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011).  In 
                                                 
16
Ijtihad is an Arabic word which stands for an effort or exercise to arrive at one’s own judgment. From 
an Islamic standpoint, it refers to the use of human reason in the elaboration and explanation of Shariah 
law. It includes, also, the interpretation of Quranic verses and Hadith (see Ayub, 2009). 
17
Ijma is the verbal noun of the Arabic word ajma’a which means to determine and to agree upon 
something. It refers, also, to a group having or holding the same opinion (see Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011, 
p. 13). 
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referring to the Hadith
18
, Visser (2013) opined that truth was safe with the community 
of believers. Hence, the community can be, also, a source of law but, unlike Quran and 
Sunnah, Ijma does not partake directly of divine revelation. Yet, there arises another 
problem since there exists no defined line about consensus. Some argued that Ijma 
referred to the unanimous consensus of Muslim Ummah as a whole on any issue 
(Kettell, 2011) while others restricted it to the agreement amongst Islamic scholars. In 
both cases, a high level of human intellectual capital is required   because the decision 
makers must possess religious as well as contemporary knowledge of economics and 
finance in order to make timely compatible and incompliance laws. Since this study 
focused on IFIs which were regulated by the individual countries, therefore, Ijma 
referred to the consensus among the elected members of the parliament or the selected 
religious leaders of a country. 
 
Qiyas (Analogical Reasoning) 
The fourth root and second secondary source of Shariah is analogical reasoning. Qiyas
19
 
is, in effect, a ruling which is required on a certain situation not covered by Quran or 
Sunnah. Technically, “Qiyas is the extension of a position from the Shariah to a new 
case, on the grounds that the latter has the same effective cause as the former. The 
original case is regulated by a given text, and Qiyas seeks to extend the same textual 
ruling to the new case” (Ayub, 2009; Kettell, 2011). In other words, a comparison can 
be made with situations which Qur’an or Sunnah did provide. For instance, the use of 
wine is prohibited in the Qur’an. In this sense, all other toxicants with similar 
deleterious effects can be assumed to fall under the same prohibition (Visser, 2013). 
The use of analogical reasoning is widely accepted but the derived conclusions must not 
clash with the injunctions of the Qur’an or the Sunnah. Hence, Qiyas is a method of 
forming legal opinion or precedent for a situation or incident for which there is no direct 
ruling in the primary sources of law (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
                                                 
18
Muhammad (PBUH) said, “My community will never agree on an error”. 
19
The literal meaning of Qiyas is “measuring or ascertaining the length, weight or quality of something. 
The term also refers to a comparison, suggesting similarity of equality between two things, one of which 
is taken as the criterion for evaluating the other (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011, p. 13-15)”. 
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In synthesizing the above discussion, it is clear that the primary knowledge 
sources of Shariah are to be taken as granted and any amendments to those sources are 
considered to be violations of Islamic jurisprudence and not permitted under any 
circumstances. On the other hand, the secondary sources of Shariah are based mainly on 
the interpretations of the primary sources and the individual knowledge of Shariah 
scholars. These scholars are the ultimate human capital sources for the Islamic 
economic system. Since Islamic financial institutions are part of the Islamic economic 
system, any policy or law, introduced by the scholars, has a direct impact on the 
efficiency of IFIs. The impact is even direct and obvious since the IFIs are co-governed 
by the religious advisors. Hence, human IC (Shariah jurists, in the case of IFIs) plays a 
significant part in influencing the product and operations of IFIs and, in turn, their 
performance. 
 
4.2 Principles of Islamic Banking and Finance 
Islamic finance is an important part of Islamic economics. Any financial institution, 
based on the spirit and principles of Shariah, is known as an Islamic financial institution 
(IFI) and Islamic banking refers to a banking system which is based on Shariah. The 
most prominent features of Islamic finance are interest-free banking (collection or 
payment of interest is not permitted) and profit/loss (risk) sharing based financing. 
Additionally, it is co-governed by the Islamic-religious scholars who endorse or certify 
the permissibility of transactions (Halaal) such as ethical investments i.e. free from 
alcohol, armaments, tobacco or pornography (Ayub 2009, Warde 2010, Schoon 2010, 
Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011). Furthermore, Islamic finance prohibits Gharar (uncertainty) 
and Mysiry (Games of chance). 
 
4.2.1 Interest-free Banking 
Prohibition of riba (an Arabic term for usury or interest) is one of the most 
distinguishing principles of Islamic finance. All those financial institutions, based on the 
principles of Islamic law, are not allowed to deal in interest or riba. Riba refers to any 
predetermined payment over and above the actual capital (Visser, 2013). According to 
the Islamic doctrine, money itself has no intrinsic value (Thomas et al., 2005) and Islam 
forbids people from profiting by lending it, without accepting a level of risk. In other 
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words, to make money from money is not religiously permissible in Islam and wealth 
can be generated only through legitimate trade and investment. Shariah provides 
guidelines on how to earn wealth through permissible, legitimate sources of income in 
the light of the Islamic religion. 
 
4.2.2 Risk Sharing 
The principle of Profit/Loss Sharing (PLS) is at the core of Islamic finance. The idea is 
that, instead of lending capital on a prefixed rate of return, a venture is formed through 
partnership between the lender and the borrower on the basis of sharing any profit and 
loss. Unlike the conventional banking system whereby risk is transferred to the 
borrower, Islamic banks share the risk. Merchant banking and venture capital are among 
the fastest growing segments in contemporary finance and are considered to be 
conventional equivalents of PLS contracts. There are two broadly used modes of 
finance for such contracts: joint-venture (long-term equity-like arrangements); and 
entrepreneur borrower (finance trusteeship or commend a partnership or trustee 
partnership) (Hassan and Lewis, 2007; Usmani, 2008; Ayub, 2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2011). 
Entrepreneur borrowing is formed by the combination of financial and human 
capital. In this participatory mode of financing, one party (potential investor or business 
angel, sleeping partner or beneficial owner) entrusts capital to another party 
(entrepreneur or managing trustee) who has the skills, expertise and experience to 
utilize these funds efficiently in an agreed manner. The capital provider has the choice 
to restrict the entrepreneur in terms of business activity, clients, method, place and time 
period, or give full authority to the entrepreneur to act independently or unrestrictedly 
on the financer’s behalf. Profit is shared then between the parties on an agreed upon 
ratio but cannot be fixed. In the case of loss, the financer bears all the capital losses 
while the entrepreneur bears the loss of services and does not receive any payment for 
her/his time and effort. Joint venture is similar to the above in its principles, except for 
the fact that the financier takes an equity stake in the venture. It is, in effect, a joint-
venture contract whereby two or more parties jointly pool their capital to finance a 
project. All the parties, involved in the contract, have the right to participate in the 
management of the project or to act on one-another’s behalf. Profit is shared on  a pre-
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agreed ratio or on the basis of capital introduced by each partner but cannot be a lump 
sum or fixed. Losses are shared in proportion to the capital contributed by each partner. 
Both methods can be combined in one project. For instance, the initial capital 
can be generated through joint-venture, while working capital may be provided by a 
potential investor or business angel later on. Such financing can be observed in 
infrastructural concerns such as building, plant and road construction, real estate, ports 
and housing development with skilful investors ranging from engineers, physicians, IT 
specialists to craftsmen and traders for micro-financing of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). All such contracts are based merely on mutual trust amongst the 
partners. 
 
4.2.3 Halaal (Religiously Permissible) Financing 
Contrary to the secular orientation of conventional banking system, the Islamic 
economic agents are ethically bound not to cross those boundaries defined by Shariah. 
Consequently, Islamic banks do not finance all business activities which conflict with 
the Islamic moral value system (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). For instance, Islamic 
banking does not support businesses dealing with alcohol, gambling, armaments, 
pornography, pork etc. 
 
4.2.4 Gharar (Uncertainty) 
Gharar is prohibited in Islamic finance  in order to protect the weak from exploitation 
and to achieve better levels of transparency and fairness (Visser, 2013). The word, 
gharar, can be translated as deception or delusion or connotates peril, risk or hazard 
(Abedifar et al., 2013). However, the most commonly used financial interpretation of 
gharar is hazard, speculation or uncertainty caused by the lack of clarity regarding the 
subject matter or the price in a contract or exchange. A simple example of gharar is 
when the liability of any of the parties, involved in the contract, is contingent or 
uncertain, and selling something that is not present at hand or the consequence of which 
is unknown. For example, the sale of a bird in the air or fish in the water (Lewis and 
Algaoud, 2001; Ayub, 2009). 
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4.2.5 Maysir (Games of Chance) 
The word Maysir and Qimar are used interchangeably in Arabic literature. Both refer to 
easy money or acquisition of wealth by chance. Simply, it refers to gambling and all 
forms of gambling  are forbidden in Islamic jurisprudence (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001; 
Ayub, 2009; Warde, 2010). Islamic scholars agree upon the fact that maysir and gharar 
make a contract null and void. 
 
4.2.6 Shariah Governance 
The underlying principle of Islamic banking and finance is Shariah-compatibility in all 
of its products and services. In order to comply with this rule, Islamic finance 
organisations are co-governed by Shariah scholars who specialize in Islamic law and 
jurisprudence with some having, also, a background in economics and finance (Ahmed, 
2011a). This condition applies to all those institutions involved either directly i.e. fully-
fledged Islamic banks, or indirectly such as conventional banks with Shariah-windows, 
investment companies and funds in Islamic finance. 
 The Shariah governance framework is an important feature of Islamic banking 
and it determines the practices and the types of products offered. Generally, any 
financial institution offering Shariah-compliant products and services is obligated to 
have its own permanent independent Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) or committee. 
However different Shariah organs, ranging from an in-house Shariah-compliance unit, 
internal Shariah audit and review to SSB, can be found across the whole Islamic finance 
industry. At the core of such Shariah organs is the agenda to implement a Shariah 
governance framework and to lay guidelines which are necessary to reduce Shariah-
compliance risks and to ensure that the IFIs fulfil their fiduciary duties of conducting 
business according to Shariah principles20. However, it should be noted that the SSB has 
                                                 
20
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB, 2009, p. 2-3) recommended “four aspects that a SSB or 
Shariah governance system should entail at the level of IFIs (1) Issuance of relevant Shariah 
pronouncements/resolutions, (2) Dissemination of information on such Shariah pronouncements/ 
resolutions to the operative personnel of the IFIs who monitor the day-to-day compliance with the Shariah 
pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-vis every level of operations and each transaction, (3) An internal 
Shariah compliance review/audit for  verifying that Shariah compliance has been satisfied,  during which 
any incident of non-compliance will be recorded and reported, and as far as possible,  addressed and 
rectified, and (4) An annual Shariah compliance review/audit for verifying  that the internal Shariah 
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no executive function or strategic role; these are the responsibilities of the Islamic 
banks’ boards of directors (see Ahmed et al., 2014). 
Ahmed (2011b) classified Shariah governance regimes into National Shariah 
Authority (NSA) and Organizational Shariah Authority (OSA). The former exists in the 
form of law/regulations supported by a complementary national Shariah supervision 
mechanism at the regulatory level. The NSA’s primary objective is to accomplish the 
broader Shariah requirements of the Islamic finance industry and to protect the interests 
of shareholders not served at the organizational level. Furthermore, an active NSA is 
expected to address the Shariah-related issues; harmonise the Shariah interpretations; 
and ensure compliance with Shariah principles. In contrast, the OSA’s core role is to 
provide an in-house mechanism of Shariah governance structures and processes which 
help to strengthen the organisation. The operational issues under OSA purview can 
include the Shariah-approval of newly designed products; monitoring of the day-to-day 
compliance with the Shariah pronouncements; internal Shariah-audit; and annual 
Shariah review.  Furthermore, Ahmed (2011b) identified “four different types of 
regulatory regimes of Shariah regulatory framework (p. 65–67). 
i. Legally constructed: This system is similar to the conventional financial 
system whereby the banking law broadly determines the banks’ 
operations. Under this structure, the Shariah framework is determined by 
law with no supporting Shariah bodies at the national and organizational 
levels21. 
ii. Robust Shariah governance: This regime has an active Shariah 
governance system both at national and organisational levels. The NSA 
plays, also, an active role in Shariah issues in the industry and regulators 
provide detailed guidelines to strengthen the Shariah supervision at the 
organisational level22. 
                                                                                                                                               
compliance review/audit has  been appropriately carried out and its findings have been  duly noted by the 
Shariah board”. 
21
A prominent example is Iran where all products, offered by the IFIs, are identified by the Usury-free 
Banking Act of 1983. There exists neither a NSA nor an OSA; however, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) is 
responsible for implementing the law. 
22
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan are the operational examples of robust Shariah governance. Bank 
Negara Malaysia, the central bank of Malaysia, established a national Shariah Advisory Council in 1997 
as the highest authority for Sharaih-related business. Likewise, the State Bank of Pakistan established a 
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iii. Passive Shariah governance: The third category of countries has passive 
framework of Shariah governance at the national level and active Shariah 
governance at the organisational level. Countries, in this category, may 
have a NSA; however, its role is limited and does not include approval of 
new products23. 
iv. Market driven: Under the market-driven regime, Shariah compliance is 
left to the IFIs and there is no central NSA to oversee the products being 
marketed. Furthermore, there is no regulatory oversight or guidelines for 
the SSB at the organisational level. The system is market driven whereby 
new Islamic Shariah-compliant products are cleared by the SSBs at the 
organisational level24”. 
Most fully-fledged Islamic banks have their own independent SSBs whereas Islamic 
Shariah-windows (extended hands of conventional banks), particularly those operating 
in Muslim minority societies e.g. France, Germany,  do not have a permanent SSB 
(Nawaz, 2013b). Instead, when required, these banks hire independent Shariah 
consultants. 
Although the Islamic banking and finance industry is currently experiencing an 
unprecedented rate of growth, one of the challenges, facing this industry, is the shortage 
of Shariah scholars  who are well versed in Shariah matters  and in modern banking 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). Consequently, it is not surprising to find the same person 
sitting on different Shariah boards (Nawaz, 2013b). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
central Shariah Board to guide the IFIs in matters related to Islamic finance. Other than Shariah scholars, 
the central Shariah board has members from various fields such as banking, accounting and law. 
23
Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE) are countries falling under passive Shariah governance 
regimes.  The Central Bank of Kuwait Law of 1968 stipulates that IFIs should have an SSB of at least 
three members appointed by the General Assembly. Likewise, the UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 calls 
for the creation of Higher Shariah Authority comprising people with backgrounds in Shariah, legal and 
banking backgrounds to ensure the legitimacy of the transactions according to the provisions of Shariah. 
Furthermore, the law requires the creation of SSB with at least three members in IFIs to ensure that the 
transactions are in accordance with the principle of Islamic law. 
24
Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and United Kingdom are all countries which follow a market-driven 
approach. 
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4.3 Islamic Finance Instruments 
The increased complexity and volatility of the financial markets since the early 1980s 
have led financial institutions to be innovative and to offer products to mitigate, transfer 
and share financial risks. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) suggested that “the economic 
activities in any economic system can be regarded as contracts between the economic 
agents, thus, a financial instrument is also a contract, whose terms and conditions 
defines the risk and return profile of the instrument (p. 72)”. There is no established 
classification of contracts in the Islamic legal system as such. Nonetheless, Iqbal and 
Mirakhor (2011) suggested a classification of the contracts dealing with business and 
commercial transactions. Islamic financial instruments can be classified into four broad 
categories, all of which are discussed in the following section. 
 
4.3.1 Transactional Contracts 
Islam gives preference to trading over other forms of business and lays great emphasis 
on promoting trade
25
. Trade is not limited to trading of physical or tangible assets and 
can be, also, trading of intangible assets such as rights to use a tangible asset. According 
to Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011), such contracts are engineered to deal with the “real sector 
economic transactions that facilitate the sale, trade and exchange of goods and services. 
However, the core transactional contracts are based on trade or exchange-based 
activities. The very core of an extended economic and financial system is formed 
through transactional contracts as these contracts create assets, which further become 
the basis of financing and investment opportunities (p. 81)”. There are two forward 
sales contracts, namely, Salam and Istisna whereby sale of the commodity is transacted 
before the commodity comes into existence. Ijarah is one of the most commonly used 
modes for sales and exchange transactions in IFIs. 
 
                                                 
25
El-Din (2013) addressed the contemporary challenge of having to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate trade in Islam and provided a comparative analysis by putting the argument forward that 
“legitimate trade in goods and services precludes usury transactions that involve lending/borrowing 
through the interest rate. The former is utility-promoting and optimality-generating but the latter is 
counterproductive, p. 108)”. 
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Figure 3.2 
Islamic Financial Instruments 
Sources: Adopted from Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) 
 
4.3.1.1 Bay’ al Salam (Purchase with deferred delivery) 
In terms of function, Bay’ Salam is similar to conventional forward contracts. However, 
the difference lies in the terms of payment arrangements. It is an ancient form of 
forward contracts wherein the buyer pays in advance to the seller the full-negotiated 
price for a specific product to be delivered at a specified future date (Ayub, 2009). 
Therefore, Salam is in effect where the parties stipulate a certain time for supply of 
specific goods of specified quantity and quality. The difference between conventional 
forward contract and Salam lies in the fact that the full negotiated price is payable  on 
the spot, as opposed to the former where the full payment is not due in advance (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2011). Although Salam exists in the theory of Islamic banking and 
finance, the IFIs do not regard it as a popular mode of financing by due its high-risk 
profile. Advance on spot payment in full is one of its flip sides which may expose the 
parties to a number of risks. 
 
4.3.1.2 Istisna (Partnership in manufacturing) 
Istisna is an agreement culminating in a sale at an agreed-upon price whereby the buyer 
places an order to manufacture, construct or assemble anything to be delivered at a 
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future date (Ayub, 2009). Istisna comes into existence once the developer or 
manufacturer undertakes to construct or manufacture the property or asset for the buyer 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). An important feature of Istisna is related to the mode and 
timing of the payment. Istisna is more flexible in terms of payment. Unlike Salam, 
advanced payment is not a condition. Even so, it is unnecessary that it be paid in full at 
the time of the delivery. Payment can be made through instalments subject to the mutual 
agreement between the parties. As opposed to the Salam contract, Istisna can be 
cancelled unilaterally before the asset or commodity is built or manufactured. 
 
4.3.1.3 Ijarah (Lease) 
Generally, Ijarah26 refers to the lease of tangible assets like property and merchandise. 
Technically, “Ijarah is a sale contract but it is not the sale of a tangible asset rather it is a 
sale of usufruct (the right to use the object) for a specified period of time” (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011, p. 84). In Islamic jurisprudence, “an Ijarah is a contract of a known and 
proposed usufruct of specified assets for a specified agreed-upon time period against a 
specified and lawful return or consideration for the service or return for the benefit 
proposed to be taken, or for the effort or work proposed to be expended. In other words, 
it is the transfer of usufruct for a consideration, which is rent in the case of hiring assets 
or things, and wages in the case of hiring people” (Ayub, 2009, p. 279). 
All the terms of an Ijarah contract should be stipulated in detail: these include a 
clear description of the leased-asset; the purpose for which the asset may be used; rental 
amount and schedule of the payment (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011).  The lessor or owner 
of the asset bears all the liabilities emerging from the ownership whereas the lessee 
bears those liabilities relating to the use of the asset. A lively example is of a leased 
house in which case all the taxes relating to the property shall be borne by the lessor, 
while utility bills, such as water, electricity and gas shall be the responsibility of the 
lessee. Consequently, the lessee has no liability unless when it is established that the 
damaged caused to the property resulted from her/his wilful transgress or negligence. In 
such a case, the lessee is liable to compensate the lessor either by paying for the damage 
or by replacing the leased asset. 
                                                 
26“Ijarah, conveys the sense of both hire and lease” (Ayub, 2009, p. 249). 
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Ijarah has huge and, as yet unrealized, potential for developing advanced 
financial instruments to cater for the needs of the entrepreneurs, retail and corporate 
investors and the public sector27. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011,p. 85-86) opined that Ijarah  
was “conducive to the formation of fixed assets and medium- and long-term 
investments in the economy”. 
 
4.3.2 Financing Contracts 
Financing contracts are the bridging contracts which are used to generate and extend 
credit by offering channels for capital formation and resource mobilization between 
investors and entrepreneurs.  An absence of debt contract is one of the distinguishing 
features of such financing contracts. They are meant either for financing aforementioned 
transactional contracts in the form of trade finance or asset-backed securities or for 
providing capital through equity partnership which can take several forms such as 
partnership, diminishing partnership, or co-ownership. Viewing such contracts from the 
perspective of their relative risk, the system offers low-risk asset-backed securities at 
one end of the risk continuum whereas, at the other extreme, it promotes risky equity 
financing such as venture capital and private equity. Since the earlier section discussed 
Ijarah and Istisna asset-backed financing contracts discussed, the following section 
discusses only Murabaha and Musharakah. 
 
4.3.2.1 Murabaha (Cost-plus Sales) 
Murabaha is one of the most popular sales contracts used by the IFIs for purchasing 
commodities and other products on credit. It refers to a mutually stipulated margin of 
profit in a sale transaction whereby the cost of the commodity is known or made known 
to the buyer. Originally, Murabaha referred to a sale transaction whereby a trader would 
purchase a product required by an end-user and, then, sell the same product to the end-
                                                 
27
Ijarah is used directly in the retail sector for housing, automobiles, plant and machinery, and consumer 
durables etc. and indirectly for Sukuk issues by the corporate and public sectors. Furthermore Ayub 
(2009) stated that although “leasing constitutes a large portion of the portfolios of IFIs, yet, the share 
could be higher. One of the basic reasons why IFIs hesitate to increase their lease portfolio is that by 
becoming the owner of the asset, IFIs take on additional obligation to administer the lease, which is not 
their core business (p. 297-298)”. 
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user at an agreed price calculated by using an agreed profit margin over the costs 
incurred by the trader. Nowadays, financial intermediaries, such as banks, perform the 
role of a trader. 
A typical Murabaha transaction involves three parties, namely, the financier 
(usually an IFI), the vendor or original seller and the end-user of the financed product. 
The whole concept is that a financier, i.e. an IFI, purchases a product (raw material or 
commodity) for the purpose of supplying the same to an entrepreneur who does not 
have his own capital to do so. The financier and the entrepreneur mutually agree upon a 
profit, often referred to as “mark-up”; this is added to the principal cost of the product. 
Hence, the parties negotiate the profit margin on cost and not the cost per se (Ayub, 
2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). A typical Murabaha transaction follows four steps 
(Ayub 2009, Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011). 
(i) Price Quotation: The client, seeking finance, describes to the vendor the 
goods she/he intended to obtain and asks the vendor to quote the price. 
(ii) Promise to buy at Cost-Plus-Profit: After getting the price quotation from 
the vendor, the client contacts the financer (bank) to finance (purchase) the 
identified product on her/his behalf from the vendor. The client promises to 
buy the same goods from the financer at a price inclusive of the original cost 
in the quotation plus a profit to be agreed upon mutually. Hence, such  a 
contract is mediated by a high degree of trust between parties. 
(iii) Acquiring the Identified Product: The bank acquires the identified goods 
from the vendor by making payment. Ayub (2009, p. 87-88) noted that “IFIs 
usually appoint the client as their agent to accept the delivery from the 
vendor on their behalf, to avoid storage cost and other costs related to the 
delivery arrangements. Additionally, the bank also accepts the goods or 
other assets as collateral against the credit risk or the risk of default in 
payment by the client”. Finally, the mode of payment i.e. lump sum or 
through instalments is agreed. 
(iv) Payment by the Client: At the fourth and final stage of the contract, the client 
makes payment to the financer (IFI); this includes the principle cost to 
acquire the product plus a profit margin for the financer. 
Murabaha is different from a conventional loan. No money is loaned in Murabaha but 
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instead financing is linked to an asset by acquiring a specific asset for the client. 
Secondly, conventional banks are exposed only to credit risk whereas IFIs are exposed 
to several risks including price risk. Another difference is that IFIs hold the ownership 
of the asset for some time before transferring the same to the client. Therefore, the IFI 
bears the risk of any damages caused to the asset. 
 
4.3.2.2 Musharakah (Partnership) 
Risk sharing through a participatory mode of financing is one of the most prominent 
features of Islamic finance. Modes, which form the basis of Islamic finance, belong to 
Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) techniques and, as such, are considered by the majority 
of Islamic jurists to be the most desirable modes. The most commonly used PLS modes 
of finance are Musharakah and Mudarabah. 
Musharakah is a versatile contract with different variations to suit different 
situations. It is a participatory contract whereby two or more parties combine their 
capital, labour or skills to form a joint venture on the basis of sharing in profit and loss 
and, hence, sharing in risk. All the parties reserve an exclusive right to participate in the 
management. However, they are free to entrust their rights to another partner involved 
since each party acts as an agent of and for the other28. Profit is shared on a pre-
determined ratio. However, the percentage of profit for each partner should be agreed 
before entering into a Musharakah but it should not be fixed or guaranteed. There is a 
consensus amongst the Shariah scholars that the loss shall be borne by the partners 
according to their contributed capitals. If any of the partners offered services not capital, 
then he is not liable to share in loss. 
 
4.3.3 Intermediation Contracts 
The core purpose to designing such contracts is to facilitate an efficient and transparent 
execution of transactional and financial contracts. In addition to the fee-based services 
                                                 
28
Musharakah is a participatory contract whereby once party offers capital while the other provides 
technical assistance. Execution of such a joint project is subject to highly qualified professionals (human 
IC) and sophisticated organizational systems (structural IC) who execute such joint ventures. IFIs possess 
such high quality stocks of IC and, hence, are entrusted by the capital providers to act of their behalf. 
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for economic activities, economic agents are provided, also, with a set of tools to 
perform financial intermediation under such arrangements. As mentioned earlier, 
participatory contracts are the act of combining investment and management. 
Mudarabah, which is the “cornerstone of Islamic financial intermediation, is a special 
case of partnership of capital and labour as such and discussed in the following section 
(Ayub, 2007, p. 320-331; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007, p. 103-105)”. In terms of 
management and control, Mudarabah is classified further into two: 
Classified or Restrictive Mudarabah: Under such arrangements, the principal has the 
choice to restrict the entrepreneur in terms of business activity, clients, method, 
geographical location and/or time period. 
Un-classified or Un-restrictive Mudarabah: It is when the principal gives the agent or 
entrepreneur full authority to act independently or unrestrictedly on the financer’s 
behalf. 
Credit risk and default often become an issue in the case of Mudarabah. Credit 
decisions are made on the bases of the firm’s financial position, trade history, its future 
performance and cash flows.  In Ayub (2009), since there might not be any tangible 
asset which could be used as collateral against potential losses,  the traditional physical 
collateral model, which was applied in mature enterprises, could not be used in the case 
of such potential entrepreneurs. In order to mitigate such risk, “the capital-owner should 
perform due diligence in respect of the past performance and reputation of the 
entrepreneur. On the other hand, the entrepreneur should also perform adequate 
screening and monitoring of potential projects worthy of good investment opportunities 
(p. 324)”. 
 
4.3.4 Fee-based Services 
Kifala is a contract of guarantee; it an obligation in addition to an existing obligation in 
respect of demand for something. It may relate to a financial obligation or an individual 
act to be performed. The former refers to an obligation to be met in the event that the 
debtor fails to honour her/his financial obligation to the principal. The later implies a 
timely execution of an act e.g. delivery of certain goods or performing a specific task. 
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Hawala refers to transferring an obligation of debt from one debtor to another. 
Under the arrangement, the debt is transferred to the assignee and the creditor cannot 
ask for repayment of the dues from the debtor (Ahmed, 2011b). The basic difference 
between Kifala and Hawala is that, in the case of the former, the principal debtor is not 
released as opposed to the latter case. 
Pledging is used commonly by the financial institutions to “reduce credit risk of 
non-payment by the borrower by securing a financial obligation either through pledge 
or through personal surety (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011, p. 104). More formally, the bank 
takes an asset as collateral against a financial liability of the borrower. In case, the 
borrower fails to pay back the borrowed amount, the bank may recover the liability by 
selling the pledged asset. 
It is an agency agreement where a designated individual or legal entity 
represents a party (client). It is a common practice to hire agents to facilitate trade 
operations. On the surface, a Wikala may look like that of Mudarabah, since both are 
principal-agent contracts. Yet, the main difference is that in the case of Mudarabah 
(precisely, unclassified Mudarabah), the agent has the freedom to utilize funds 
according to their professional knowledge, as opposed to the case of Wikala whereby 
the agent executes particular tasks according to the instructions given by the client (see 
Ayub 2009, Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011). 
Several services are offered under Jo’ala against a pre-determined fee or 
commission. The scope of Jo’ala is wide enough to open up several fee-earning 
opportunities and can be utilized to offer advisory, consultancy (including Shariah 
consultancy), asset management, fund placement and trust services often offered by 
investment banks in the conventional financial system. 
Takaful is an Arabic word which means mutual or joint guarantee (Kettell 
2011). It is the closest Islamic instrument to the conventional insurance system. The 
prime objective of Takaful is to pay a defined loss from a defined fund. Typically, 
Takaful is carried out in the form of solidarity Mudarabah, where all the partners 
mutually agree to share their losses by contributing periodic premiums in the form of 
investments. They are then entitled to redeem the residual value of profits after fulfilling 
the claims and premiums (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011). 
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Takaful and conventional insurance share the common goals of providing a 
reasonable financial security against unpredicted catastrophe, disaster or risk befalling 
one’s life of property (Kettell 2011). Although both sets of insurance strive for a 
common ideal based on contractual principles yet, there exist some differences between 
both systems. First, the contemporary insurance system contains elements such as riba 
(interest), gharar (uncertainty) and mysir (games of chance or gambling), which are 
contradictory to Shariah law. Tabarru (contribution or donation) is the main core of 
Takaful, which makes it free from such elements. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) point to 
another critical difference –the right to receive surplus profit that give participants the 
right to share the surplus profits generated, but at the same time they are liable, in 
addition to the premiums, for amounts they have already distributed, if the initial 
premiums paid during a period are not sufficient to meet all the losses and risk incurred 
during that period (p. 122)”. 
 
4.3.5 Social welfare Contracts 
Although facilitation of social welfare contracts is beyond the scope of intermediation, 
an intermediary can, however, certainly offer community services by institutionalizing 
social welfare contracts. Such contracts are made between the society and individuals to 
promote the well-being and welfare of the less privileged. Since Islamic banking is 
grounded on Shariah law which promotes welfare of mankind and prevents harm, IFIs, 
therefore, promote social welfare contracts. The main sources for fund generation in 
such contracts are zakah (religious levy) and penalties imposed on late payments (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2011). 
 
4.3.5.1 Qard-al-Hassan (Benevolence Loan) 
Qard-al-Hassan is a gratuitous loan which bears zero interest. Historically, such loans 
are provided for charitable purposes whereby the recipient does not have to pay a return 
on principal amount but he/she is morally bound to repay the loaned amount in full. 
Moreover, the provider of capital is not compensated for inflation. A lively example is 
of current accounts held in an Islamic bank. The depositors lend their money to the bank 
free of interest. Although these funds are demand deposits, whilst the bank holds them, 
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they can be invested freely to fund any of the bank’s day-to-day operations (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011). 
 
4.3.5.2 Waqf (Trust) 
In Dusuki (2008, p. 57), “Waqf is a form of perpetual charity that entails the use of 
assets such as cash, land, real estates for charitable purposes. One of the unique 
characteristics of waqf instruments is its perpetuity that does not allow waqf asset to be 
disposed of and its ownership cannot be transferred. Thus, waqf creates and preserves 
long-term assets that generate income flows or indirectly help the process of production 
and creation of wealth”. 
 
4.3.6 Statement of Financial Position of an Islamic Financial Institution (IFI) 
Since the mechanics of Islamic financial engineering were established by individually 
describing the modes/instruments of Islamic finance, it is imperative to highlight them 
on the statement of financial position of a typical Islamic financial institution (IFI). The 
following may not be representative of each and every Islamic bank in existence but it 
offers a general structure of intermediation using Islamic contracts. 
 
Table 3.1 
Typical Statement of Financial Position of an Islamic Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Trade Financing 
- Salam 
- Murabaha 
Demand Deposits 
- Current Account 
- Savings Account 
Ijarah / Istisna Investment Accounts 
Mudarabah (Profit/Loss Sharing Investments) Special Investment Accounts 
Musharakah (Equity Partnership) Capital, Equity, and Reserves 
Services (Jo’ala, Wikala, Kifala)  
Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007, p. 116) 
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4.3.6.1 Liabilities Side –Sources of Funds for an Islamic Bank 
On the liabilities side of an Islamic bank, the depositors are offered current, savings, 
investment and special investment accounts. In addition to deposits, an Islamic bank 
offers, also, to its individual and corporate clients, for a fee, basic banking services such 
as funds transfer, foreign exchange transactions, letters of credit, investment 
management, Shariah advisory and other related services. 
 
Current Account 
Current accounts are demand accounts and are kept with the bank on custodial 
arrangements and are repayable in full on demand. Demand deposits are regarded as 
loans to the bank and whose payment is guaranteed. They are based on the principle of 
al-Wadia (trust or safekeeping) and are not remunerated. An agency contract is formed 
for the purpose of protecting and safekeeping the depositor’s assets. The bank may use 
such funds to invest in religiously permissible activities at their own risk. Usually, 
Islamic banks use these funds to meet their liquidity needs and to manage their cash 
flow (see Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
 
Savings Account 
Such accounts involve usually higher balances and a longer time commitment. Similar 
to the current accounts, savings accounts are based on the principle of al-Wadia) or 
Mudarabah. A few banks promise a fixed interest. For instance, the Islamic Bank of 
Britain (IBB) have held a fixed return at 3 per cent since 2004; this is calculated and 
paid to the depositors on monthly basis (Islamic Bank of Britain, 2013). Most offer 
some kind of remuneration, in the form of hiba (gift), usually at the discretion of the 
institution and depending on its profitability (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
 
Investment Account 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011, p. 105) explained that “the major portion of the bank’s 
financial liabilities would consist of investment accounts that are, strictly speaking, not 
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liabilities but a form of equity investment, generally based on the principle of 
Mudarabah. Investment accounts are offered in different forms, often linked to a pre-
agreed period of maturity, which may be from one month upwards and could be 
withdrawn if advance notice is given to the bank. The profits and returns are distributed 
between the depositors and the bank, according to a pre-determined ratio”. A 
distribution of 80% to the investors (depositors) and 20% to the bank is typical; 
however, this ratio may vary considerably from bank to bank. The investment account 
holders bear risks very similar to those of the shareholders; however, they do not have 
any right to monitor and control the management or voting right. 
 
Special Investment Account 
A bank may offer a Special Investment Account (SIA) customized for high-net-worth 
individuals or corporate clients. Such accounts operate under the Mudarabah principal 
but the profit distribution ratio and the modes of investment of the funds are 
“customized to suit the individual client’s needs. Generally, special investment 
opportunities – identified by the bank, remain the subject matter of a SIA. These 
opportunities have a specific size and maturity and result from the banks participation in 
a pool of investment, private equity, joint venture or a fund in the form of Musharakah 
(Ayub, 2009, p. 327)”. 
The maturity and profit ratios are negotiated separately for each special 
investment account, with the yield directly subject to the success of the particular 
investment project. SIAs carry a significant potential for designing and developing 
funds with precise risk-return profiles to offer high-net-worth individuals and 
institutional clients opportunities to manage portfolios and to perform efficient risk 
management. 
 
4.3.6.2 Assets Side 
Banks need to manage diversified portfolios and select proper instruments/modes of 
financing in order to manage risk efficiently. The volume of investment deposits 
determines the investment strategies of a bank. If depositors are risk-averse, banks 
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should be risk averse, also, i.e. investing in less risky modes. The assets side of an IFI 
can carry a more diversified portfolio of heterogeneous asset classes, representing a 
wider spectrum of risk and maturity profile. For short-term maturity, limited-risk 
investments, there is a choice of asset-backed securities that resemble debt securities in 
terms of the payoffs. Such securities originate from trade-related activities, such as 
Murabaha and Bay’ Salam, and are arranged by the bank which uses its skill, market 
knowledge and its customer base to finance the trading activity. 
Ijarah and Istisna are popular for the medium-term maturity investments. Both 
modes are asset-backed and are suited best for financing automobiles and machinery. 
On the other hand, Salam has a vast potential in financing the productive activities in 
crucial sectors and, particularly, the rural economy which includes agro-based industries 
and agriculture generally. 
On the other hand, profit/loss sharing contracts – Mudarabah and Musharakah 
can be used for short, medium and-long-term project financing, import financing, pre-
shipment export financing, and working capital financing and financing all single 
transactions. For instance, IFIs use Diminishing Musharakah for the purchase of fixed 
assets such as real estate assets (houses), transport, machinery, etc. Similarly, Murabaha 
is used for the purchase and sale of trade financing automobiles, acquisition and holding 
of stock and inventory, raw material, spares and replacements and semi-finished goods. 
Huge single transactions are financed through Musawamah whereby the bank can 
engage into private equity or venture capital activities via Musharakah for longer-term 
maturity investments. 
 
4.4 Empirical Studies 
The basic assumption, underlying the conventional banking theories, is that banks 
accept deposits at a lower interest rate and resell those deposited funds to those seeking 
finance for economic activities at a higher interest rate. Consequently, the banks earn 
profits based on their competitive advantage at gathering information and underwriting 
risk (Santos, 2001). Hence, profit in conventional banking system is driven mainly by 
the spread between the interest rates i.e. the interest rate received from the capital 
borrowers and the interest rate paid to depositors.  Here, the contention is that IFIs 
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perform the same intermediary function with the exception of  a predetermined interest 
rate. In other words, IFIs do not receive or pay a predetermined or prefix interest rate 
but, instead, profit is earned through investments in different projects and shared on the 
basis of agreements with depositors and with borrowers. 
Given the robust growth of Islamic finance industry, many leading conventional 
banking groups i.e. Citibank, HSBC, Standard Chartered bank etc. have made their way 
to the Islamic way of banking. As a consequence, the numbers of financial institutions 
which offer Shariah-compliant products, have increased causing competition within the 
Islamic finance industry. Correspondingly, many empirical studies examined the 
efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks and documented that IFIs were more 
efficient than their conventional counterparts. Nonetheless, the evidence in this regard 
remains inconclusive. 
Most of the available studies used the traditional financial ratios such as ROA 
and ROE to assess the performance of financial institutions in the context of 
conventional banking
29
. Others compared the performance efficiency of banks being 
either conventional or Islamic. These studies used the same financial ratios to compare 
the performance between two sets of banking. In contrast, another steam of research 
remained exclusively focused on Islamic financial institutions. Table 3.2 provides 
chronologically a summary of these studies, including, author, year, aim of the study 
and main findings. 
Samad and Hassan (1999)  were among the pioneer studies which evaluated the 
inter-temporal and interbank performance of a leading Malaysia Islamic bank –Bank 
Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). The study used the financial ratios, such as ROA and 
ROE, to measure the financial performance of BIMB while liquidity performance was 
measured using loan-deposit ratio, cash-deposit ratio and current ratio. All those ratios 
were compared against eight conventional banks operating in Malaysia for the period 
from 1984 to 1989. The comparative analysis showed no significant differences in the 
financial performance based ROA and ROE. 
                                                 
29
Appendix 2.1 provides a summary of those studies remained exclusively focused on conventional 
financial institutions. 
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Table 3.2 
Chronical summary of selected empirical literature on Islamic banking and finance 
       
Study Country(ies) Period Data type Explains Methodology Main Findings 
       
Bashir (1999) Sudan 1979-93 Yearly “bank-
level accounting 
data 
Asset size and bank 
performance 
Regression -OLS Larger banks are more profitable yet have higher 
leverage. 
Samad (1999) Malaysia 1992-96 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Cost efficiency Descriptive 
statistics and 
ANOVA 
Islamic banks are more efficient than their conventional 
counterparts. 
El-Gamal and 
Inanoglu 
(2002) 
Turkey 1990-2000 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Production technology Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis 
Islamic banks have a similar production technology to 
conventional commercial banks. 
Hassan and 
Bashir (2003) 
IFIs operating 
in 21 countries 
1994-2001 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Determinants of bank 
profitability (ROA, 
ROE, NIM) 
Regression -GLS Controlling for macroeconomic environment, financial 
market structure, and taxation, the results indicate that 
high capital and loan-to-asset ratios lead to higher 
profitability (as does favourable macroeconomic 
conditions). 
 Yudistira 
(2004) 
IFIs operating 
in 12 countries 
1997-2000 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Technical and scale 
efficiency 
Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
and OLS 
regression 
Islamic bank inefficiencies appear relatively low 
(around 10%) compared with those for conventional 
banks derived from other studies. Small to medium-
sized Islamic banks exhibit diseconomies of scale. 
Islamic banks in the Middle East are less efficient than 
those operating outside the region. 
Al-Jarrah and 
Molyneux 
(2005) 
Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia 
1992-2000 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Cost and profit 
efficiency 
Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis 
Islamic banks are more cost and profit efficient banks 
compared to conventional commercial and investment 
banks. 
Mohamad et al. 
(2008) 
21 OIC 
countries 
1990-2005 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Cost and profit 
efficiency 
Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis 
No significant difference between cost and profit 
efficiency of conventional versus Islamic banks, 
irrespective of size, age, and geographical location. 
Islamic banks based in the Middle East and Turkey are 
more cost efficient than their African counterparts. 
Bader et al. 
(2008) 
21 OIC 
countries 
1995-2005 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Cost, revenue, and 
profit efficiency 
Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
No significant difference between cost, revenue, and 
profit efficiency of conventional versus Islamic banks. 
Note this study uses the same sample as Mohamed, 
Hassan, and 
Bader (2008). 
Mohamad et al. Malaysia 1995-2004 Quarterly bank- Efficiency of Data No difference in the efficiency of conventional and 
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Study Country(ies) Period Data type Explains Methodology Main Findings 
       
(2008) level accounting 
data 
conventional and 
Islamic banks 
Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
Islamic banks exists in context of Malaysian financial 
sector. 
Chong and Liu 
(2009) 
Malaysia  Monthly interest 
rates (rates of 
return for 
Islamic banks) 
Causality relationship 
between Islamic banks 
deposits rates and 
interest rates in 
conventional banking 
Granger causality 
test 
Rates of return on the investment deposits of Islamic 
banks are closely related to rates on conventional 
banks’ deposits. 
Pepinsky 
(2010) 
Indonesia 2008:05/06 Consumers Views of Islamic 
finance 
 Islamic banks are more technically inefficient. 
       
Majid et al. 
(2010) 
10 countries 1996-2002 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Returns to scale and 
efficiency 
Parametric output 
distance function 
Islamic banks have moderately higher returns to scale 
than conventional banks but appear less efficient due to 
Shariah compliance. Country effects have a significant 
impact on efficiency differences. 
Baele et al. 
(2011) 
Pakistan 2006:04-
2008:12 
Monthly 
business loans 
Loans default rate Hazard function Default rates on Islamic loans are lower than for 
conventional loans. 
Feisal Khan 
(2010) 
Pakistan 2006:06-
2009:03 
Monthly bank-
account data 
Growth deposit 
accounts 
 Islamic deposit accounts grow faster than conventional 
ones 
Čihák and 
Hesse (2010) 
Twenty OIC 
member 
countries 
1993–2004 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Insolvency risk Regression—OLS 
and Robust 
Small Islamic banks are more stable than small 
conventional banks; however, large Islamic banks are 
less stable than their conventional counter-parts. 
Rashwan 
(2010) 
15 Countries 2007–09 Bank-level data Profitability and 
efficiency over the 
banking crisis. 
Multivariate 
analysis of 
variance 
(MANOVA) 
Islamic banks are more profitable and efficient than 
traditional banks pre-crisis but the opposite is the case 
post-crisis. 
Khan and 
Khanna (2010) 
Pakistan  2008 Survey of 
customers at 
two banks 
Bank selection criteria 
 
Regression—OLS Religiosity and wealth matters when opening an Islamic 
bank account 
Hasan and 
Dridi (2010) 
8 Countries 2007-2009 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Factors influencing 
performance, growth, 
and ratings over crisis 
period 
Regression—OLS The credit and asset growth of Islamic banks was more 
than that of conventional banks from 2008 to 2009 
‘contributing to financial and economic stability’, 
although profits of Islamic banks fell more than 
conventional banks in 2009 due to limitations in their 
risk management practices. 
Ongena and 
Şendeniz-
Yüncü (2011) 
Turkey  2008 Bank–firm 
relationships 
Firm bank choice Multinomial logit Islamic banks mainly have corporate clients that are 
young, transparent, industry-focused, and have 
multiple-bank relationships. 
Weill (2011) 7 OIC countries 2001-07 Yearly bank- Market power Regression— Islamic banks have lower market power than 
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Study Country(ies) Period Data type Explains Methodology Main Findings 
       
level accounting 
data 
random effects 
GLS 
conventional banks. 
Weill and 
Godlewski 
(2012) 
6 Countries 2001-2009 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Yearly loans default Regression—OLS Choice for Islamic versus conventional syndicated 
loans by large firms driven by country-level religiosity 
and institutional quality, not firm-level quality. 
Ghannouci et 
al. (2012) 
8 Countries 
from MENA 
and South East 
Asia 
2000-2006 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Determine technology 
gap 
Meta-frontier 
Approach 
No technology differences in conventional and Islamic 
banks were observed. 
Pappas et al. 
(2012) 
22 Countries 1995-2010 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Various bank 
measures 
survival probability 
 Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher 
intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better 
capitalized, also during the crisis. 
Zaheer et al. 
(2012) 
Pakistan 2002:11-
2010:1 
Quarterly Banks 
data 
Credit growth  Credit channel of monetary policy through the Islamic 
banking sector is less potent than through the 
conventional part 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
141 countries 
(including 22 
OIC member 
countries) 
1995–2007 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Efficiency, asset 
quality, stability, and 
business orientation 
Regression—OLS 
Fixed effects, 
Robust 
Few significant differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
24 OIC 
countries 
1999-2009 Yearly bank-
level accounting 
data 
Credit risk, insolvency 
risk, interest rate risk, 
and possibility of 
extracting religious 
rent 
Regression—
random effects 
Small Islamic banks that are leveraged or based in 
countries with predominantly Muslim populations have 
lower credit risk than conventional banks. Small 
Islamic banks also appear more stable. 
Wijnbergen 
and Zaheer 
(2013) 
Pakistan 2002:02-
2010:08 
Quarterly Bank 
data 
Asset quality and 
stability 
 IFIs > Conventional banks 
Islamic branch > conventional branch of the same bank 
(except when small) 
Baele et al. 
(2014) 
Pakistan 2006:04-
2008:12 
Monthly bank 
data 
Load default  Islamic loans less likely to default” 
Sources: Researcher + adopted from Abedifar et al. (2013) and Baele et al. (2014) 
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Similarly, the liquidity performance ratios showed neither improvement nor 
deterioration during the study period. Conversely, the interbank comparison of liquidity 
performance suggested that BIMB appeared to be statistically more liquid than 
conventional banks. Furthermore the risk and insolvency analysis suggested that BIMB 
was less risky and more solvent when compared to the conventional banks. Although 
the study pioneered the research in this area, it focused only on one Islamic bank which 
did not represent the whole Islamic finance industry in Malaysia 
Borrowing form Agency and Intermediation theories, Bashir (1999) examined 
analytically and empirically the implications of the bank’s scale (total assets) on 
profitability and risk measures of two Islamic banks based in Sudan. The study found a 
significant relationship between size and profitability measures i.e. ROA and ROE; this 
suggested that Islamic banks became more profitable as they grew in size. Furthermore, 
the study found a negative relationship between size and risk index; this implied that a 
large size was economically efficient. However, these results lent support to the 
intermediation theory; this confers a diversification advantage as size increases. 
However, the sample size, used in the study, was too small to generalize the findings. 
While the above studies were county specific, other studies were conducted in a 
cross-country manner. Hassan and Bashir (2003) analysed the impact of bank 
characteristics and the overall financial environment on the performance of Islamic 
banks operating in 21 countries worldwide for the period 1994 to 2001. The results 
revealed that the profitability measures of Islamic banks responded positively to the 
increases in capital and negatively to loan ratios. The results suggested, also, that larger 
equity to total asset ratio led to more profit margins, indicating that adequate capital 
ratios played a weak empirical role in explaining the performance of Islamic banks. 
Furthermore the analysis suggested that implicit and explicit taxes had a negative effect 
on the bank performance measures while favourable macroeconomic conditions, such as 
higher GDP growth rate, had a positive impact on performance measures. Contrary to 
the findings of Bashir (1999), bank size was found to be negatively associated with 
profitability. Likewise, Yudistira (2004) analysed the stability and efficiency of 
eighteen Islamic banks for the period from 1997 to 2000. The study calculated 
technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency measures by employing the non-
parametric technique, Data Envelopment Analysis. The overall results suggested that 
the selected Islamic banks remained efficient in creating value during the study period. 
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However, the banks suffered from the Asian financial crisis during 1998-1999. The 
study revealed, also, that there were diseconomies of scale for small-to-medium Islamic 
banks and encouraged merger and accusation. Lastly, the study found that banks, which 
were not listed, were based in regions other than the Middle East and were 
comparatively more efficient. However, the study did not compare these results to those 
conventional banks competing in the same markets. 
On the other hand, there is substantial empirical evidence on the performance 
differences between the two sets of banking i.e. conventional and Islamic financial 
institutions. Some of the existing studies suggest that both sets of banking i.e. 
conventional and Islamic are equally efficient and as such there are no performance 
differences between them. For instance, Hussein (2004) examined the performance of 
Bahrain as a leading financial hub in the Gulf region. The study compared the profit 
efficiency of Islamic banks against their conventional counterparts operating in the 
same market. Using Fourier’s flexible functional model, the study estimated the profit 
efficiency index and reported no significant differences in the profit efficiencies of 
Islamic and conventional banks. This was despite the fact that many Islamic banks were 
small in size and acted as venture capital. Likewise, Bader et al. (2008) measured and 
compared the cost, revenue and profit efficiency of 43 Islamic and 37 conventional 
banks based in 21 countries worldwide. They assessed the average and overtime 
efficiency of the sample banks based on firm-specific characteristics such as size, age, 
and region using static and dynamic panels. Similar to Hussein (2004) the study found 
no significant differences in the overall efficiency of results between Islamic and 
conventional banks. In the most recent study, Beck et al. (2013) analysed empirically, 
during the period from 1995 to 2009, the differences in business orientation, efficiency, 
asset quality, and stability of 422 conventional and 88 Islamic financial institutions 
across a sample of 22 countries . The anecdotal evidence suggested no significant 
differences between the business model of conventional and Islamic banks. 
While recent evidence reported otherwise, Majid et al. (2010) investigated, 
during the period from 1996 to 2002,  the efficiency of 23 Islamic and 88 conventional 
banks (total 558 observations) based in 10 different countries, namely, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
The study controlled, also, for environmental factors such as country macroeconomic 
conditions, type of bank and accessibility of banking services and firm-specific factors 
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i.e. bank size for their potential influence on banks’ performance.  The results revealed 
that, during the study period, sample Islamic banks appeared to be associated with 
higher input usage. The study reported, also, differences in the Islamic banks’ 
efficiencies operating in different geographical locations. Moreover, most sample banks 
exhibited slight returns to scale, although Islamic banks were found to have moderately 
higher returns to scale when compared to their conventional counterparts.  This 
suggested that Islamic banking might benefit from increased scale. These findings lent 
support to the results of Bashir (1999). In a similar vein, from yet another perspective, 
Ayesha K Khan (2010) posited that religious beliefs  could have a significant impact on 
individual financial choices. The study collected evidence form 33 banks including 
Islamic banks, operating in Pakistan during the period 2006 to 2009 and submitted that 
Islamic banks enjoyed substantially higher deposit growth rates than conventional 
banks. Furthermore he found that, while a recent global financial crisis triggered a fall 
in deposit growth rates at all other types of banks, it had a positive impact on Islamic 
banks. This was despite the fact that these banks tended to have lower credit scores 
when compared to conventional banks. 
In a cross-county analysis of Islamic financial institutions, Čihák and Hesse 
(2010) measured the financial stability of Islamic banks operating in nineteen different 
banking systems  during the period  from 1993 to 2004. The sample included 77 Islamic 
and 397 conventional banks. Using Z-scores as a measure of stability, the study 
revealed that small Islamic banks were financially more stable than small commercial 
banks. Also, large commercial banks were financially more stable than large Islamic 
banks while small Islamic banks were financially more stable than large Islamic banks. 
This contrast suggests that Islamic banks are more stable when operating on a small 
scale and less financially stable when operating on a large scale. A plausible explanation 
for the given results is that it is significantly more complex for Islamic banks to adjust 
their credit risk monitoring system as they expand in size (Čihák and Hesse, 2010). 
Abedifar et al. (2013)  confirmed these findings for small Islamic banks in a sample of 
countries with both Islamic and conventional banks. The study gathered evidence from 
a sample of 553 conventional and Islamic banks from 24 countries during the period 
1999 to 2009. 
In summary, when comparing the efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
financial institutions while controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, the 
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existing literature highlighted few significant differences in business orientation.  
However, a substantial body of empirical evidence suggested that Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) were less cost-effective but had higher intermediation and financial 
ratios, higher asset quality and were better capitalized. Furthermore, the literature 
suggested, also, large cross-country variations in the differences between conventional 
and Islamic financial institutions and across IFIs of different sizes. 
An interesting element, missing in these studies, particularly those concerning 
Islamic financial institution, is that none of these studies verified the homogeneity of the 
Islamic finance industry.  This study contributes to the existing body of literature by 1) 
analysing the homogeneity of Islamic finance industry, and 2) comparing the 
performance of different Islamic banks operating within the Islamic finance industry. 
Hence it is argued that Islamic finance industry was not homogeneous since not 
all the IFIs were FFIBs. Some IFIs operated as Windows
30
. FFIB refers to a full service 
intermediary financial institution which conducts its business in accordance with the 
Shariah and, as such, does not deal simultaneously in conventional banking business. 
Whereas subsumed under Windows are all those extended hands of various 
conventional banking groups which offer Islamic finance services alongside 
conventional banking as their core business. 
The Islamic business model of banking is based on Shariah (the legal code of 
Islamic jurisdiction); this guides Islamic economics while the traditional conventional 
banking model is based on different ideology and pursues different goals i.e. profit 
maximization. Simply stated, FFIBs came into being to offer Shariah-compliant 
solutions to those looking for investment opportunities while not violating their 
religious beliefs. It should be noted that this is Islamic banking in theory or an ideal of 
Islamic banking; however, the practice of Islamic banking may be found to deviate from 
this path.  The prominent conventional banking groups came into this business through 
their extended hands i.e. Shariah-windows after realizing the fact that they  were on the 
verge of losing their clients in certain regions, such as the Gulf, where these 
conventional banks  had a track record of providing banking services from over a 
                                                 
30
Citi-Islamic, HSBC-Amanah, and Standard Chartered-Saadiq are some of the prominent examples of 
Windows, which are wholly owned subsidiaries of Citi Group, HSBC, and Standard Charted Bank 
respectively (see, also, footnote 1 on page 17-18). 
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century
31
, way before the birth of Islamic banking (Wilson, 2007; IDB, 2007; Warde, 
2010). 
Moreover, the governance mechanism of both sets of banking differs, also, in its 
nature and purpose. Islamic finance is based on trust and requires less monitoring when 
compared to the Windows which follows the same westernized corporate governance 
model. Additionally, from an Islamic standpoint (ideally), governance is to achieve 
social equality and create more value for the society at large, while the conventional 
governance model focuses on wealth maximization for shareholders. This argument 
finds supports in the traditional shareholder theories e.g. the stakeholders theory 
(Freeman and Reed, 1983; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman 2001). In other 
words, borrowing from the agency theory of the firm, it is argued that the conventional 
banking model is based on the central assumption of the self-interests of individuals 
who tend to maximize their own returns by all means available to the firm. This might 
result in conflicts between both parties, known as the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Baiman, 1990; Kunz and Pfaff, 2002). However, FFIBs are not expected to suffer 
to the same extent due to the trust factors among the parties involved in business. In 
summary, the operating mechanism of conventional and Islamic banking system is 
entirely different. The IC stock including human capital, structural capital and capital 
employed is, also, somewhat different in nature for both sets of banking. 
Taking together the significance of the arguments, both sets of banking are 
expected to utilize their resource base i.e. IC, physical, and financial resources 
differently and, as a consequence, to achieve different level of performance. Hence, the 
performance of all the resources of these institutions (FFIBs and Windows) is measured 
and compared to ascertain the existence of differences in performance between the two 
sets of banking. 
                                                 
31
During the nineteenth century, most of the Muslim world was controlled by the colonial powers from 
the West. These powers brought the Muslim world into a Western-imposed economic order for which it 
was ill-prepared (Warde, 2010). In the last decade of the nineteenth century, European commercial banks 
decided to cater for these occupied Muslim territories. In an attempt to process the financial transactions 
related to the Suez Canal construction, Barclays Bank opened a branch in Cairo back in 1890s. It is 
considered to be to be the first commercial bank established in the Muslim world (IDB, 2007). On the 
other hand, Wilson (2007) stated that the European banks first engaged with the Gulf region about ninety 
years ago. In the 1920s, the Eastern Bank – predecessor of Standard Chartered Bank proposed a branch 
on the Island of Bahrain. The permission was subject to the elimination of all interest based transactions. 
That is when the European banks had to encounter demands for Islamic finance. Simultaneously, the 
National Handelsbank of the Netherlands – predecessor of ABN-Amro received approval in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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4.5 Research Gap for Islamic based Study 
Today’s knowledge-intensive and modernized economy calls for an efficient allocation 
of resources. Such an allocation can be achieved through financial systems. An efficient 
financial system is expected to perform several functions. This includes the vital 
function of facilitating efficient financial intermediation through the financial market 
and institutions such as banks. An Islamic bank is a full service intermediary financial 
institution which abides by Islamic law. IFIs perform the function of financial 
intermediation by offering various products and services. Products are tangible whereas, 
in contrast, services are intangible in nature since customers cannot touch or observe 
these services unless they are being exposed to them. Additionally, given the intangible 
nature of services, it is difficult to conduct research; have a prototype for market-testing; 
determine the actual cost of the service; and measure success (Ahmed, 2011b). Being a 
young industry, Islamic finance is facing all these challenges at  present and there are 
few new research studies in the area. 
 In order to compete with the well-established conventional banking system, IFIs 
require competent human intellectual capital (staff) in order to ensure the fullest 
delivery of services to the end users. As established earlier, Shariah-compliance is at the 
core of products and services offered by IFIs and this would require careful Shariah-
monitoring of the delivery structure and system (structural IC) so that the quality of 
service remains within the limits of Shariah-law. Equally, IFIs are duty-bound to raise 
capital only from legitimate sources. Hence, in the Islamic finance industry, product 
innovation requires all three sources of IC viz. human, structural, and financial capital. 
However, there is a dearth of research which investigates the aspects of their 
combination in creating competitive advantage. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
The chapter provided the fundamental concepts and principles which would serve as 
foundations upon which the significance of IC in Islamic finance was established. The 
groundwork material included presentation of principles of Islamic banking and finance. 
Then, the focus turned to intellectual sources of Shariah law and was followed by the 
various instruments of Islamic banking and finance. This was followed by focusing on 
empirical studies on Islamic banking and finance. This helped to identify, in both 
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streams of literature, the research problem and research gap i.e. IC and Islamic banking 
and finance. The next step is to state the aim of research, research questions and 
development of research models to test the research hypotheses.  The next Chapter deals 
with all these issues. 
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Chapter 5:  Theoretical Framework and Development of Hypotheses 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework and presents the research hypotheses 
to be tested. There are three main research hypotheses to be tested in relation to the 
effects of IC, CG and IFIs’ firm-specific characteristics on performance in achieving the 
first research objective. The fourth research hypothesis is related to the effects of IC, 
CG and IFIs’ firm-specific characteristics on performance before and after the financial 
crisis, thus addressing the second research objective. The fifth research hypothesis is 
related to the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific characteristics on performance of 
FFIBs and Windows; this is the third research objective. There is no single theory 
related to IC. However, the literature considered the firm’s resource-based view and 
agency theory to be applicable when discussing IC. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents and discusses the conceptual 
framework employed in this research. Section 4.2 presents the development of the 
hypotheses and section 4.3 presents a summary of the chapter. 
 
5.1 Conceptual Framework 
In recent years, great strides have been made to examine bank’s performance by 
incorporating different theories to yield interesting insights which reflect the unique 
nature and role of banking in modern economies. Another scholarly stream of literature 
examined the relationship between IC and bank’s performance using different 
theoretical lens. The literature suggested no single theory when discussing IC; 
accordingly, this study’s conceptual framework was based on two different theories, 
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Development of Hypotheses 
4.0 
Introduction 
4.1 
Conceptual 
Framework 
4.2 
Hypotheses 
Development 
4.3 
Chapter Summary 
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namely, resource-based view of the firm and agency theory. The following sections 
discuss the said theories. 
 
5.1.1 Resource-based View of the Firm 
In recent years, the resource-based view, which is associated with competitive 
advantage, has become one of the standard theories in strategy (Hoopes et al., 2003) and 
has achieved widespread dissemination in academic literature and management practice 
(Acedo et al., 2006). The Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm suggests that firms 
can achieve and sustain competitive advantages by mobilizing their valuable resources 
and capabilities which are inelastic in supply (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993;Wernerfelt 
1984).  Furthermore, Toms (2010) emphasized this argument and stated that the RBV 
explained either competitive advantage or delivery of sustained above-normal returns 
(Peteraf, 1993) or economic profit, in terms of firms’ bundles of resources (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993), which  were valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
(Barney, 1991). 
Grant (1991) asserted that a firm’s success and profitability was determined by 
not only the external factors but, also, by the internal factors
32
; this is the idea upon 
which the resource-based theory is grounded. According to Barney (1991) and Peteraf 
(1993), each enterprise is treated as heterogeneous under this perspective because 
heterogeneous character can be maintained for a longer-term and, thereby, having long-
term profit (income). Such imperfect (heterogeneous) mobility of resources is necessary 
in order to transform a short-run competitive advantage into a sustainable long-run 
competitive advantage. Barney (1991,p. 102) stated that "a firm is said to have 
competitive advantage when it is implementing a value-creating strategy not 
simultaneously implanted by any current or potential competitors ". 
                                                 
32
In the context of  this study which is based on financial institutions, internal factors represent the bank-
specific characteristics i.e. bank-size, bank-age, bank liabilities, liquidity structure, ownership structure, 
governing boards, operating region and core business activity. On the other hand, macroeconomics 
factors such as chartering rules, financial regulations, government regulations, GDP growth, effective tax 
rate, inflation rate, and market volatility, etc. are all factors which are subsumed under external factors. 
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Within the resource-based framework, the firm is viewed as a nexus of resources 
and capabilities. Resources confer enduring competitive advantages on a firm to the 
extent that they are not bought freely and sold in the spot market (Lado and Wilson, 
1994). To the extent that these firm-specific resources and capabilities yield economic 
benefits that cannot be duplicated perfectly through competitors' actions, they may be 
potent sources of sustained competitive advantage. 
Richard (2000) argued that, from a strategic human resource management 
standpoint, the most important assets for a service provider, particularly a bank in 
gaining and maintaining competitive advantage, was its people i.e. the human IC. As 
other sources of competitive advantage, such as technological capabilities (structural 
IC) and physical and financial resources (capital employed) have become easier to 
emulate, the crucial differentiating factor between firms can be how human IC works 
within an organization (Pfeffer, 1994). 
In the context of IFIs, the concept of human IC is that people possess knowledge 
(knowledge of Shariah in particular), skills and experience that provide economic value 
to the IFIs. Barney and Wright (1998) noted that in order for human IC to contribute to 
sustainable competitive advantage, it had to create value, appear rare and remain 
difficult to imitate.  The position of Shariah knowledge and knowledge of contemporary 
economics, embedded in people affiliated with IFIs, serve as a source of sustained 
competitive advantage for IFIs because the combination of such knowledge source 
creates value that is both rare and difficult to imitate. Additionally, to be a source of 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Hoopes et al., 2003), resources and 
capabilities must be: 
1. Valuable: A valuable resource enables a firm to improve its market position 
relative to competitors (Peteraf, 1993).  The Islamic finance industry is 
expanding and catering for a bigger market and, as IFIs reach out to a broader 
customer base, they need employees (human IC) who understand particular 
customer preferences and requirements. Equally, there is a need for efficient 
structural IC (i.e. technological capabilities) to deploy record and maintain 
financial capital (capital employed). All such resources, particularly human IC, 
are valuable for IFIs since they can help the IFIs to improve their market 
position relative to their conventional rivals. 
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2. Rare: To be of value in sustaining competitive advantage, resources must be 
available in short supply relative to demand. Barney (1991) posited that a 
strategic asset had to be rare in order to offer sustained competitive advantage. If 
it is assumed across the Islamic finance industry that Shariah scholars as a 
human IC resource do not create value, when in fact they do, there is tremendous 
potential for IFIs to exploit the rare characteristics of a diverse employee (SSB) 
base for competitive advantage. The number of financial institutions, offering 
Shariah-compliant banking solutions, is growing rapidly; ultimately, this calls 
for more controlling and monitoring mechanism provided by a balanced 
corporate governance mechanism including an effective SSB. However, not only 
are scholars well-versed in Shariah and contemporary knowledge of economics 
are rare but, also, they are in short supply. As a consequence, it is not surprising 
to see the same Shariah scholars sitting on several Shariah supervisory boards 
across the industry (Nawaz, 2013b). Additionally, most of the conventional 
banks, offering Shariah-compliant products, do not employ a permanent SSB but 
tend to hire Shariah scholars when needed. 
3. Isolated from imitation or substitution: To be rare, resources need to be 
immobile and costly to imitate or to replicate. In today’s knowledge-intensive 
economy, most of the valuable resources are protected by knowledge (that is, 
human IC) while others e.g. copyrights and patents (structural IC), are protected 
from imitation by law (property rights). The nature of human IC is recognized 
by the proponents of the resource-based view since they emphasise its 
ambiguity, subjectivity and creativity (Pfeffer 1994). Furthermore, knowledge-
based resources depend upon large numbers of people engaged in coordinated, 
creative action providing a firm with a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Richard, 2000). IFIs are co-governed by the religious scholars and, hence, work 
in close coordination with the SSB which ensures the Shariah-compliance of all 
their products and services. Arguably, IFIs have more resources in the form of 
human IC to draw on and should be more creative and innovative. Therefore, 
knowledge-based resources such as well-versed Shariah advisors on the SSB, 
allow an IFI to succeed by giving it the skills needed to adapt its products and 
services to market needs and to meet competitive challenges. It is not to say that 
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the knowledge-based resources, possessed by the IFIs, are difficult to be 
imitated by their conventional rivals but actually quite the contrary
33
. Although 
some conventional banks offer Shariah-compliant banking solutions to their 
clients, it took them some time to acquire the required resources and, by then, 
the imitated institution (the IFIs) may have developed their skills further. 
Therefore, it seems difficult for conventional financial institutions to imitate the 
Islamic banking model in its full capacity. 
Since Barney (1991) and Wernerfelt (1984) published their original work, a distinction 
has emerged in the RBV literature between resources and capabilities. Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993) defined resources as all input factors both tangible and intangible, 
human and nonhuman  which were controlled or owned by the firm  which entered into 
the production of goods and services to satisfy human desires. Grant (1991) added that 
resources were the inputs into the productions process whereas Wernerfelt (1984) stated 
that a resource meant anything which could be thought of as strength or a weakness of a 
given firm. More formally, a firm's resources, at a given time, can be defined as those 
(tangible and intangible) assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm. Examples 
of resources are: brand names; in-house knowledge of technology; employment of 
skilled personnel; trade contracts; machinery; efficient procedures; capital etc. 
On the other hand, capability is joint resources to produce any work or activity 
(Grant, 1991; Olalla, 1999), and the firm's capacity to deploy resources. Unlike 
resources, capabilities are based on developing, carrying, and exchanging information 
through the firm's human capital (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). 
A more simple and clear classification was given by  Makadok (2001) who 
simplified both concepts and suggested that a resource  was an observable (but not 
necessarily tangible) asset which could be valued and traded i.e. on the one hand, a 
brand, a patent, a parcel of land or a license and capability. On the other hand, it was 
unobservable (and, hence, necessarily intangible), could not be valued, and changed 
hands only as part of its entire unit. Most significant resources for an IFI are, but not 
limited to, knowledge held by its people, unique technological resources to handle 
                                                 
33
Some leading conventional banks (i.e. Citibank and HSBC) have established separate entities by 
replicating the Islamic banking model while others (e.g., BNP Paribas and Lloyds bank) are offering 
selected Shariah-compliant products under the same roof. As such, the latter does not employ a permanent 
SSB but hire Shariah consultants when required. 
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transactions, and  its exclusive customer base i.e. individuals and firm looking  for 
investment opportunities while not violating their religious beliefs or willing to invest  
in a risk sharing mechanism offered by the IFIs. 
Referring to the definition of intellectual capital IC, all the intangible resources 
listed above, especially those by Wernerfelt (1984)  were mostly IC, i.e. brand names, 
in-house knowledge. Barney (1991) argued that: 
"Sustained competitive advantage derives from the resources and capabilities a 
firm controls that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable. 
These resources and capabilities can be viewed as bundles of tangible and 
intangible assets, including a firm's management skills, its organizational 
process and routines, and the information and knowledge it controls" 
The above view is in line with views on the characteristics of a knowledge-rich or high-
IC firm as suggested by Brooking (1996), Edvinsson and Malone (1997), Stewart and 
Ruckdeschel (1998), and Dzinkowski (2000). 
As discussed in chapter 2, IC can be classified into human IC and structural IC 
whereby, the former is associated with the role of thinking and reflexivity (i.e. the 
knowledge, professional skill and experience, and creativity of employees) while the 
latter is concerned with efficiency, re-production and re-use of knowledge (structural IC 
consists of innovation capital, which are intellectual assets such as patents, and process 
capital, which are organizational procedures and processes). All the resources, linked by 
the various authors with RBV, are, in effect, IC. Cañibano et al. (2000) noted: 
"Both tangible and intangible assets are perceived as potential strategic assets. This 
resource-based view of the firm, including the benefits of both tangible and 
intangible assets, is gaining acceptance in the accounting, economic and strategic 
management literature, following positive results of linkages between firm resources 
and measures of performance (p. 215)"   
 IC is a strategic asset which can lead to firms’ higher performance and sustaining 
competitive advantage. Equally, sub-components of IC viz. human capital and structural 
capital are perceived to be potential strategic assets under RBV. An IFI’s most 
significant capability of is to provide an alternative banking system which is more stable 
and resistant to the financial turbulence. The IFI performs this function through its 
human intellectual capital base and possesses certain skills in mobilizing both the IC 
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and physical resources. Hence, the resource-based view of the firm relates closely to IC 
and, therefore, RBV is used as an economic foundation to examine the IC’s role in 
helping IFIs obtain competitive advantage. 
 
5.1.2 Agency Theory 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency 
relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent) 
who performs that work. Agency theory attempts to describe this relationship using the 
metaphor of a contract whereby the agent’s rights and responsibilities are specified in 
their mutually agreed-upon employment relationship. The terms of employment include 
compensation arrangement, information system, allocation of duties, and allocation of 
ownership rights (Baiman, 1990). 
Hence, agency theory reflects on principal-agent relationship34 in which the 
principal is represented by the owners or shareholders while the agent is represented by 
the firm’s managers and staff and the two parties are mediated by a contract. The 
principals offer a contract to the agent who, then, chooses those actions required to 
maximize their overall utility, restricted by contractual constraints. This implies that the 
firm’s managers and the staff are paid by the shareholders to work on their behalf and, 
in return, the managers and staff will do their best to increase the shareholder's value by 
increasing the value of the company. Also, this will increase their interest since they 
will be rewarded normally with a bonus, an increase in salary, or job promotions. The 
available literature on accounting and finance classified the contractual relationships 
into employment contracts (between shareholders and managers) and lending contracts 
(between debt-holders and shareholders). Such contractual safeguards are erected to 
mitigate the agency problem between principal and agent. 
Unlike conventional finance, the Islamic finance contractual relationships are 
complex and dynamic since contracts are drawn up in the divine guidance of Shariah. 
This restricts the exploitative elements i.e. riba (interest), gharar (uncertainty) and 
                                                 
34
Ross (1973) posited that the principal-agent relationship was not limited to shareholders and 
management alone, such a relationship could be observed in each stage of the organization hierarchy. For 
instance, the relationship between governing board (principal) and CEO (agent), who delegates the job 
further accordingly in order to achieve organizational goals. Thus, it entails a set of agreements between 
different parties involved in an organization. 
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speculation. In other words, in the conventional financial system, contracts are drawn up 
solely based on material information, facts and conditions, whereas the Islamic financial 
contracts in are made up of material and ethical components (Aljifri and Kumar, 2013). 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004, p. 55) posited that “contracts in Islamic financial system 
consist of two elements, one the material fulfilment and two the sincerity, truthfulness, 
and insistence on rigorous and loyal fulfilment of what he/she had consented to do”. 
Hence, the contracts in conventional and Islamic financial system are similar in 
terms of material facts but they differ significantly in ethical components. Ideally, 
Islamic financial contracts are based on Shariah. Consequently, they rely substantially 
on an ethical dimension and any breach of the ethical codes, set by the Shariah 
principles, can render the contract void. Furthermore, Islamic financial contracts are 
drawn up based on the available financial instruments. In order to understand the 
complexity underlying these contracts, it is helpful to recall the typical statement of 
financial position of an Islamic bank. Table 4.1 presents the general intermediation 
using Islamic contracts which can be found in the statement of financial position of 
most Islamic banks. 
 
Table 4.1 
Statement of Financial Position of an Islamic Bank 
Contract type Assets Liabilities 
Asset-based Trade Financing 
- Salam 
- Murabaha 
- Ijarah / Istisna 
Demand Deposits 
- Current Account 
- Savings Account 
Risk-sharing based - Mudarabah 
- Musharakah 
- Investment Accounts 
- Restricted Investment      
Accounts (RIA) 
- Unrestricted Investment   
Accounts (URIA) 
Fee-based Services (Jo’ala, Wikala, Kifala)  
Focusing first on the asset side, the available contracts can be classified into asset based 
(i.e. Salam, Murabaha and Ijarah), risk-sharing based (i.e. Mudarabah and Musharakah), 
and fee-based (e.g., Jo’ala, Wikala, and Kifala). These three categories cover almost all 
the types of financial contracts offered by the Islamic financial institutions and, 
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therefore, they cover all the relevant types of agency relationships. On the liabilities 
side, funds are classified into two types; 1) demand deposits (principal) whereby funds 
are accepted for the purpose of investment and authority is provided to IFIs (agent) to 
act on behalf of depositors; and 2) special investment accounts (principal) whereby the 
IFIs (agent) channel funds mainly through Mudarabah and Musharakah by. 
To summarise, in the context of Islamic finance, Rab-ul-Maal
35
 (principal) is the 
capital provider and Mudarib (bank), as the agent, is liable to manage these funds in the 
best interests of the depositors and shareholders. All such deposits are based on the 
Islamic concept of Amanah (trust) and, hence, such contracts are based on mutual trust 
amongst the principals and agent. The agent is expected to utilise both tangible, in the 
form of structural IC, and intangible, in the form of personal knowledge, skills and 
expertise resources, to create value for the principals. In other words, the agent is 
expected to invest the provided capital in Shariah compliant investment opportunities 
while using knowledge about and relationships with the market. Moreover, the agent is 
not expected to pursue personal interests which would lead ultimately to agency 
problems. 
In synthesizing the above argument, from a conventional standpoint, agency 
theory is based on the central assumption of self-interests of individuals. It argues that 
both the principal and the agent tend to maximize their own returns by all means; this 
might result in conflicts between both parties (known as the agency problem). In 
contrast, Islamic banking is based on trust and agents are entrusted by the principals to 
perform their obligations in an ethically correct way. 
                                                 
35
In its simplest form, providers of funds are the principals while services providers are the agents. In 
IFIs, principals are represented by shareholders, depositors and investment account holders. Investment 
account holders are sub-classified into restricted investment account (or RIA) holders and unrestricted 
investment account (or URIA) holders. In the case of the former, funds are channelled through restricted-
mudarabah contracts in conjunction with RIA funds for investment purposes. In this sense, funds, 
available to the IFI from RIA holders, are not fully under its control since the account holder has the right 
to determine the purpose or manner of investing his or her funds. For instance, the RIA holder may not 
allow the IFI to combine his funds with those at hand of the IFI i.e. other deposits. While, in the former 
case, funds are channelled through unrestricted-mudarabah contracts in conjunction with URIA funds for 
investment purposes. The URIA holders entrust the IFIs as their agents and authorise them to invest their 
funds in any manner which the IFI deems appropriate. As such, the IFI can combine its funds with those 
of the URIA holders, or likewise the funds of URIA holders with other sources of funds available to the 
IFI, such as current accounts, in order to use the pooled amounts in providing financing facilities or 
undertaking investment projects. However, IFIs, are restricted to adhere to Shariah guidelines pertaining 
to investment (see inter alia Ayub, 2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011; Kettell, 2011). 
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Agency theory represents, also, important CG issues in both the financial and 
nonfinancial industries. From a corporate finance literature perspective, an obvious 
advantage of  IFIs is their greater ability to allocate risk optimally though the sharing of 
the project return between capital provider and entrepreneur (Sarker, 1999). Therefore, 
IFIs are expected to be less prone to the principal-agent problem. Consistent with the 
previous literature on CG studies (Jensen, 1986; Dalton et al., 2003; Salama and 
Putnam, 2013), this study adopts agency theory to test the hypothesis related to the 
corporate governance of IFIs. 
 
5.2 Development of Research Hypotheses 
As explained in Chapter 1, this study’s research objectives were three fold: firstly, to 
examine the effects of IC and physical capital on the performance of IFIs; secondly, to 
measure the effects of corporate governance features on the performance of IFIs; and, 
thirdly, to analyze the effects of firm-specific variables on the performance of IFIs. 
Based on these research objectives, the following sections develop the research 
propositions. 
 
5.2.1 Value added intellectual capital (VAIC) and performance 
Pulic’s early research (see Pulic, 1997, 2002 & 2004) on the Austrian, Croatian, and 
Australian banking sectors revealed the importance of IC in the financial sector. The 
research results highlighted the fact that there was a strong interaction between IC and 
organizational corporate success. Pulic's research demonstrated that banks, with higher 
expenditures on IC components, were more profitable and had better financial 
performance. Pulic and Bornemann (1997) were the first to study the impact of IC in the 
banking industry. Their study measured the IC performance of 24 largest Austrian 
banks for the years 1993-1995 and submitted that the increased efficiency in IC was the 
simplest, cheapest and most secure way to ensure sustainable success and the most 
important resource of corporate success. Pulic (2002) measured the IC performance of 
Croatian banks for the years 1996-2000 by using VAIC
TM
 as a methodological tool. The 
study revealed significant differences in bank ranking based on efficiency and 
performance. Similarly do Rosário Cabrita and Vaz (2005) provided empirical evidence 
that IC was related substantively and significantly to the organizational performance in 
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the Portuguese banking industry. In a similar vein, Ting and Lean (2009) tested the 
relationship between IC and the financial performance of Malaysian financial 
institutions for the years 1999-2007. Using the same methodological tool, the empirical 
findings revealed that there was a significantly positive relationship between VAIC
TM
 
and return on assets (ROA).  The authors concluded that VAIC
TM
 indicated efficiency 
in creating corporate value or the extent of corporate intellectual ability. In other words, 
an increase in value creation efficiency has a positive influence on a firm’s profitability. 
Therefore, the study suggested that it was necessary to maximize the utilization of 
resources, specifically IC, for financial institutions in order to maximize the company’s 
profits. Such strong association between IC efficiency and banks' performance was 
confirmed, also, in studies conducted in Turkey and Thailand. Yalama and Coskun 
(2007) examined the impact of VAIC
TM
 on a bank's profitability and revealed that IC 
was a more important factor than CE (physical and financial capital) for banks listed on 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market. Saengchan (2008) studied the relationship 
between IC capability and financial performance of Thai commercial banks for the 
period from 2000 to 2007. The study confirmed that IC acted as a major source of 
corporate advantage to Thai banks since IC efficiency of was associated strongly with 
the banks’ profitability. Similarly,  Appuhami (2007) found that a firm’s IC  had a 
significantly positive relationship with its investors’ capital gains and shares. The 
findings enhanced the knowledge base of IC and development of competitive 
advantages in an emerging economy like Thailand. 
In summary, the above mentioned studies examined the impact of IC on 
business performance as measured by the firm’s market valuation, profitability, 
productivity, return on equity, etc.  These studies documented mixed evidence about the 
relationship between IC and a firm’s overall performance. Some of the literature tended 
to treat the sub-components of IC i.e. human IC and structural IC as completely 
independent constructs and, thereby, lost sight of the whole IC. This is not to say that 
defining and understanding the subcategories of IC is unimportant; quite the contrary. In 
fact, developing theoretically based subcategories of IC is necessity in order to advance 
our ability to operationalize and understand the very abstract and sometimes confusing 
IC concept. Youndt et al. (2004) posited that treating human IC and structural IC as 
discrete, unidimensional phenomena tended to simplify reality by not explicitly 
acknowledging the potential patterns of coexistence among these differing types of IC. 
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Therefore, in order to fully understand how IC develops and drives performance, it may 
be helpful to look at an organization’s overall profile of IC in aggregate and to focus 
independently on individual parts. 
Accordingly, it is expected that the higher a firm’s aggregate stock of IC, the 
more successful the firm will be and the greater will be its competitive advantage. In 
other words, the higher the value added intellectual coefficient of IC (hereafter, VAIC) 
that the IFI has, the higher will be its accounting and market performance based on 
ROA and Tobin’s Q respectively. Hence, the main hypothesis to be tested is that IC is 
associated positively with the performance of IFIs (i.e. accounting performance based 
on ROA and market performance based on Tobin’s Q) as measured by the additional 
net value created. The hypothesis is in line with the resource-based view of the firm by 
anticipating a positive contribution of IC as a strategic asset on the performance of IFI. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant positive relationship between VAIC and the 
performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
The extant literature suggests that typically IC is understood to consist of human IC; 
this is creative and structural or organizational IC which consists of best practices. 
Murthy and Mouritsen (2011) suggested that it was necessary to measure the 
contribution of each resource, particularly for the financial services industry which was 
relatively less researched. Accordingly, sub-components of VAIC viz. HCE, SCE, and 
CEE were measured separately, to examine which of the three components contributed 
most to the value creation of IFIs. 
 
5.2.1.1 Human capital efficiency (HCE) and performance 
Colombo and Grilli (2005) suggested that firms with greater human IC (i.e. higher 
education or skill)  were likely to have better entrepreneurial judgment and as long as 
human IC continued to be developed, staff  could improve their job performance and, 
ultimately, improve the firm’s performance (Hsu, 2007). Human IC increases as staff 
accumulate specialized information, skill and know-how; this allows them to 
communicate efficiently and effectively and, thus,  reduces decision-making errors and  
improves performance (Luthans and Youssef, 2004). This inference found, also, support 
in other literature streams. For instance, human capital theorists (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 
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1961), simply reason that an increase in worker skills, knowledge, and abilities most 
likely translates into increased organizational performance. Likewise, Dakhli and De 
Clercq (2004) suggested that a firm's stock of human IC would influence its 
profitability. 
Empirical evidence from the financial sector suggested a significant relationship 
between human IC and firm performance. Mavridis (2004) analyzed 141 Japanese 
banks for the period 2000 to 2001. The author focused on the actual status of human and 
physical capital and its impact on the 'intellectual' added value-based performance. The 
study revealed that the best performing banks were those who had mainly very good 
results in the usage of their IC, particularly, the human capital. In Malaysia, Goh (2005) 
measured, using VAIC
TM
 methodology, the IC performance of Malaysian commercial 
banks for the years 2001 to 2003,. The results showed that the value creation capability 
of Malaysia’s commercial banks was attributed largely to HCE. This means that 
investment in human IC yields a relatively higher return than investments in physical 
and structural IC. A later study by Ting and Lean (2009) confirmed these findings. 
Employing the same methodology, Kamath (2007) analyzed the value-based 
performance of the Indian banking sector for the years 2000 to 2004. The results 
showed that foreign banks were the top performers in HCE. Similarly a recent study by 
Mondal and Ghosh (2012) suggested that, when the measure of IC was classified into 
major components, HCE played a major role in enhancing the returns of banks and 
suggests that an increase in HC investment enhances the banks’ financial performance; 
this is consistent with the earlier findings of Goh (2005) in Malaysia. Recently, Joshi et 
al. (2013) examined the IC performance of the Australian financial sector for the period 
from 2006 to 2008 and reported that all Australian-owned banks  had relatively higher 
HC efficiency than CE and SC efficiency. Mention and Bontis (2013) reported that, 
based on the questionnaire survey of both the Belgian and Luxemburg banking sectors, 
human IC contributed both directly and indirectly to business performance in the 
banking sector. 
All in all, the empirical evidence suggested human capital to be the performance 
driver in the financial sector. In the case of IFIs, human IC is important since employees 
are expected to not only have conventional knowledge and skills related to the provision 
of such services but, also, to have  a good knowledge on Shariah because this will 
enhance the credibility and reputation of IFIs in the market place. The knowledge, 
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embedded in the human IC and employed by the IFIs, is valuable, rare, and isolated 
from imitation or substitution. As suggested in the resource-based view of the firm, the 
next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a significant positive relationship between HCE and the 
performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.1.2 Structural capital efficiency (SCE) and performance 
Structural IC provides an environment which enables an organization to create and 
leverage knowledge. An organization with strong structural IC will have a supportive 
culture which encourages employees to try and learn new knowledge (Florin et al., 
2003). De Brentani and Kleinschmidt (2004) suggested that an organization's operation 
processes and the organizational commitment of sufficient resources had a significant 
impact on performance. A similar suggestion  was made by Youndt et al. (2004), who 
found structural IC to be associated typically with financial returns and Tobin’s Q. 
Likewise, Hsu and Wang (2012) posited that structural IC, i.e. operations, procedures 
and the processes of knowledge management, propelled organizations’ value creation 
activities which had a positive effect on their performance. In other words, firms require 
advanced technologies to compete in today’s fast-paced economy and, therefore, greater 
care is needed to manage structural IC so that the required level of performance is 
achieved. Additionally, investments in structural IC can have a positive impact on 
corporate performance. 
 For example, Huang and Liu (2005) employed multiple regression models to 
examine the relationships between innovation capital and information technology (IT) 
capital (i.e. structural IC) and a firm’s performance. They reported that investment in 
structural IC had a positive effect on performance. Likewise, El-Bannany (2008) 
applied variables to study the IC performance of UK banks for the years 1999-2005. 
The study found that investments in IT systems, banks' efficiency, barriers to entry and 
efficiency of investments in IC variables had a significant impact on IC performance. 
 Murthy and Mouritsen (2011) argued that there might be trade-offs between the 
elements of IC, suggesting that multiple forms of intellectual capital  might be 
unproductive. Consequently, not all investments in the elements of IC are profitable for 
IFIs (Youndt et al., 2004; Li, 2001). Recent empirical evidence extended support to this 
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argument. Mention and Bontis (2013) found human IC to be the value driver in the 
Belgian and Luxemburg banking sectors whereas structural IC was found to be related 
positively to business performance. This suggests that structural IC is not the main 
value driver; however, it offers some kind of supporting mechanism to the addition of 
overall value. 
Particularly in the case of the Islamic finance industry and given that it is a 
relatively young industry with a less stabilized structural capital, expenditure on 
structural IC is expected to be high. This may reflect negatively on the performance 
indicators. Moreover, IFIs adopt different structural processes and systems to track and 
record their transactions. Unlike the conventional banking system, penalty on late 
payment, for instance, is not credited into the account receivables. Such penalties are 
considered to be interest and are subject to a charity account set up for the benevolence 
loans and other charitable purposes. This requires development and investment in the 
structural processes which will enhance their performance. Furthermore, IFIs adopt a 
rare structural mechanism which is not imitated by their conventional rivals. This 
argument is in line with the resource-based view of the firm; this attributes superior 
economic performance to organizational resources and capabilities (Bharadwaj, 2000). 
Since RBV recognizes explicitly the importance of tangible and intangibles, it offers a 
significant opportunity to explore these theoretical complementarities by examining the 
relationship between structural IC resources and performance of IFIs. Therefore, the 
next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a significant positive relationship between SCE and the 
performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.1.3 Capital employed efficiency (CEE) and performance 
Empirical evidence suggested a positive relationship between CEE and corporate 
performance. For instance, Mavridis (2004) found a significantly positive correlation 
between value added and CEE. Similarly, Kamath (2007) found Indian public sector 
banks to be the top performers in CEE when compared to their foreign counterparts. In 
an extended research on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Chu et al. (2011) reported that 
structural capital enhanced corporate profitability but CEE was still a major  
determinant of the financial performance. 
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Most of the IFIs are based along the Arabian Peninsula and are blessed with the 
petrodollar. The powerful groups in the Gulf-region, particularly the Royal families, 
their extended families, and to a lesser degree those having close working relationships 
with them (Hudaib and Haniffa 2009). These groups own most of the wealth in the 
Gulf-region. This provided Islamic banking with an opportunity to lure the huge sums 
of petrodollars amassed in these hands. A major proportion of this wealth is channeled 
through IFIs for investment purposes since the clients seek investment opportunities 
which do not violate their religious obligations. IFIs offer such a platform. This brings 
huge sums of money into the Shariah-compliant business and increases the physical and 
financial bases of IFIs. The financial capital, raised from shareholders and depositors, 
must be managed efficiently as it is based on the Islamic concept of amanah (trust). 
Since no interest is involved in the Islamic way of banking and profit, it is earned solely 
through employing capital in different projects. Therefore, the efficiency of employed 
capital is expected to be associated positively with the overall performance of IFIs. 
Hence, the next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1c: There is a significant positive relationship between CEE and the 
performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Most studies, including those on the financial services industries, examined generally 
the association between IC and firm performance in a single country context while 
controlling for firm-specific variables i.e. firm-size and leverage. Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) suggested that attempts to establish the existence of such an association without 
controlling for the influence of corporate governance characteristics might ‘‘lead to 
spurious relationships and misguided conclusions’’. This study attempts to mitigate this 
concern.  In a departure from  previous research,  this study examines empirically the 
impact of corporate governance features i.e. board size, board composition, leadership 
structure, size of Shariah supervisory board (SSB), and size of audit committee (ACS), 
on the performance. 
 
5.2.2 Corporate governance (CG) and performance 
The main theoretical framework for the vast majority of corporate governance research 
is represented by the agency theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dalton et al., 2003). 
Agency models imply generally that managers and shareholders tend to have divergent 
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interests (Salama and Putnam, 2013) and, as a result, when monitoring is lax, managers 
may pursue corporate strategies that are not in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986). 
 Previous research indicated that corporate managers  were generally risk-averse 
due to their dependence on the firm for their immediate livelihoods (Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998). With a preference for reducing uncertainty, corporate managers are 
likely to support policies and strategies related to Physical Capital (PC) over IC 
resources because they are better able to directly control the former (Mahnke, 1997). 
This condition arises because ownership  of PC resources is attributed to shareholders 
who, then, pass responsibility for their use to corporate management (Ho and Williams, 
2003). Consequently, control of IC resources may not be within the direct power of a 
corporate manager. Without direct control, corporate managers have less ability to apply 
ex ante monitoring criteria and cannot make adjustments as easily on a continuous basis 
to reduce uncertainties (Mahnke, 1997). 
Correspondingly, corporate governance advocates highlighted the potential 
association between corporate governance features and firm performance (Blair, 1995; 
Mahnke, 1997; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Zaman et al., 2011). An extant literature 
examined the impact of corporate governance on firm value. In the US, Gompers et al. 
(2003) analysed the association between corporate governance and long-term equity 
returns, firm value based on Tobin’s Q, and accounting measures of performance based 
on ROE. The study revealed that well-governed firms outperformed their poorly 
governed counterparts. Furthermore, well-governed firms offer higher ROE; are valued 
more highly; and their accounting statements show a better operating performance. 
Bauer et al. (2004) replicated the same to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value in the context of European firms operating in fifteen 
different countries across Europe. The study revealed that the said relationship 
weakened substantially after adjusting for country differences. Contrary to Gompers et 
al. (2003), the study found a negative relationship between ROE and net profit margin 
and proxies used to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. These findings suggest a significant relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value. Moreover, the results of Salama and Putnam’s (2013)  
recent study suggested that firms with higher quality corporate governance performed 
better and traded at higher values. 
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Islamic banking is an eastern concept while conventional corporate governance 
is a western concept. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine if the conventional 
corporate governance model fits to the Islamic way of banking. The effect of each 
performance variable is analysed separately. The following sections develop hypotheses 
related to each CG features. 
 
5.2.2.1 Board size 
Although previous studies showed an association between board size and corporate 
performance (Provan, 1980; Kidwell and Bennett, 1993; Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Alexander et al., 1993), no consensus existed as to the direction of this association. 
Agency theory tenets argued generally for smaller boards reasoning that as size 
increased control and monitoring functions  were impaired (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; 
Dalton et al., 1999). Agency theorists advocate, also, that a larger board size increases 
the opportunity for manipulation by corporate management. For example, Jensen (1993, 
p. 865) argued that when ‘‘boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely 
to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control”. From an Islamic 
standpoint of Shura (consultation) and in accordance with RBV, a large board size is 
better for IFIs as the functioning of an Islamic bank requires diversified and constant 
advisory. Therefore, the hypothesis, tested here, is: 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a significant positive relationship between board size and 
the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.2.2 Board composition 
Board composition is defined as the proportion of outside directors to the total number 
of directors, thereby making a distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Several theoretical perspectives (e.g. agency 
theory, resource-dependence theory and stakeholder theory), support the proposition 
that outside directors are instrumental in guiding a firm’s performance. 
The premise of agency theory is that non-executive directors are needed on the 
board to monitor and control the action of executive directors due to their opportunistic 
behaviors. On the other hand, the resource-dependence theory proposes that non-
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executive directors provide firms with links to the external environment due to their 
expertise, prestige and contacts. 
While the above reasoning appears compelling, there were mixed empirical 
results of the association between the proportion of outside directors and corporate 
performance.  For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) contended that inclusion of outside 
directors on boards would result in improved corporate performance.  However, this 
expectation  was questioned by Baysinger et al. (1991), who argued that, in the absence 
of detailed information, outside directors  might be unable to understand business well 
enough to make a meaningful contribution to improve the firm's performance.  Also, 
from a stakeholder perspective, stakeholder orientations are likely to be more diversified 
amongst outside directors relative to inside directors (Youndt et al., 2004). Finally, as 
Wang and Dewhirst (1992, p120) stated, ‘‘outside directors have a very strong 
stakeholder orientation, and recognize that their responsibility encompasses more than 
shareholders and are very conscious about the needs and expectations of the various 
constituencies of their firms’’. 
Despite conflicting arguments and inconclusive empirical results, board 
composition is a potentially important factor affecting corporate performance. Hence, 
the study controls, also, for the proportion of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) on the 
board. A high proportion of NEDs suggests better governance because such directors 
have an interest in protecting their own ‘reputation capital’ and avoiding potential 
financial losses that may result from litigation (Young et al., 2000). IFIs need more 
NEDs with different skills and expertise e.g. Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic accounting, 
knowledge of accounting standards (IFRS and AAOIFI) etc.. Accordingly, the extended 
research hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a significant positive relationship between proportion of 
NEDs on the board and the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.2.3 Leadership structure (Role duality) 
The impact of duality on corporate performance was of interest to advocates of various 
schools of thought (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Patton and 
Baker, 1987).  Previous research on corporate governance suggests that the board's 
monitoring efficiency is enhanced when the CEO has limited power in influencing the 
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board's agendas and actions (Yermack, 1996; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Jensen (1993) 
contended that the presence of a dual CEO (when the CEO simultaneously serves as 
chairman of the board)  was a strong indication of an inefficient board of directors and 
he maintained that, for the board to be effective, it  was important to separate the CEO 
and chairman positions. Correspondingly, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggested that 
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman  would help enhance monitoring quality. 
The arguments, taken together, indicate that the relationship between leadership 
structure and performance appears to be ambiguous. Hence, it is interesting to analyze 
the direction of the relationship in the context of this study. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2c: There is a significant relationship between role duality and the 
performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.2.4 Size of Shariah supervisory board (SSB) 
Co-governance36 by the religious leaders is another unique aspect of corporate 
governance concerning IFIs. The underlying principle of Islamic banking and finance is 
the Shariah-compatibility of all its products and services.  In order to comply with this 
rule, Islamic finance is co-governed by the Shariah scholars (advisors), who specialize 
in Islamic law and jurisprudence sometimes with a background of economics and 
finance (Ayub, 2009; Schoon, 2010). 
The SSB’s obligations include advising on some specific issues with reference to 
Shariah and Shariah auditing to satisfy the stakeholders since it does not operate as an 
ex-post compliance medium. Furthermore, Shariah advisors have vested interests, also, 
in fulfilling their responsibilities since, besides enhancing their own future advisory 
opportunities, they need to protect the reputation of Islam (as the whole business is 
based on religious ideology) and their own personal reputations in the society. For these 
reasons, SSB size is expected to influence the performance of IFIs. Again referring to 
the Islamic concept of Shura, IFIs do not require a large SSB size; however, a standard 
                                                 
36
Ahmed (2011) contended that the SSB did not have any executive role; however, the prime obligation 
of SSB is the advisory role. 
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SSB should not be less than three permanent members. Therefore, the next hypothesis 
is: 
Hypothesis 2d: There is a significant relationship between SSB-size and the 
performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.2.5 Audit committee size (ACS) 
The accounting literature emphasized the importance of auditing regimes in enhancing 
internal corporate control by reducing information asymmetries between management 
and shareholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). A major 
function of the audit committee is to establish and maintain high quality financial 
reporting process of the firm (Chen and Zhou, 2007); this mitigates the agency 
problems related to under-investment i.e. tendency to pass positive NPV projects, over-
investments i.e. tendency to invest in negative NPV projects or both (Biddle et al. 
2009).  Chen and Chen (2012)  found firms with strong audit committees made more 
efficient capital allocation decisions and enjoyed a high access value. Research suggests 
that a larger audit committee is more likely to enhance its status and power within an 
organization, and demand higher audit quality (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). 
Furthermore, Pincus et al. (1990) suggested that larger audit committees  would be more 
likely to discover potential problems through an increase in resources which would 
enable them to help improve the quality of its oversight. Taking all the arguments into 
account, this study tested the following hypothesis that large audit committee enhanced 
the audit process. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2e: There is a significant positive relationship between audit 
committee size and the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.3 Firm specific factors and performance 
As knowledge creation, diffusion, and storage are inherently evolutionary in nature, the 
degree to which an organization develops its IC may vary across the sample.  Extant 
literature (Bashir, 1999; Bader et al., 2008; Majid et al., 2010; Čihák and Hesse, 2010)  
examined the performance efficiency of  IFIs whereas some of those studies made, also, 
a comparison between Islamic and conventional financial institutions. Controlling for 
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internal factors, such as bank size, leverage, bank age, and environmental factors, such 
as country macroeconomic conditions, type of bank and accessibility of banking 
services, operating region, financial regulations etc., highlight a number of significant 
differences in business orientation. 
Accordingly, as suggested by the extant literature (Daily and Dalton, 1994; 
Segars and Grover, 1995; Young et al., 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chen and Li, 
2013; Kadous et al., 2013), this study  used a number of firm-specific variables. As 
control variables, the standard proxies, used to measure the control factors in this study, 
are defined formally below. 
 
5.2.3.1 Firm-size 
Bashir (1999) was among the pioneer studies which examined analytically and 
empirically the implications of the bank’s scale (total assets) on profitability and risk 
measures of two Islamic banks based in Sudan. The study found a significant 
relationship between size and profitability measures i.e. ROA and ROE, suggesting that 
Islamic banks became more profitable as they grew in size. Likewise, Majid et al. 
(2010) investigated the efficiency of Islamic and  conventional banks and suggested that 
Islamic banking  might benefit from increased scale. However, Čihák and Hesse (2010) 
posited that small Islamic banks outperformed small conventional and large Islamic 
banks. Firm size is expected to be related positively to both accounting performance of 
IFIs based on ROA and market performance of IFIs based on Tobin’s Q. The next 
research hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a significant positive relationship between firm size and 
the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.3.2 Firm complexity 
Structural complexity is yet another potential factors related to firm-related 
characteristics; this  was suggested as being significant in explaining the impact of IC 
on a  firm’s performance (Hsu and Wang, 2012).  The total number of existing 
subsidiaries (SUB) is used as a proxy measure for firm complexity. Courtis (1979) and 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) submitted that firm complexity required a firm to have an 
122 
 
effective Management Information System (MIS) for monitoring purposes and the 
availability of such a system helped to reduce the cost of information production per 
unit. Thus, firms with a greater number of subsidiaries are more complex and, 
ultimately, need higher internal control and greater in-house capabilities (Zaman et al., 
2011). Accordingly, the next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a significant positive relationship between structural 
complexity of business and the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 
5.2.3.3 Level of risk 
Level of risk or leverage, which is another control variable, is employed as a proxy of a 
firm’s capital structure that is likely to affect firm performance. Geringer et al. (2000) 
found the level of risk to be related significantly to the firm’s performance. According 
to Smith and Warner (1979), leverage reflects a firm’s financial risk; this may limit the 
firm’s available economic resources to support long-term intangible investment. Level 
of risk, using leverage as a proxy, is another firm-related control variable used in this 
study. Firms with higher leverage require careful monitoring to protect themselves from 
business and financial risk and, as such, are related negatively to both accounting and 
market based performance measures. Accordingly, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3c: There is a significant negative relationship between leverage and 
the financial performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.3.4 Listing status 
Listed firms are more visible and tend to attract the market’s attention.  The literature 
suggests that listing status is a significant factor in explaining strategic information 
disclosures (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1992). Moreover, listed firms are more likely to meet 
the needs of capital markets  in obtaining funds on favourable terms (Gray et al., 1995). 
Likewise, Yudistira (2004) posited that listing status  had a positive impact on the 
efficiency of Islamic banks. An increasing demand for Islamic bonds has been 
witnessed in recent years. This calls upon the IFIs to become listed in order to attract 
more investors and be more visible to the market.  A review of the Islamic financial 
market revealed that the absolute number of listed IFIs increased during recent years. 
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Such a trend may be attributed to the increased demand for Shariah compliance 
products. Therefore, it was important to examine the effect of listing status on the 
performance of IFIs. Listed IFIs can attract more investment. Equally, listing status 
enhances the confidence level of investors. Hence, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3d: There is a significant positive relationship between listing status 
the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.3.5 Type of auditor (BIG4) 
It is suggested that firms with internal control problems are less likely to hire a BIG4 
auditor because they might be financially constrained and consider a BIG4 firm to be 
too expensive. Equally, the BIG4 auditors might avoid such firms because they are 
perceived to be risky and might expose the BIG4 to potential litigation. 
 Kadous et al. (2013) were of the view that non-specialists (non-Big4) auditors, 
relied on a trust heuristic in assessing and weighting a firm. Furthermore, the authors 
argued that the non-specialists appeared to substitute trust in a stronger social bonds for 
an objective assessment. In turn, the firm was weighted heavily due to the stronger 
social bond, even when it was poorly justified. Such trust heuristic is troublesome 
because it implies that social bonds inhibit the objective processing of new information.  
This is because the specialists (the Big4) do not engage in a trust heuristic and are less 
prone to the trust heuristic. Islamic finance is based on trust among the parties involved 
in Shariah-compliance business and advocates strong social bonds while the specialist 
auditors do not seem to put weight on such values. Therefore, it is worth testing if the 
choice of auditor has an impact on the performance of an IFI. 
Recent studies suggested that high-quality auditing enhanced a firm’s value in the 
market. For instance, Chen and Li (2013) tested a sample of 376 largest Canadian firms 
listed on the TSX Venture Exchange during 2003–2004 and posited that high-quality 
audit reduced the likelihood of managerial asset diversion and enhanced firm value.  
Furthermore, the study suggested that compliance with the stringent auditing policy had 
a significantly positive impact on a firm’s market performance based on Tobin’s Q and 
investment efficiency and a significantly negative impact on a firm’s cost of equity 
capital.  As described above, BIG4 enhances the market confidence. Accordingly, the 
study tested the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3e: There is a significant positive relationship between type of auditor 
and the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 
5.2.3.6 Operating region 
Islamic finance is a global phenomenon and not subject only to Muslim dominated 
regions. Consequently, IFIs operate in a global context and are present in more than one 
hundred countries worldwide. As investments in firms IC and performance outcomes 
may differ systematically across geographical locations, it is imperative to control for 
operating region in order to identify the differences between geographical proximity and 
similarities in terms of cultural background. 
 This research includes 64 IFIs based in ten different countries worldwide. The 
sample countries range from high to relatively low income economies and significant 
differences exist in many characteristics including those related to social structure, 
economics, politics, and geography (Majid et al., 2010). Therefore, for instance, 
countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, are plagued by the effects of political 
unrest; this results in high outflows of capital and low inflow of FDI as the investors’ 
confidence is shaken. In contrast, due to its high level of economic development and its 
comprehensive regulatory framework, countries, such as Bahrain and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) attracted confidence among investors (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). 
Additionally, Bonin et al. (2005) submitted that country-specific factors played a 
significant role in explaining the differences in firm performance. Besides such specific 
country differences, significant differences in financial reporting standards and bank 
regulatory frameworks (Karim 2001) suggest strongly that  appropriate controlling for 
the operating region would have an important impact on the performance of the samples 
IFIs. Accordingly, the hypothesis, tested here, is as follows:  
Hypothesis 3f: There is a significant positive relationship between operating 
region and the performance of IFIs based on ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2.4 Research Models 
The research models were developed based on an in-depth review of the literature 
including the relevant theories. As stated in Chapter 1, the main purpose of this study 
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was to investigate the effects of IC efficiency and CG characteristics on IFIs’ 
performance, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics during the period 2007 
to 2011. Referring to Figure 4.1, IC efficiency was this study’s variable of interest 
which might affect IFIs’ performance. According to resource-based theory, firms, which 
utilize their IC resources efficiently, are able to enhance their economic performance by 
gaining competitive advantages. Since VAIC refers to the overall IC efficiency and is 
comprised of the three components, this study considers not only the overall IC 
efficiency but, also, each component’s efficiency in affecting economic performance.  
Hence, the IC independent variables consist of VAIC, HCE, SCE and CCE. 
Corporate governance characteristics was this study’s second variable of interest 
which might affect the IFIs’ economic performance. Agency models imply generally 
that managers and shareholders tend to have divergent interests and, as a result when 
monitoring is lax, managers may pursue corporate strategies which are not in the best 
interests of shareholders.  This is because Islamic finance (in theory) is based on trust 
and requires relatively less monitoring than conventional financial institutions. 
Therefore, consistent with this study’s primary objective, there was an examination of 
the impact of CG features i.e. board-size, board composition, leadership structure, size 
of Shariah supervisory board and size of audit committee on the IFIs’ performance. As 
suggested by the agency theory, firm related factors were this study’s third variable of 
interest which might affect IFIs’ performance. Agency theory suggests that firm 
performance can be affected by the internal factors such as firm size, level of risk, firm 
complexity as well external factors such as operating region. Performance is assessed 
based on two distinguish measures: ROA (accounting performance); and Tobin’s Q 
(market performance). 
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Figure 4.1 
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Firm-related factors :(H3) 
1. Firm-size (FSIZE) 
2.  Level of risk 
3. Type of auditor (BIG4) 
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5. Firm complexity (SUB) 
6. Operating region 
Governance-related factors :(H2) 
1. Board-size (BSIZE) 
2. Board composition (NED) 
3. Role duality 
4. Shariah supervisory board size (SSB) 
5. Size of audit committee (ACS) 
IC efficiency :(H1) 
 VAIC 
 Human Capital Efficiency (HCE) 
 Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) 
 Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) 
Resource-based Theory 
Agency Theory 
Agency Theory 
H1a (+) 
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H2d (+/-) 
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H3b (-) 
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5.2.5 Impact of IC and corporate governance on the performance of IFIs pre and 
post financial crisis 
An overall slowdown in the financial markets around the globe was observed during the 
recent global financial crisis. The crisis shook, also, the foundations of the centuries old 
financial system and shed doubts on the proper functioning of the conventional banking 
system. There were calls for radical changes to the existing financial system. While 
radical transformation may threaten the profitability and survival of existing incumbent 
conventional financial institutions, it may bring, also, a cohort of new opportunities and 
powerful new players into the market such as the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). 
 The superior performance of the Islamic finance industry during the global 
financial crisis attracted increased attention on the Islamic way of banking. Academics 
and policy makers alike pointed to the advantages of the Islamic way of banking and 
how it helped contain the adverse impact on profitability during the crisis. Hasan and 
Dridi (2010) observed that the credit and asset growth of Islamic finance were at least 
twice as high as that of conventional banks during the global financial crisis.   
Furthermore, Hasan and Dridi (2010, p. 33) stressed that “While conventional 
intermediation is largely debt-based and allows for risk transfer, Islamic intermediation, 
in contrast, is asset-based, and centres on risk sharing. In addition to providing Islamic 
banks with additional buffers, these features make their activities more closely related to 
the real economy and tend to reduce their contribution to excesses and bubbles.” 
In a recent study, while controlling simultaneously for time-variant country-
fixed effects, Beck et al. (2013) documented significant differences in business 
orientation while comparing the efficiency and stability of the traditional model of 
financial intermediation (conventional banking model) and the Shariah-compliant 
business model (Islamic banking model),. The study found that IFIs were better 
capitalized; had higher asset quality and higher equity-asset ratios; and were less likely 
to disintermediate especially during crises. This might explain why they are less subject 
to disintermediation and deleveraging as often observed in conventional financial 
institutions. Furthermore, the study posited that such higher capitalization and better 
asset quality had helped IFIs to outperform their conventional counterparts during 
financial distress. 
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Corporate governance is yet another potential factor which plays a significant 
role during an unseen crisis. For instance, Mitton (2002) measured the impact of 
corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), using a sample of 
398 firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The study 
suggested that stronger corporate governance was an important factor, especially during 
an unexpected period of extreme economic distress. Baek et al. (2004) measured the 
impact of corporate governance on firm value during the 1997 Korean financial crisis. 
The study found that firm value was related to several key indicators of corporate 
governance and suggested that differences in governance practice at the firm level 
played a significant role in determining its value during a crisis. 
Shariah-compliant business is regarded as one of the fastest growing segments in 
the global financial services. Islamic finance has become systemically important in 
many markets and too big to be ignored. Literature shows that Islamic banking and 
finance grew at the rate of 15-20 per cent during the last decade (Schoon 2010) and the 
total assets held by the IFIs doubled to US$ 2 trillion during the same period (Beck et 
al., 2013; Ernst and Young, 2013). At present, there are 400 IFIs spread over 100 
countries worldwide, covering most of the Muslim world and various market niches in 
the West (Ernst and Young, 2011; Nawaz 2013b). Islamic finance is expected to enjoy 
the same trends in the upcoming years. Although the financial assets still constitute only 
a fraction of total global banking assets (1.5%), the importance of the Islamic way of 
banking has been increasing rapidly. 
While the financial crisis gave Islamic finance an opportunity to prove its 
resilience, it highlighted, also, the need to address important challenges facing the 
Islamic finance industry. In order to sustain the current robust growth, IFIs need to 
come up with new products in order to fulfil the increasing needs of their clients; these 
are more diversified than before. Such product innovation requires higher intangible 
resources, especially human intellectual capital (people with the knowledge of Shariah 
and economic qualification). Equally, sophisticated structural capital is needed to 
execute the innovative ideas and convert them into tangible products. At the same time, 
IFIs are constrained by the Shariah-code not to raise capital from illegitimate sources. 
Therefore, IC resources are significantly important for IFIs. 
In summary, the empirical evidence posited for the sound financial health of the 
Islamic finance industry. There was a reported upward trend in the growth of total assets 
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held by the IFIs (Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Beck et al., 2013). This implies that trust in the 
Islamic finance industry remained unshaken during the financial turmoil; this resulted in 
higher fractions of financial capital (capital employed) flowing into the Islamic banking 
system. As a result, during the financial crisis, IFIs outperformed their conventional 
rivals by producing higher financial returns (Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010). Equally, 
the significance of effective corporate governance mechanism and corporate 
performance, particularly during the financial turbulence, were documented, also 
(Mitton, 2002; Baek et al., 2004). Several key indicators of corporate governance are 
said to be associated with a firm’s market value and differences in governance practice 
at the firm level play a significant role in determining its value during a crisis. In a crux, 
the efficiency, in utilising the resource base including both physical, and financial and 
IC, can be regarded as the main factor which can help an IFI to maintain sound financial 
and market performance during financial distress.  
Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested here is that it is anticipated that trust plays 
a vital role in attracting huge sums of capital for the IFIs during the crisis. Trust in 
Islamic finance is that all the operations of IFIs are Shariah-compliant in which, ideally, 
both management (including SSB) and staff (human IC: agent) are well-versed in 
Shariah knowledge along with the knowledge of contemporary economics. Therefore, 
IFIs used the raised capital in an efficient (using technological resources: structural IC) 
manner to produce higher financial returns and market value and, hence, they remained 
stable during the financial crisis. The hypothesis is in line with agency theory by 
anticipating the role of IFIs as agents and is line, also, with resource-based view by 
determining the role of IC as a crucial asset in attaining and maintaining superior 
performance.  
However, the studies, conducted in the area, were concerned about the tangible 
aspects and ignored the intangible aspects; these are arguably the main performance 
drivers for IFIs. The financial performance of IFIs was stable during the crisis; however, 
no evidence is available on the IC and CG performance of IFIs. Therefore, it was 
important to analyse which IC i.e. human IC, structural IC and financial capital played a 
crucial role in helping IFIs to maintain superior performance during the recent financial 
distress. The analysis would help, also, to identify the areas that needed further 
improvement. Therefore the hypothesis to be tested here is: 
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Hypothesis 4: To what extent do IC and CG affect performance during the 
financial crisis? 
This research’s secondary objective was to compare the IC and CG performance of IFIs 
before and after the global financial crisis.  This study extended over a five year period 
i.e. 2007-2011. The recent financial crisis was triggered in 2007; however, it is 
imperative to include the data from 2008 as well since this can offer a better 
understanding of the effects of the crisis on the performance of IFIs. Therefore, years 
2007 and 2008 were regarded as the pre-crisis period. 2009 was regarded as the time of 
market adjustments whereas the signs of recovery can be witnessed by the end of the 
study period. Accordingly, years 2010 and 2011 are said to be the recovery years of the 
post-crisis period. The research framework 2 (see research framework 2) was used to 
examine the effects of IC and CG features on the performance of IFIs before and after 
the crisis. Research framework 2 is identical to the main research framework i.e. 
framework 1, with the exception of controlling for the time period being the pre-crisis 
(2007-2008) and the post-crisis (2010-2011). 
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Figure 4.2 
Research Framework 2 
Impact of IC and corporate governance on performance of IFIs pre- and post-financial crisis 
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132 
 
5.2.6 Comparative analysis of Islamic finance industry 
The basic assumption, underlying the conventional banking theories, was that banks 
accepted deposits at a lower interest rate and resold those deposited funds to those 
seeking funds for economic activities at a higher interest rate. Therefore, the banks 
earned profit based on their competitive advantage at gathering information and 
underwriting risk (Santos, 2001). Hence, in conventional banking system, profits were 
driven mainly by the spread between the interest rates i.e. the interest rate received from 
the capital borrowers and the interest rate paid to depositors. Here, the contention was 
that IFIs performed the same intermediary function with the exception of a 
predetermined interest rate. In other words, IFIs did not receive or pay a predetermined 
or prefix interest rate. Instead, profits were earned through investments in different 
projects and shared on the basis of agreements between the depositors and the 
borrowers. 
Given the robust growth of the Islamic finance industry, many leading 
conventional banking groups i.e. Citibank, HSBC, and Standard Chartered bank etc. 
made their way to the Islamic way of banking. As a consequence, the number of 
financial institutions, offering Shariah-compliant products, increased causing 
competition within the Islamic finance industry. Correspondingly, many empirical 
studies examined the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks and documented that 
IFIs were more efficient than their conventional counterparts. Nonetheless, the evidence 
in this regard remained inconclusive. 
Most of the available studies used the traditional financial ratios such as ROA 
and ROE to assess the performance of banks be they conventional or Islamic. These 
financial ratios were used, also, by some of those studies to compare the performance 
between the two sets of banking. Additionally, the studies controlled, also, for 
macroeconomic factors i.e. GDP growth, operating region and firm-specific 
characteristics i.e. size and age. 
Borrowing from Agency and Intermediation theories, Bashir (1999) examined 
analytically and empirically the implications of the bank’s scale (total assets) on the 
profitability and the risk measures of two Islamic banks based in Sudan. The study 
found a significant relationship between size and profitability measures i.e. ROA and 
ROE suggesting that the Islamic banks became more profitable as they grew in size. 
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Whilst Bashir’s study remained country specific, other studies were conducted in a 
cross-country manner. Hassan and Bashir (2003) analysed the impact of bank 
characteristics and the overall financial environment on the performance of Islamic 
banks operating in 21 countries worldwide for the period 1994-2001. The results 
revealed that the profitability measures of Islamic banks responded positively to the 
increase in capital and responded negatively to loan ratios. Likewise, Yudistira (2004) 
analysed the stability and efficiency of eighteen Islamic banks for the period 1997-2000 
and reported that the selected Islamic banks remained efficient in creating value during 
the study period. The study found, also, that unlisted banks were based in regions other 
than the Middle East and comparatively were more efficient. However, the study did not 
compare these results to those conventional banks competing in the same markets. 
On the other hand, there was substantial empirical evidence on the performance 
differences between the two sets of banking i.e. conventional and Islamic financial 
institutions. Hussein (2004) estimated the profit efficiency index and reported no 
significant differences in the profit efficiencies of Islamic and conventional banks 
operating in Bahrain. Likewise, Bader et al. (2008) measured and compared the cost, 
revenue and profit efficiency of 43 Islamic and 37 conventional banks based in 21 
countries worldwide. Similar to Hussein (2004), the study found no significant 
differences in the overall efficiency of results between Islamic and conventional banks. 
In  the most recent study, Beck et al. (2013) analysed empirically the differences in 
business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, and stability of 422 conventional and 88 
Islamic financial institutions across a sample of 22 countries for the period 1995-2009. 
The anecdotal evidence suggested no significant differences between the business 
models of conventional and Islamic banks. 
Some studies reported otherwise. Majid et al. (2010) investigated the efficiency 
of 23 Islamic and 88 conventional banks based in 10 different countries for the period 
1996-2002 and reported differences in the efficiencies in the Islamic banks operating in 
different geographical locations. In a cross-county analysis of Islamic financial 
institutions, Čihák and Hesse (2010) measured the financial stability of Islamic banks 
operating in nineteen different banking systems for the period 1993-2004. The sample 
included 77 Islamic and 397 conventional banks. Using Z-scores as a measure of 
stability, the study revealed that small Islamic banks were financially more stable than 
small commercial banks. Also, large commercial banks were financially more stable 
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than large Islamic banks while small Islamic banks  were financially more stable than 
large Islamic banks. Abedifar et al. (2012) confirmed these findings for small Islamic 
banks in a sample of countries with both Islamic and conventional banks. 
In summary, when comparing the efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
financial institutions while controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, the 
existing literature highlighted a number of significant differences in business 
orientation.  However, a substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that IFIs are 
less cost-effective. However, they have a higher intermediation and financial ratios; 
higher asset quality; and are better capitalized. Furthermore, the literature suggests, also, 
a large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic 
financial institutions and across IFIs of different sizes. However, there is a dearth of 
research which takes into consideration the impact of IC and CG while comparing the 
performance of banks being conventional or Islamic. 
 CG are very important factors in determining firms performance, particularly, 
for IFIs which came into being for the betterment of the society as a whole and not in 
the pursuit of financial profit alone. Moreover, IFIs’ governing boards of are entrusted 
by the stakeholders to serve their interests and not follow their personal deeds. 
Therefore, it is imperative to measure the effects of both IC and CG-features on the 
performance of IFIs; however, there exists no study as such to date. Another interesting 
element, which is missing in earlier studies and particularly those concerning IFIs, is 
that none of these studies have considered so far the heterogeneity of the Islamic finance 
industry.  This study addresses this omission from the literature by 1) analysing the 
homogeneity of the Islamic finance industry; and 2) comparing the impact of IC and CG 
on the performance of FFIBs and Windows. 
It was argued that the Islamic finance industry was not homogeneous since not 
all the IFIs were FFIBs. Some IFIs operated as Windows37. FFIB refers to a full service 
intermediary financial institution that conducts its business in accordance with the 
Shariah and, as such, does not deal simultaneously in conventional banking business. 
                                                 
37
Citi-Islamic, HSBC-Amanah, and Standard Chartered-Saadiq are some of the prominent examples of 
Windows; these are wholly owned subsidiaries of Citi Group, HSBC and Standard Charted Bank 
respectively. 
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Windows are all those extended hands of various conventional banking groups which 
offer Islamic finance services alongside conventional banking as their core business. 
The Islamic business model of banking is based on Shariah; this guides Islamic 
economics while the traditional conventional banking model is based on a different 
ideology and pursues different goals i.e. profit maximization. Simply stated, FFIBs 
came into being to offer Shariah-compliant solutions to those looking for investment 
opportunities while not violating their religious beliefs. The prominent conventional 
banking groups came into this business through their extended hands i.e. Shariah-
windows after realizing the fact that they  were  about to lose their clients in certain 
regions, such as the Gulf, where these conventional banks  had a track record of 
providing banking services from over a century, way before the birth of Islamic banking 
(Wilson, 2007; IDB, 2007; Warde, 2010). 
Moreover, the governance mechanism of both sets of banking differs, also, in its 
nature and purpose. Islamic finance is based on trust and requires less monitoring as 
compared to the Windows which follows the same westernized corporate governance 
model. Additionally, from an Islamic standpoint, governance is to achieve social 
equality and create more value for the society at large, while the conventional 
governance model focuses on wealth maximization for shareholders. 
Borrowing from the agency theory of the firm, it is argued that the conventional 
banking model is based on the central assumption of self-interests of individuals who 
tend to maximize their own returns by all means available to the firm and which might 
result in conflicts between both parties, known as the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Baiman, 1990; Kunz and Pfaff, 2002).  On the other hand, FFIBs are not expected 
to suffer to the same extent due the trust factors among the parties involved in business. 
In summary, the operating mechanisms of the conventional and Islamic banking 
systems are entirely different. The IC stock, including human capital, structural capital 
and capital employed, is, also, somewhat different in nature for both sets of banking as 
are the governance mechanisms. 
Taken the significance of the arguments together, both sets of banking are 
expected to utilize their resource base i.e. IC, physical, and financial resources 
differently and are governed differently. Hence, as a consequence they achieve different 
levels of performance. Hence, the hypothesis, to be tested here, is that there exist 
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significant differences in the IC and CG performance of both sets of banking i.e. FFIB 
and Windows. The hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant difference in the effect of IC and CG on the 
performance of FFIBs and Shariah Windows. 
This research’s third objective is to compare the IC and CG performance of FFIBs 
against the Windows. 
 It is established that, as such, the Islamic finance industry is not homogenous   
because not all of this study’s sample of IFIs in this study are FFIBs. Since the business 
orientations of the selected IFIs   were different, their performance ought to be different 
too. Therefore, the selected IFIs were divided into two groups: 1) fully-fledged Islamic 
banks and 2) Shariah-windows. The total number of IFIs, included in this study is 64 of 
which 37 are classified as FFIBs while the remaining 27 are sorted as Shariah-windows. 
The research framework is similar to the framework for the second research objective 
(See research framework 3) used to determine the performance differences between two 
sets of banking and is, also, the replication of framework 1, with the exception of 
controlling for bank type being FFIBs or Shariah windows. The sets of variables, used 
in all the research models, are unchanged. 
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Figure 4.3 
Research Framework 3 
Comparative analysis of Islamic finance Industry (FFIBs vs. Windows) 
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Comparative Analysis 
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5.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the theoretical framework and presented, also, the main sets of 
research hypotheses to be tested. The first set of hypothesis related to the effects of IC, 
CG and firm-specific characteristics on the performance of IFIs in achieving the first 
research objective. The second set of research hypothesis related to the effects of IC, 
CG and firm-specific characteristics on IFIs’ performance before and after the financial 
crisis, thus, addressing the second research objective. Finally, the third set of research 
hypothesis related to the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific characteristics on 
performance of FFIBs and Windows; this addressed the third research objective. 
 IC is a strategic asset which can lead to a firm’s higher performance and 
sustaining a competitive advantage. Resource-based view (RBV) of the firm explicitly 
recognizes the importance of intangibles such as customer orientation and 
organizational knowledge. It offers a significant opportunity to explore these theoretical 
complementarities through examining the relationship between IC resources and the 
performance of IFIs. Equally, sub-components of IC viz. human capital and structural 
capital are perceived to be potential strategic assets under RBV. Hence the resource-
based view of the firm relates closely to IC and, therefore, RBV is used as an economic 
foundation to examine IC’s role in helping IFIs obtain competitive advantage. 
From a conventional standpoint, agency theory is based on the central 
assumption of self-interests of individuals. It argues that both the principal and the agent 
tend to maximize their own returns by all means; this might result in conflicts between 
both parties (known as the agency problem). In contrast, the Islamic banking is based on 
trust and agents are entrusted by the principals to perform their obligations in an 
ethically correct way. Hence, agency theory is adopted to test the research hypotheses 
related to the corporate governance of IFIs. 
Agency theory tenants posit, also, that firm performance can be affected by the 
internal factors such as firm size and external factors such as operating region. 
Accordingly, using agency theory, this study examined the effect of firm-related 
variables (i.e. firm-size, level of risk, firm complexity, listing status, type of auditor and 
operating region) on the performance of IFIs. 
 This chapter discussed, also, the proposed research model to test the extended 
research hypotheses and to answer the research questions this chapter. Performance was 
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assessed based on both the accounting performance measure, proxied by return on 
assets (ROA), and market performance measure based on Tobin’s Q. Since the 
theoretical bases were set and the research model was developed to test these extended 
research hypotheses, the next step was to design the research methodology. This is 
discussed in the next Chapter (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 6:  Research Methods and Data 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Research is a multi-stage process.  This includes choosing a topic; identifying the 
research gap through the literature review; defining the research objective supplemented 
by research questions; designing research methodology; and developing research 
instruments for data collection and data analysis. All these stages are necessary, 
however, they may follow different sequence depending on the individual researcher. 
Scholars divided research into three different types, namely, explanatory, 
descriptive and exploratory subject to the nature of information required by the 
researcher (Saunders et al., 2011; Tull, 1990; Yin, 2009). It is appropriate to use  an 
exploratory study when the situation at hand is not well known and when the literature 
does not offer much evidence on the subject matter (Sekaran and Bougie, 2011). 
Furthermore, Sekaran and Bougie (2011) opined that an exploratory study  was required 
in order to establish a viable theoretical framework about an existing phenomenon. 
Although the importance of IC in pursuing performance is known, the specific 
means through which IC influences corporate performance and the empirical evidence 
on IC’s actual contribution to the dynamics of the value creation process remain under 
research in the Islamic banking and finance sector. As far as the researcher is aware, 
there are no studies which examined the effects of IC and CG-features on the 
performance of IFIs and, as such, this study may be considered to be exploratory to fill 
the gap in the literature. 
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This chapter describes the research method adopted in this study; the research design 
relating to the collection of data; the source of data; and method of analysis. The chapter 
is organized as follows. Section 5.1 explains this study’s research strategy. Sections 5.2 
and 5.3 explain the sampling method and sources of the data respectively. Sections 5.4 
and 5.5 describe the proxies and measurement of the dependent and independent 
variables respectively. Section 5.6 describes the procedures in analysing the panel data 
for regression models and the final section provides the chapter summary. 
 
6.1 Research Strategy 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), there exist two philosophical paradigms i.e. 
positivist (quantitative) and interpretivist (qualitative). The former is an epistemological 
position which favours the application of natural science methods for the study of social 
reality. It relies mainly on numerical data and statistical tools, and tests to draw precise 
inferences and dig out perfect truth (Malhotra, 2008; Neuman, 2005). Quantitative 
research exhibits the relationship between theory and research as a deduction process; 
entails the collection of numerical data; follows a positivist approach; and holds an 
objectivist’s conception of social reality. In contrast, the latter focuses on the 
interpretations, perceptions and perspectives held by the social actors (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Qualitative research deals with subjectivity, interpretations, explanations, 
meanings and understandings of social actors in their context. The most commonly used 
research tools for qualitative research are questionnaires, interviews and observations 
(Creswell, 2013). According to Bryman and Bell (2011), qualitative research methods 
were used first in social sciences to study social and cultural aspects by using action 
research, case studies and ethnography. Following Bryman and Bell (2011) and Sekaran 
and Bougie (2011), some of the pros and cons of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches are summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1 
Qualitative vs. Quantitative research approach 
 Qualitative Approach Quantitative Approach 
Strengths  Dynamic and flexible and thus 
allowing more freedom to researcher 
 Provides in-depth 
understanding of the research topic 
 Provides intellectual creativity 
to flourish  
 Generates rich and in-depth 
data base 
 Enables the researcher to 
establish rapport with potential 
participants and therefore gain their 
cooperation and historical information 
 Cost effective 
o Low cost of data collection 
o Low cost of data processing 
 Easy to access the respondents based 
in different geographical locations 
 Easy to replicate 
o Replication of research as whole 
o Use of research instruments with 
fever alterations 
Critics  Qualitative research is too 
subjective 
 Difficult to replicate due to 
unstructured approach of research 
 Less transparent and reliable 
due to interactive or participatory nature 
of research 
 Widespread decline in response rate 
in survey research 
 Consequent biases 
 Collects a much narrower superficial 
dataset 
 Numerical descriptions put limit on 
results hence, quantitative research provides 
less elaborate accounts of human perception 
Since the main objective of this research was to examine the impact of IC and its sub-
components as well as corporate governance variables on performance of IFIs, this 
research adopted a quantitative research approach. 
6.2 Sampling Method 
 This study’s population was IFIs, both fully-fledged Islamic banks and Shariah-
windows. The  selected sample of IFIs was based on the Bankscope database which has 
a unique collection of micro-level banking information for different countries and is 
widely used for international studies and policymaking (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). Initially, there was a total of 157 IFIs, identified as “Islamic Banks” 
in the Bankscope database and representing 21 countries worldwide. 
Given this study’s longitudinal objective, the time period, established for the 
survey of annual financial data, was set between 2007 and 2011. There were three basic 
reasons to support the selection of this time period. Firstly, a new generation of Islamic 
finance, which was more innovative and diverse, emerged during the first decade of 21
st
 
century as the doctrine was undergoing a new aggiornamento. This was driven mainly 
by factors such as globalization of economies, dramatic changes in political-economic 
environment and Islamic insurgence (Kettell, 2011; Nawaz, 2013a; Nawaz, 2013b). 
Secondly, Islamic finance documented  its stability during the recent global financial 
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crisis (Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Baele et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013)  and the Islamic 
finance industry  was expected to enjoy the same trends in the upcoming years (Schoon, 
2010; Ernst and Young, 2011). Lastly, the West realized, also, the potential of the 
Islamic way of banking during this period. For example, the UK regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), granted five banking licenses for the Islamic retail and 
investment banks  between 2004 and 2008 (Kay, 2004; Wilson, 2005; Nawaz, 2013a). 
All such factors contributed equally in making the Islamic financial industry a fertile 
ground for potential research. Hence, the significance of the study was justified. 
Since the study required panel data for 5 years from 2007 to 2011, the database was 
filtered for data availability. Several filters were applied before arriving at the final 
sample used in this study.  
Filter 1: Bank (Existence) Verification 
All identified 157 Islamic banks were accessed individually through their website 
address provided in the Bankscope database in order to verify if the said banks were still 
active. Where the website address was not provided in the Bankscope database, the 
bank was contacted via direct telephone (where possible), email correspondence and by 
using, also, different means (i.e. central bank's websites and google.com search using 
name of the bank). 
Filter 2: Availability of Required Data 
The selected banks were checked individually in order to check the availability of the 
required data for the years 2007-2011. A total of 93 banks were omitted from the initial 
sample for the following reasons: required data not available or not accessible; available 
data did not cover the required time period (2007-2011); or available data was in 
language other than English (e.g. Arabic, Indo etc.). 
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Table 5.2 
Breakdown of Final Sample 
 
No. of Countries 
Asia Europe Middle-east Total 
3 2 5 10 
No. of Banks (IFIs) 64 
No. of Firm-years (5 x 64) 320 
Time Window 2007 – 2011 
A final sample of 64 Islamic banks, representing 10 countries, was selected. Table 5.2 
presents the breakdown of the selected sample. A total of 64 Islamic banks (37 banks 
were sorted as fully-fledged Islamic banks and 27 banks were sorted as Shariah-
Windows) operating in ten different countries was selected as a final sample. The total 
number of observations (annual reports/financial statements) was 320 for the period of 
five years (2007-to-2011). Figure 5.1 presents the breakdown of the sample selected for 
each country in three regions. 
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Figure 5.1 
Selected regions and countries 
 
 
6.3 Sources of Data 
The data, used in this study, was derived mainly from the Bankscope database. Data 
concerning the governance-specific variables, such as board-size, NED, role duality, 
SSB, and size of the audit committee was not readily available on the Bankscope 
database. Therefore, the missing data for these variables along with other missing 
variables, e.g. type of auditor, was extracted manually from the annual reports of each 
financial institution. The reason for using a firm’s annual reports was that there was 
considerable support within the accounting disclosure literature of an analysis of 
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146 
 
reporting practices solely using annual reports. For instance, Campbell (2000) suggested 
that annual reports  were the most widely distributed of all an organization’s publicly 
produced documents and management had complete editorial control of the 
discretionary disclosure of information in these documents. 
 
6.4 Measure of Dependent Variables 
 This study’s dependent variable was the performance of IFIs. Performance was 
operationalized in terms of the monetary  values which a firm received in exchange for 
the price it paid for products or services (Hsu and Wang, 2012). This rationale was 
supported by the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) which dominated 
theoretical and empirical research in this area. Hirschey and Wichern (1984) and 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) posited  that an assessment of an organization’s 
performance ought to include both accounting and market-based measures. 
Accordingly, this research used two distinct performance measures: ROA; and Tobin’s 
Q. 
 
6.4.1 Measure of Accounting-based Performance 
Traditionally, financial-based  indices, such as return on assets (ROA) and return of 
equity (ROE), are employed to measure performance (Usoff et al., 2002). ROA gives an 
idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings while 
ROE measures a firm’s efficiency at generating profits from every dollar of net assets, 
and shows how well a company uses investment dollars to generate earnings growth. 
These traditional accounting based performance measures were criticized for their 
inadequacy in guiding strategic decisions. In particular, they do not consider the cost of 
capital incurred to fund the projects which generate these returns and, thus, are severely 
lacking as instruments to guide managers in their quest for value-creating venues. In 
addition, they fail often to shed light on the underlying causes for organizations’ high or 
low performance (Bontis, 1998). However, Stewart and Ruckdeschel (1998) argued that 
financial-performance measures, particularly ROA,  were more appropriate in IC studies 
because they could be used to illustrate the financial value of intangible assets. 
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Previous studies used various proxies for financial-performance measures 
including ROA, return on sales, and ROE simultaneously (Lant et al., 1992; Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Youndt et al., 2004), while others used only a single measure (Ramdani 
and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Hsu and Wang, 2012; Adams and Santos 2006). Consistent 
with the latter stream of research, this study used ROA as a proxy for accounting based 
performance measure of IFIs. Return on equity was ruled out because it was more 
sensitive to capital structure differences. 
 
6.4.2 Measure of Market-based Performance 
In addition to the accounting-based performance measure, the market-based 
performance measure was considered, also. Market-based performance measures, such 
as market-to-book value and Tobin’s Q, are used widely to reflect the market's 
assessment of the firm’s value. 
Market-to-book value approach (or MB ratio) is the most widely known 
indicator of IC. It is an easy indicator of IC and, also, is adopted generally by public 
corporations when they state the difference between book value and market value 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Roos et al., 1997; Sveiby 1997). The contention is that 
the value of a firm's IC  is represented by the difference between the firm’s market 
value and book value (Dzinkowski, 2000). Market  value is defined as  a  firm’s most 
probable price and it is equal to price per share multiplied by the total numbers of 
outstanding shares (Chang, 2007) while the book value is the net value of the firm's 
assets. MB ratio, as a measure of the IFIs’ market performance was ruled out due to 
multicollinearity since the denominator for Tobin’s Q and MB ratio was the same i.e. 
total assets. 
 Tobin’s Q  is the ratio of the market value of a firm (number of shares x share 
price) to the replacement cost of its assets (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). If the former is 
higher than the latter, the firm is making higher than normal returns on its investment. 
The strength of this measure is that it addresses a significant weakness in the traditional 
accounting framework, namely, measuring of assets using historical costs (Stewart and 
Ruckdeschel, 1998; Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Abeysekera, 2008b). Chung and Pruitt 
(1994) noted that Tobin’s Q was more accurate than the market-to-book method 
because it used replacement rather than historical costs. Likewise, Dzinkowski (2000)  
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argued that Tobin’s Q   was more accurate than the market-to-book method because it 
used replacement, rather than historical costs
38
. For this reason, and consistent with 
previous research (Youndt et al., 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Adams and Santos, 
2006; Chen and Li 2013), this study uses Tobin’s Q as the proxy measure of  IFIs’ 
market performance. 
 
6.5 Measure of Independent Variables 
6.5.1 Intellectual capital efficiency variables 
VAIC
TM
 is an analytical procedure designed to enable management, shareholders and 
other relevant stakeholders to monitor effectively and evaluate the efficiency of  value 
added by a firm’s total resources  and each major resource component (Ho and 
Williams, 2003). Unlike traditional accounting which focuses on controlling costs, the 
VAIC
TM
 introduces a novel concept of 'corporate intellectual ability' (Pulic, 2004). It 
refers to the firm’s total value creation efficiency arising from two key resources: 1) 
intellectual capital which consists of human IC and structural IC; and 2) physical or 
financial capital (capital employed efficiency). 
Formally, VAIC
TM
 is a composite sum of three indicators termed as: (1) Human 
Capital Efficiency (HCE), an indicator of the efficiency of value added by human 
capital resources employed; (2) Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE), an indicator of the 
efficiency of value added by structural capital; and (3) Capital Employed Efficiency 
(CEE), which indicates how much value is created for every monetary unit invested in 
financial or physical capital. Algebraically, the VAIC
TM
 relationship is formalized as 
follows: 
VAIC
TM
 = HCE + SCE + CEE 
Where VAIC
TM
 = VA intellectual coefficient; HCE = human capital 
coefficient; SCE = structural capital coefficient, and CEE = capital employed 
coefficient. 
                                                 
38
Dotzel et al. (2013, p. 265) advocated the use of Tobin’s Q reasoning that “(1) it is a forward-looking 
measure because it is based on stock market prices, (2) it captures long-term performance by comparing 
replacement and market values, and (3) it can be used across industries because accounting conventions 
do not affect it”. 
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A high coefficient indicates a higher value creation using the firm's resources, including 
IC. The phases in executing the VAIC
TM
 method are described below. 
Step 1: Value added (VA) 
Pulic (2004)  took Value Added (VA) as the most appropriate indicator for business 
success. VAIC
TM
 is used to calculate a firm’s VA by subtracting input from output, 
whereby personal expenses are not included in the input. In financial terms, this is equal 
to: 
VA = Output – Input   Eq. (1) 
Where: VA = Value added, Output
39
 = Total income, Input
40
 = Total expenses 
(excluding employee cost) 
Step 2: Human Capital Efficiency (HCE) 
HCE is calculated by dividing a company’s VA by its HC41 (all the expenditures for 
employees are embraced  in human capital) to indicate in practice the real productivity 
of the firm’s personnel, i.e. how much value the company creates through one monetary 
unit invested in human resources. HCE is calculated as follows: 
HCE = VA/HC   Eq. (2) 
Step 3: Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) 
Pulic (2004) stated that human capital and structural capital were reciprocal. The lesser 
human capital participates, the more structural capital is involved (SC = VA – HC). 
SCE is calculated by dividing a firm’s SC by its VA. SCE measures how much capital a 
company can create through one monetary unit invested in VA, i.e. it measures the 
productivity or efficiency of VA from structural capital. 
                                                 
39
 Calculated from the income statement of each bank using Bankscope database, this provides a break-up 
for income. Hence, output = Gross interest and dividend income (Interest income on loans + other interest 
income + Dividend income) + Total non-interest operating income (Net insurance income + Net fees and 
commissions + other operating income). 
40
 Calculated from the income statement of each bank using Bankscope database, this provides a break-up 
for income. Hence, input = Total interest expense (Interest expense on customer deposits + Other interest 
expense) + Total non-interest expenses (Other operating expenses). 
41
 Calculated from the income statement of each bank using Bankscope database, this provides separately, 
human capital under the heading ‘Personal expenses’. 
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SCE = SC/VA   Eq. (3) 
Step 4: Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) 
Pulic (2004) stated that IC might not operate independently and needed to function in 
concert with financial and physical capital in order to create value. Furthermore, in 
order to receive a full insight into the efficiency of value creating resources, it is 
necessary to take both financial and physical capital into account. A firm’s CEE is 
obtained by dividing its VA by its CE (where CE = book value of the net assets of 
company): 
CEE = VA/CE  Eq. (4) 
 
Step 5: Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC
TM
) 
The final step is to calculate the Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC
TM
), which 
is a composite sum of the intellectual capital efficiency and the capital employed 
efficiency and this indicates how much value a firm creates in total per monetary unit 
invested for each resource. 
VAIC
TM
 = HCE + SCE + CEE   Eq. (5) 
The amount of VA and the efficiency in utilizing IC can be measured quantitatively by 
using the above formulae. A high coefficient indicates a higher value creation using the 
firm's resources including IC. 
VAIC has its strengths and weaknesses. In terms of its strengths, VAIC
TM
 
provides a standardized and consistent basis of measure, thereby enabling the effective 
conduct of a comparative analysis. Sveby (2007) outlined 42 methods of measuring IC 
and there was no one best fit method of measuring IC. Secondly, VAIC
TM
 makes use of 
publically available and audited financial data and, therefore, the calculations can be 
considered objective and verifiable (Pulic, 2000; Pulic, 2004;Ho and Williams, 2003). 
Other IC measures  were criticized due to subjectivity in measurement and difficulty in 
verification (Williams, 2001; Sveby, 2007). Thirdly, VAIC is a straightforward 
technique  which enhances cognitive understanding and enables ease of calculation by 
various internal and external stakeholders (Schneider, 1999). Finally, the VAIC
TM
 
method was applied to IC research of listed companies in many countries. 
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6.5.2 Corporate Governance and Firm-related Variables 
There are five corporate governance and six firm-specific variables which were 
employed in the regression models. Table 5.3 provides operationalization of these 
variables. 
Table 5.3 
Variables and their Calculation 
Variable name Acronym Operationalization 
 
Dependent variables 
Return on Assets ROA Net income available to stockholders / Total assets 
Tobin’s Q TQ Market capitalization + Total liabilities / Total assets 
 
Independent variables 
Value added VA Total income – Total expenses 
Human capital  HC Total personal expenses 
Human capital 
efficiency 
HCE HCE = VA/HC 
Structural capital SC SC = VA – HC 
Structural capital 
efficiency 
SCE SCE = SC/VA 
Capital employed CE Physical and financial capital employed 
Capital employed 
efficiency 
CEE CEE = VA/CE 
Value added intellectual 
coefficient 
VAIC VAIC = HCE + SCE + CEE 
 
Governance-specific control variables 
Board-size BSIZE Log of total number of directors on board 
Board structure NED Fraction of non-executive directors on the board to total 
board size 
Leadership structure Duality Dichotomous; yes/no 
Shariah supervisory 
board 
SSB Total number of Shariah advisors 
Audit committee size ACS Log of total number of members serving on audit 
committee 
 
Firm-specific control variables 
Firm-size FSIZE Log of total assets 
Level of risk Risk Using leverage as proxy (Total debt/ Total assets) 
Firm complexity SUB Total number of existing subsidiaries 
Listing status Listing Dichotomous; yes/no 
Type of auditor BIG4 Big four vs. non-Big four 
Operating region Region 1 if the IFI is based in Gulf region, 0 otherwise 
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6.6 Data Analysis Method 
6.6.1 Regression models 
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the advanced propositions. This analysis is a 
statistical technique which can be used to analyze the relationship between a single 
dependent variable and several independent variables (Neter et al., 1996; Hair, 2009). 
An example of a multiple regression equation is as follows; 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3+ ……….+ βkXk + ε 
Where, 
Y = predicted value of dependent variable; 
α = y intercept, value of y when all x(s) = 0; 
X = various independent variables; 
β1….k = various coefficients assigned to independent variables during the regression; 
and 
ε = standard error of estimates 
Regression results produce beta coefficients or regression coefficients which range from 
–1.00 to +1.00.  These indicate the strength of the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables (Hair, 2009). In this research, they indicated the 
strength between (1) accounting performance of IFIs based on ROA –dependent 
variable and VAIC (including sub-components viz. HCE, SCE and CEE), and corporate 
governance-related variables (i.e. board-size, board-composition, role duality, size of 
Shariah supervisory board, and size of audit committee) –independent variables, and (2) 
market performance of IFIs based on Tobin’s Q –dependent variable, and independent 
variables i.e. VAIC (including sub-components viz. HCE, SCE and CEE), and corporate 
governance-related variables (i.e. board-size, board-composition, leadership-structure, 
size of Shariah supervisory board, and size of audit committee). Adjusted R
2
 explains 
the fit of model i.e. how much the model’s variables are captured to explain the 
dependent variable. 
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6.6.1.1 Research objective 1 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of IC efficiency and CG 
characteristics on the IFIs’ economic performance, while controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics for the period 2007-2011. The research aimed, also, to ascertain the 
effect of intellectual capital elements viz. human capital efficiency (HCE), structural 
capital efficiency (SCE) and capital employed efficiency (CEE) respectively on 
performance (i.e. accounting performance based on ROA and market performance 
based on Tobin’s Q) of IFIs. 
 Accordingly, two main regression models were developed to investigate the 
effects of IC (and its sub-components viz. HCE, SCE and CEE) efficiency and CG 
characteristics on IFIs’ performance (i.e. accounting performance based on ROA and 
market performance based on Tobin’s Q). 
 
Regression Model 1: 
ROA = α + β1VAIC + β2 governance-specific-factors (lnBSIZE + duality + NED + 
lnSSB + lnACS) + β3 firm-specific-factors (lnFSIZE + risk + SUB + listing + big4 + 
region) + ε 
Model 1 was used to measure the VAIC’s impact VAIC on the IFIs’ financial 
performance based on ROA. Since VAIC was a composite of three measures, three 
further regression models were run for HCE, SCE and CEE referred to as Model 1a, 1b 
and 1c, respectively. 
 
Regression Model 2: 
Tobin’s Q = α + β1VAIC + β2 governance-specific-factors (lnBSIZE + duality + NED 
+ lnSSB + lnACS) + β3 firm-specific-factors (lnFSIZE + risk + SUB + listing + big4 
+ region) + ε 
Model 2 was used to measure the VAIC’s impact on the IFIs’ market performance 
based on Tobin’s Q. Since VAIC was a composite of three measures, three further 
regression models were run for HCE, SCE and CEE referred to as Model 2a, 2b and 2c, 
respectively. 
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6.6.1.2 Research objective 2 
This research’s secondary objective was to compare the impact of IC and CG on the 
IFIs’ performance before and after the global financial crisis. The study covered a five 
year period i.e. 2007-2011. Since the global financial crisis started in the second half of 
2007, consequently, its effects could be observed better in 2008. Therefore, years 2007 
and 2008 were used as proxies to examine the effects of IC and CG features on the IFIs’ 
performance before crisis while years 2010 and 2011 were used as proxies to examine 
the effects of IC and CG features on the IFIs’ performance after the crisis. Regression 
models 1 and 2 were used while controlling for the time period i.e. before and after the 
financial crisis. 
 
6.6.1.3 Research objective 3 
This research’s third objective was to compare the impact of (IC and CG on the 
performance of FFIBs and the Windows. As established earlier, the Islamic finance 
industry was not homogenous and, as such, not all the sampled IFIs included in this 
study were FFIBs. Since the sampled IFIs had different business orientations, there 
ought to be differences, also, in their performance. Therefore, the sampled IFIs were 
divided into two groups 1) FFIBs and 2) Windows. Regression Models 1 and 2 were re-
run while controlling for bank type, being FFIBs or Windows, in order to determine the 
performance differences between the two sets of IFIs. 
 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
Research is a multi-stage process and different researchers adopt different processes 
depending on their research needs and given circumstances.  This chapter explained 
some of the crucial stages of this study.  
As established earlier, this study’s primary objective was to examine the effects 
of (IC and CG features on IFIs’ performance and, therefore, the study used mainly 
secondary data. Accordingly, the study adopted a quantitative research technique. This 
exhibited the relationship between theory and research as a deduction process; followed 
a positivist approach; and entailed the collection of numerical data.  
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A total of 64 Islamic banks (37 banks were sorted as FFIBs and 27 banks were 
sorted as Shariah-Windows) operating in ten different countries. These were selected as 
the final sample. The total number of observations (annual reports/financial statements) 
was 320 for the five year period (2007-to-2011). The data, used in this study, was 
derived mainly from Bankscope database. In addition, the missing data was extracted 
manually from the annual reports of each financial institution. 
The data, used in the study, met the assumptions of OLS and, therefore, the next 
step was to apply different statistical techniques in testing the research hypotheses and 
answering the research questions and, ultimately, fulfilling the research objectives. 
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Chapter 7:  Effects of Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance 
Features on Performance of Islamic Financial Institutions 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings for this study’s first research objective which was to 
investigate, for the period 2007 to 2011, the effects of IC efficiency and CG 
characteristics on IFIs’ performance while controlling for firm-specific characteristics,. 
It was to consider, also, the effects of each IC element viz. HCE, SCE and CEE on both 
sets of IFIs’ accounting performance based on ROA and market performance based on 
Tobin’s Q. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
variables employed in the regression models. Section 6.2 presents the results for the 
correlation analysis. Section 6.3 reports the results of the multiple regression models 
followed by discussion of the findings in section 6.4. Finally, section 6.5 presents the 
summary of the chapter. 
 
  
7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 show the descriptive statistics including the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the models for the five years pooled data. 
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures and Continuous Independent Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Std. Skew. Std. Kurt. 
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 
ROA 0.666 2.374 -3.810 3.809 -0.483 2.245 
Tobin’s Q 0.830 0.275 0.245 1.126 -1.083 2.903 
VAIC 3.925 2.018 0.361 7.030 -0.289 2.214 
      HCE 2.941 1.850 -0.281 5.898 -0.234 2.241 
      SCE 0.698 0.219 0.267 1.052 -0.441 2.800 
      CEE 0.191 0.156 -0.094 0.488 0.059 2.487 
Notes: See Table 5.3 on page 171 for variable definitions. 
The results of the pooled data for the dependent and IC-related independent variables 
are reported in Table 6.1. Focusing first on the dependent variables, it can be seen that 
the sampled IFIs’ overall financial performance was sound as indicated by ROA with a 
mean of 0.67. Equally, the market based performance measure, Tobin’s Q, has a mean 
of 0.83, suggesting that most of the sampled IFIs’ market value was in excess of the 
book value of net assets. 
As for the continuous independent variables in Table 6.1, it can be seen that the 
VAIC is 3.93, suggesting that, for the period 2007~2011, the sampled IFIs were 
generally effective in generating value from their IC and physical capital base.  
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics indicate that HCE, SCE and CEE all have 
positive means of 2.94, 0.70 and 0.19 respectively. The minimum values for HCE, SCE 
and CEE are -0.28, 0.27, and -0.09 while the maximum values for the same variables 
are 5.90, 1.05, and 0.49 respectively. 
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Table 6.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Features 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Std. Skew. Std. Kurt. 
BSIZE 9.013 2.948 4 19 1.407 5.803 
lnBSIZE 2.150 0.280 1.609 2.773 0.178 2.896 
NED 0.697 0.266 0.1 0.92 -0.678 2.442 
SSB 4.197 1.822 1 12 1.480 6.835 
lnSSB 4.122 1.450 2 7 0.585 2.147 
ACS 3.441 0.847 2 6 1.535 6.626 
lnACS 1.221 0.181 1.099 1.609 1.056 2.629 
Duality 0.144 0.351 0 1 2.031 5.124 
Notes: See Table 5.3 on page 171 for variable definitions. 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the corporate governance characteristics 
considered in this study. It can be seen that the IFIs’ average board size is nine; this is 
slightly above the recommended size of eight for board effectiveness (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). In terms of board composition, the mean percentage of non-executive 
directors on the boards is above 50%, with an overall mean of 70%, suggesting that 
NEDs remain in the majority of the sampled IFIs’ boards. This is in line with the 
recommendations of the various corporate governance codes. With regard to the size of 
Shariah supervisory board and size of audit committee, it can be seen that the means for 
both variables are 4.20 and 3.44 respectively, indicating that the sampled IFIs follow a 
tightening monitoring policy. A mean of 14 percent for role duality suggested that role 
duality was uncommon in the sampled IFIs. 
Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics for firm-specific variables used as 
control variables. As indicated by the descriptive results, the minimum and maximum 
value for firm-size is 10.79 and 16.84 with a mean of 14.36, indicating that the sampled 
IFIs sustained their total assets during the study period since there were no high 
variations in firm-size. Level of risk, which was measured using leverage as a proxy, 
had a minimum and maximum value of 4.37 and 77.99 respectively. This indicated the 
diversity in risk level within the industry. Firm complexity, measured by total number 
of existing subsidiaries (SUB), had a minimum and maximum value of 0 and 20 
respectively, suggesting that the sampled IFIs followed diversified complex business 
structures. All other dummy variables i.e. listing status, type of auditor and region 
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remained relatively unchanged during the study period. For all the variables, skewness 
scores lay within the range of -1.96 and +1.96 as did the kurtosis scores within the 
suggested range of -3 to +3 (see Bruin, 2006; Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
 
Table 6.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Firm-specific Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Std. Skew. Std. Kurt. 
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 
lnFSIZE 14.361 1.557 10.787 16.836 -0.674 2.736 
Risk 42.504 21.858 4.369 77.986 0.009 1.973 
SUB 6.031 6.875 0 20 0.989 2.613 
Listing 0.481 0.500 0 1 0.075 1.006 
BIG4 0.813 0.391 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
Region 0.469 0.500 0 1 0.125 1.016 
Notes: See Table 5.3 on page 171 for variable definitions. 
 
7.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 6.4 presents the correlations results between the dependent variables, ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, and the independent variables. ROA is related positively with VAIC 
indicating that efficiency in creating corporate added value through IC enhanced a 
firm’s financial performance. Similarly, ROA was found to be related significantly with 
HCE and CEE in a positive direction. As for the market performance measure, Tobin’s 
Q was found, also, to be associated positively and significantly with VAIC, HCE, SCE, 
and CEE. As for the governance-specific variables, there was no significant relationship 
for any of the variables with the performance measures. In the case of firm-specific 
control variables, firm-size and listing status were related to both performance 
measures. Since none of the independent variables had correlation coefficients 
exceeding 0.7, multicollinearity problems did not exist. This was supported, also, by 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) results. 
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Table 6.4 
Correlation Analysis 
 ROA Tobin's Q VAIC HCE SCE CEE lnBSIZE NED lnSSB lnACS Duality lnFSIZE Risk SUB Listing BIG4 
Tobin's Q 0.2***                
VAIC 0.5578*** 0.3256***               
HCE 0.656*** 0.387*** 0.907***              
SCE -0.0299 0.146** 0.411*** 0.2147***             
CEE 0.566*** 0.3745*** 0.56*** 0.6076*** -0.0558            
lnBSIZE 0.0743 0.1641 0.0986 0.149** -0.0256 0.1258           
NED -0.1283 -0.0501 -0.2554*** -0.2496*** -0.1173 -0.1585** -0.3582***          
lnSSB 0.1259 0.0503 0.1061 0.1464** 0.0131 0.0739 0.4267*** -0.144**         
lnACS 0.0599 0.0884 0.0748 0.099 0.0307 0.1163 0.1539** -0.1015 0.0896        
Duality 0.1426 0.1749 0.1426 0.1694** 0.0058 0.1017 0.1995*** 0.2165*** 0.1624** 0.0295       
lnFSIZE 0.3376*** 0.4194*** 0.3725*** 0.4397*** 0.0366 0.4516*** 0.1824** -0.0552 0.2952*** 0.116 -0.1985***      
Risk 0.1795** -0.0388 0.1685** 0.204*** -0.1406 0.4576*** 0.1823** -0.1181 0.1318 0.1409 -0.1697** 0.3397***     
SUB 0.1494** 0.1067 -0.0584 -0.0424 0.0109 0.0477 0.0296 0.1259 0.1361 -0.1449** -0.1525** 0.2423*** -0.036    
Listing 0.2479*** 0.3363*** 0.1269 0.1893*** -0.0481 0.1575** 0.3094*** -0.2097*** 0.2344*** -0.0762 -0.1402 0.226*** 0.1814** 0.2753***   
BIG4 -0.1255 -0.0571 -0.3272*** -0.3501*** -0.224*** -0.1071 -0.2251*** 0.4668*** -0.1476** 0.014 0.2596*** -0.1881*** -0.0637 0.0675 -0.018  
Region -0.0126 -0.0239 -0.0971 -0.0877 -0.2852*** 0.0017 0.0606 0.1573** -0.0921 -0.2739*** 0.0993 -0.0548 -0.0626 -0.0517 0.2107*** 0.4512*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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7.3 Multivariate Analysis 
In order to test whether IC and CG features  were associated significantly with 
performance of IFIs (i.e. accounting- and market-based performance measured by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q respectively), regression analysis was conducted using STATA 13.1. 
Hence, the hypotheses, to be tested, were H1 and H2a-to-H2e, first based on ROA 
followed by Tobin’s Q. 
In order to examine the effects of IC and CG on the IFIs’ performance, 
alternative versions of the following panel regression specification were estimated: 
 
PERF = α + β1VAIC + β2 GOV (lnBSIZE + NED + lnSSB + lnACS + 
duality) + β3 FIRM (lnFSIZE + risk + SUB + listing + big4 + region) + ε 
Eq. 
(1) 
 
PERF denotes one of the alternative performance measures (ROA or Tobin’s Q), GOV 
includes all five measures of corporate governance-variables, and FIRM includes all six 
firm-specific control variables42. 
ROA  = Return on assets (accounting performance); 
Tobin’s Q = Tobin’s Q (market performance); 
VAIC   = Value added intellectual coefficient; 
lnBSIZE  = Log of board size; 
Duality = Role duality; 
NED  = Non-executive directors; 
lnSSB  = Log of Shariah supervisory board; 
lnACS  = Log of audit committee size; 
lnFSIZE = Log of firm size (total assets); 
Risk  = Level of risk, using leverage as proxy; 
                                                 
42
Note that VAIC is a composite sum of HC, SC, and CE efficiency.  In order to capture the impact of 
each sub-component of VAIC, four different regression models, referred as Model 1, 1a, 1b and 1c for 
accounting-based performance, and Models 2, 2a, 2b and 2c for market-based performance  were run 
separately, where explanatory variable changes in each equation. 
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SUB  = Total number of existing subsidiaries; 
Listing  = Listing status; 
BIG4  = Type of auditor; 
Region  = Operating region; 
α  = intercept; and  
ε  = standard error of estimates. 
 
Models 1 and 2 were used to measure the impact of VAIC and   CG variables on the 
sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance. 
Table 6.5 reports the results of the regression analysis based on ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. Model 1 examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ accounting 
performance and VAIC and CG and firm-specific features. The F -value for pooled data 
was significant at the 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
was 35%. Focusing first on the 
results for the accounting-based performance measure, as reported in the second column 
of Table 6.5, it can be seen that, for the sampled IFIs, VAIC  had a significant (p < 0.01) 
and positive relationship with ROA. Hence hypothesis H1 for accounting performance 
was accepted. The result implied that IFIs were efficient in creating value through their 
IC and financial capital resource-based and, consequently,  were able to generate higher 
returns on assets. 
Likewise, Model 2 examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ market 
performance and VAIC and CG and firm-specific features. The F -value for pooled data 
was significant at the 1% level. The adjusted R
2   
was 36%. Results for the sampled IFIs’ 
market-based performance, as reported in the third column of Table 6.5, showed a 
positive and significant relationship between Tobin’s Q and VAIC at the 1% 
significance level. Hence, hypothesis H1 for the sampled IFIs market-based 
performance was supported. 
As for governance related variables, the results suggested that there was no 
significant relationship between the sampled IFIs’ accounting-based performance and 
the governance-specific features. Thus, the hypotheses H2a-to-H2e for accounting 
performance were rejected. On the other hand, the results indicated a significant 
relationship between some governance-specific variables and market performance. Both 
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role duality (positively) and SSB (negatively) were related to market performance at the 
1% significance level. Hence, hypotheses H2c was accepted for market performance 
while hypothesis H2d was rejected for market-based performance. Role duality referred  
to centralization of power and, for instance,  Jensen (1986) proposed that role duality  
gave too much power to one individual who was more likely to pursue strategies which 
advanced personal interests to the detriment of the firm as a whole. 
However, in the context of this study, the interpretation was somewhat different. 
Islamic banking was based on trust and extended the stewardship generally towards the 
middle and lower management.  Furthermore, these findings suggested that combining 
the role of CEO and chairman impacted positively on the IFIs’ market-based 
performance. These findings were quite the contrary to the  previous research (Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Lehn and Zhao 2006), which 
suggested that the board's monitoring efficiency was enhanced when the CEO had 
limited power to influence the board's agendas and actions. However, these results 
agreed with the stewardship theorists (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997), 
who reasoned that managers were good stewards of corporations and acted in the best 
interests of their principals. Among other governance-specific characteristics and unlike 
the accounting-based performance measure, board size was found to be associated 
significantly with Tobin’s Q at the 5% level, suggesting that markets perceive large 
boards as counterproductive for IFIs. Thus, hypothesis H2a for market-based 
performance was accepted. 
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Table 6.5 
Regression Results of ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 ROA Tobin's Q 
Constant -3.946** -0.485*** 
VAIC 0.621*** 0.0292*** 
lnBSIZE -0.486 0.144** 
NED -0.0446 0.0872 
lnSSB 0.0326 -0.0351*** 
lnACS 0.620 0.0408 
Duality 0.184 0.0978*** 
lnFSIZE 0.101 0.0737*** 
Risk 0.00546 -0.00377*** 
SUB 0.0455** -0.00440** 
Listing 0.603** 0.186*** 
BIG4 0.257 0.112*** 
Region 0.133 -0.0921*** 
N 320 320 
Adjusted R
2
 0.352 0.364 
R-squared 0.3768 0.3878 
F-Value 20.03*** 17.45*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
As for firm-specific variables, firm complexity and listing status related positively to 
ROA at the 5% significance level, suggesting that listed IFIs with complex business 
structures generated higher returns on assets. Hence, hypotheses H3b and H3d were 
accepted for accounting performance. All other firm-related variables were not 
statistically significant with ROA. Therefore, there was not enough statistical evidence 
to support hypotheses H3a, H3c, H3e, and H3f. 
In contrast, all firm-related variables were found to have significant relationship 
with IFIs’ market performance based on Tobin’s Q at the 1% significance level. Hence, 
hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3d, and H3e were accepted for market performance. 
Furthermore, firm size, listing status and type of auditor were in the positive direction 
while level of risk, firm complexity and operating region were in the negative direction. 
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Hence, hypothesesH3c and H3f were rejected. The results implied that market value 
declined as risk and number of subsidiaries increases. Equally, IFIs based in regions, 
other than Gulf, tended to achieve higher market valuations. 
 
7.3.1 Sub-components of VAIC and Performance 
Furthermore, six sets (three sets for each performance measure) of regression Models 
were developed to measure the individual impact of VAIC measured separately by HCE 
and SCE; and CEE on the IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance. The 
following section describes these Models. 
 
7.3.1.1 Sub-components of VAIC and accounting performance of IFIs 
Model 1a was used to measure the HCE’s impact on the IFIs’ accounting performance, 
based on ROA. The hypothesis, tested here, was H1a for accounting performance. The 
F -value for five year pooled data was positive and significant at the 1% level while the 
adjusted R
2 
was 46% suggesting the Model’s best fit. Model 1a’s results are reported in 
the second column of Table 6.6. These indicated a significant and positive relationship 
at the 1% level between HCE and ROA, supporting hypothesis 1a for accounting-based 
performance. The results of both sets of control variables were similar to those reported 
in Model 1. 
Model 1b was used to measure the impact of SCE on the sampled IFIs’ financial 
performance, based on ROA. The hypothesis, tested here, was H1b for the sampled 
IFIs’ accounting-based performance. The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 
1% level while the adjusted R
2
 was 14%. Model 1b’s results, as reported in the third 
column of Table 6.6, showed no significant relationship between SCE and the 
accounting-based performance measure. Therefore, these did not support hypothesis 
H1b for the sampled IFIs’ accounting-based performance. The results of the control 
variables were the same as observed in Model 1, with the exception of firm-size, which 
was related to ROA at the 1% significance level. This suggested that, as the firm size 
increased, the SCE increased, also, and reflected positively on the sampled IFIs’ 
financial performance. 
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Table 6.6 
Regression Results of ROA and Tobin’s Q with HCE, SCE, and CEE 
  
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 
ROA ROA ROA Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Constant -1.966 -3.461 -0.575 -0.396** -0.591*** -0.238 
HCE 0.868***   0.0390***   
SCE  -0.506   0.136**  
CEE   8.617***   0.636*** 
lnBSIZE -0.532 -0.891 -0.775 0.141** 0.127* 0.133** 
NED -0.169 -0.694 -0.0388 0.0803 0.0654 0.104* 
lnSSB 0.0316 0.0184 0.0958 -0.0352*** -0.0353*** -0.0301*** 
lnACS 0.322 0.854 0.485 0.0280 0.0563 0.0242 
Duality 0.132 0.227 0.388 0.0955*** 0.103*** 0.111*** 
lnFSIZE -0.0209 0.385*** 0.0739 0.0688*** 0.0851*** 0.0643*** 
Risk 0.00480 0.00549 -0.0145** -0.00380*** -0.00346*** -0.00527*** 
SUB 0.0542*** 0.0236 0.0199 -0.00406** -0.00535*** -0.00571*** 
Listing 0.385 0.783*** 0.769*** 0.176*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 
BIG4 0.601* -0.497 -0.384 0.126*** 0.0848** 0.0847** 
Region 0.0583 0.178 0.0262 -0.0953*** -0.0719** -0.103*** 
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Adjusted R
2
 0.462 0.136 0.357 0.377 0.339 0.418 
R-squared 0.4823 0.1688 0.3813 0.4007 0.3635 0.4401 
F-Value 31.57*** 6.28*** 17.18*** 18.07*** 13.60*** 28.52*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
Finally, Model 1c’s results, which examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ 
accounting-based performance and CEE, are reported in the fourth column of Table 6.6. 
The F -value was significant at the 1% level, while the adjusted R
2 
was 38% for the 
combined five-year period. These results were similar to those of Model 1a but with a 
slightly higher coefficient. The results suggested a positive and significant relationship 
at the 1% level between CEE and ROA, thus, supporting hypothesis H1c for IFIs’ 
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accounting performance.  The results for the control variables were found to be the 
same as observed in Model 1a with the exception of risk which was significant at the 
5% level in the predicted direction. 
 
7.3.1.2 Sub-components of VAIC and market performance of IFIs 
Model 2a was used to measure the HCE’s impact on the sampled IFIs’ market 
performance, based on Tobin’s Q. The hypothesis, tested here, was H1a for the sampled 
IFIs’ market-based performance. The F-value was significant at 1% level while the 
adjusted R
2 
was 38%. Model 2a’s results are reported in the fifth column of Table 6.6. 
These indicated a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level between HCE and 
Tobin’s Q, supporting hypothesis H1a for the IFIs’ market performance. Similar to the 
accounting-based performance measure, the results for the market-based performance 
measure corroborated human IC as the primary source of value creation for the sampled 
IFIs. The results of governance-related variables and firm-specific variables were the 
same as observed in Model 2. 
Model 2b was used to measure the SCE’s impact on the sampled IFIs’ market 
performance, based on Tobin’s Q. The hypothesis, tested here, was H1b for the sampled 
IFIs’ market-based performance. The F–value was significant at the 1% level while the 
adjusted R
2
 was 34% for the combined five-year period. Model 2b’s results, as reported 
in the sixth column of Table 6.6, showed a positive and significant relationship at the 
5% level between SCE and Tobin’s Q, thus supporting hypothesis H1b for the sampled 
IFIs’ market-based performance. These results were contrary to those observed for the 
accounting-based performance in which case the analysis showed no significant 
relationship between SCE and ROA. These findings lent support to the argument, 
extended by Huang and Liu (2005), that investment in structural IC had a positive effect 
on performance. The findings  were similar, also, to those of El-Bannany (2008) who 
examined the IC performance of UK banks and reported that investment in structural IC 
(i.e. IT systems)  had a significant impact on the bank’s performance. Consequently, 
although HCE and CEE appeared to be the main value drivers for IFIs, nonetheless, 
SCE played, also, a substantial role in determining the sampled IFIs’ market valuations. 
The results of governance-related variables and firm-specific variables were the same as 
observed in Model 2. 
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Finally, Model 2c was employed to examine the association between the 
sampled IFIs’ market performance and CEE. The F -value was significant at 1% level 
while the adjusted R
2 
was 42%. CEE was found to have a positive (p < 0.01) and 
significant relationship with market performance, thus, supporting hypothesis H1c for 
the sampled IFIs’ market-based performance. The results lent, also, support to the 
findings of Youndt et al. (2004) who found that firm performance  was associated with 
Tobin’s Q. The results of CG-variables and firm-specific variables were the same as 
observed in Model 2. 
 
7.4 Discussion of Findings 
The overall results depicted a positive relationship between VAIC and the sampled IFIs’ 
performance i.e. accounting performance based on ROA and market performance based 
on Tobin’s Q. These findings supported the main research hypotheses that there were 
positive and significant relationships between VAIC and the sampled IFIs’ performance 
based on ROA and Tobin’s Q respectively. However, the results of the segregate 
analysis of the VAIC sub-components on both sets of performance measures suggested 
some differences in the sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance. It 
should be pointed out that when each of the three sub-components of VAIC viz. HCE, 
SCE, and CEE were analysed separately, the statistical analysis produced different 
results. 
 
7.4.1 Accounting-based Performance of IFIs 
 IC (measured by VAIC) was expected to be one the major determinant for the sampled 
IFIs’ accounting performance, based on ROA. The significant positive result supported 
the hypothesis that there was a significant and positive relationship between VAIC and 
the sampled IFIs’ accounting performance. 
The results agreed with the earlier research in the context of conventional 
financial institutions. The study endorsed the findings of Ting and Lean (2009) who 
examined the relationship between IC and the financial performance of Malaysian 
financial institutions for the years 1999-2007. The study revealed a positive and 
significant relationship between VAIC and ROA. The findings were  in agreement with 
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Muhammad and Ismail (2009), who observed a higher contribution of IC in the value 
creation efficiency of Malaysian commercial banks. The results lent support, also, to the 
findings of do Rosário Cabrita and Vaz (2005) who, after surveying 53 affiliated 
members of the Portuguese Bankers Association, found that IC was related 
substantively and significantly to the organizational performance of the Portuguese 
banking industry,. Likewise, the results were consistent with Yalama and Coskun 
(2007) who posited that, for banks listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market, 
human IC was a more important factor than physical and financial capital. 
 As a consequence, it was to establish that VAIC indicated efficiency in creating 
corporate value or the extent of corporate intellectual ability. In other words, the higher 
the value creation efficiency of an IFI, the higher is its financial performance. Hence, it 
can be said crucially that VAIC implies efficiency in creating corporate value or 
financial performance. 
Based on the results reported in this study, it is argued that IC acts as a major 
source of corporate advantage to IFIs since IC efficiency is associated strongly with the 
IFIs’ profitability. Hence, these results lend support to the arguments, drawn from 
resource-based view of the firm, that IC is a strategic asset which has a positive impact 
on a firm’s performance. It is established that IC should be recognized, also, as one of 
the major investments in driving the firm’s sustainable growth. These claims found 
support in the previous studies. For example,  Mavridis (2004) and Saengchan (2008), 
who analyzed the contribution of IC and physical resources to the value-added 
efficiency of Japanese and Thai banks respectively, submitted that the best performing 
banks were those which utilized their IC resources more effectively than the physical 
ones. 
In summary, the comparative analysis of this study to the existing literature 
suggested a varying degree of linkages between IC-efficiency and financial 
performance. Although these studies provided a significant amount of empirical 
evidence, nevertheless most studies continued to focus on a particular sector and, hence, 
were country specific. Therefore, it was difficult to generalize these studies’ findings.  
This study mitigates such concerns. In a departure from the existing literature, this study 
used 64 IFIs based in ten different geographical locations around the globe. Therefore, 
this study’s results are arguably more reliable and robust since the study gathered 
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evidence from ten financial sectors. Moreover, the use of panel data, for the 5 years 
from 2007 to 2011, justifies the contributions made by this study. 
The results strongly supported the hypothesis that HCE was associated 
positively with the sampled IFIs accounting-based performance. The results 
corroborated human IC as the primary source of value creation; this allows for a better 
understanding of the hidden values of intellectual wealth (Subramaniam and Youndt, 
2005). This implies that human IC is the precursor for an IFI’s intellectual wealth of. In 
other words, with the development of human IC, an IFI’s ability to merchandise its IC 
results in higher profitability. These findings are in line with the suggestion of Colombo 
and Grilli (2005) that firms with greater human IC (i.e. higher education or skill)  were 
likely to have better entrepreneurial judgment and, as long as human IC continued to be 
developed, staff could improve their job performance and, ultimately, improve the 
firm’s performance (Hsu, 2007). 
 This study’s results were consistent with the earlier studies in the financial 
sector (Goh, 2005; Mavridis and Kyrmizoglou, 2005; Mention and Bontis, 2013), who 
reported that human IC contributed both directly and indirectly to business performance 
in the banking sector. As established earlier, human IC is most significant for IFIs since 
employees are expected to have not only conventional knowledge and skills related to 
the provision of banking services but, also, to possess strong knowledge of Shariah as 
this will enhance the IFIs’ credibility and reputation in the market place. Arguably, 
knowledge embedded in the human IC in employment by the IFIs is valuable, rare, and 
isolated from imitation or substitution; this assists IFIs in sustaining superior 
performance. The resource-based view of the firm gives rise to this argument that firms 
can achieve and sustain competitive advantages by mobilizing valuable resources and 
capabilities that are inelastic in supply (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
In what follows, the IFIs’ capability of value creation is regarded as being equal to 
Shariah scholars (human IC) who are rare and, thus, offer a tremendous potential for 
IFIs to exploit the rare characteristics of a diverse employee (SSB) base for competitive 
advantage. 
SCE, the second sub-component of VAIC, was assumed, also, to be associated 
positively with ROA; however, the results reported otherwise. No significance support 
was found for the hypothesis that there is a significant positive relationship between 
ROA and SCE. Therefore, the results do not lend support to the findings of Youndt et 
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al. (2004) who found structural IC to be associated typically with financial returns. 
However,  this study’s results lend support to the argument that there may be trade-offs 
between the elements of IC, as proposed by Murthy and Mouritsen (2011). This 
suggests that multiple forms of IC may be unproductive. Consequently, not all 
investments in the IC- elements are profitable (Li, 2001). 
 The Islamic finance industry is still in its infancy and striving with many 
challenges. One of the potential challenges, facing Islamic finance, is to meet up with 
the increasing demand for Shariah-compliant products and services.  Also, in order to 
provide these services, IFIs have to be present physically in various markets, either 
where they do not exist or the numbers of operational branches are fairly limited. 
Ultimately, Islamic finance needs to expand itself. Such expansion requires some sort of 
structural mechanism in order to supplement the human capital. As established earlier, 
although human capital is essential for product innovation, structural capital is equally 
important for human IC to work better. In other words, structural IC constitutes the 
supportive infrastructure which enables human IC to function in an organization 
(Zéghal and Maaloul, 2010). Hence, IFIs may acquire all such non-human storehouses 
of knowledge ranging from tangible assets protected by law such as, copyrights, patents, 
databases, trademarks, computer and software to corporate culture, trust among 
employees, transparency, management processes, information system and all other 
elements which enable employees to give better productivity. The acquisition cost of the 
said resources is high at present while, as reflected in the results, the return is low. 
Structural capital is a onetime expense in case of tangible resources i.e. office building, 
whereas the technological resources, such as software, keep updating. Therefore, it is 
argued that, eventually, investments in structural resources will have a positive impact 
on the IFIs’ efficiency and profitability. 
This argument found comprehensive support in existing literature on 
conventional finance. For instance, El-Bannany (2008) , studied the IC performance of 
UK banks for the years 1999-2005 and submitted that investments in structural capital, 
i.e. IT systems, had a positive impact on the bank’s profitability. A similar suggestion  
was made by Hsu and Wang (2012), who posited that structural IC, i.e. operations, 
procedures and the processes of knowledge management, propelled organizations’ value 
creation activities which had a positive effect on their performance. In other words, IFIs 
require advanced technologies to compete in today’s fast-paced economy. Hence, IFIs, 
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with strong structural IC, will have a supportive culture  with will encourage employees 
to try and learn new knowledge (Florin et al. 2003) and this will impact significantly on 
their performance (De Brentani and Kleinschmidt, 2004). Accordingly, it is expected 
that the contribution of structural IC to the total value added efficiency of IFIs will 
increase over time and it will have an ultimate positive affect on their accounting 
performance. 
Capital employed efficiency (CEE) is the third sub-component of VAIC, 
recognized to be related positively to the IFIs’ accounting performance. The results lend 
support to the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between CEE and ROA, 
suggesting that CEE is a significant factor in explaining the IFIs financial performance. 
Likewise, in the context of conventional finance, studies regarded financial capital to be 
an important factor in determining a bank’s profitability. For instance, Mavridis (2004) 
found a significant and positive correlation between ROA and CEE. Similarly, Kamath 
(2007) found that, when compared to their foreign counterparts, Indian public sector 
banks  were the top performers in CEE as. In an extended research on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, Chu et al. (2011) found that CEE was a major determinant of the 
financial performance. 
In summary, the IFIs’ accounting based performance was driven mainly by HCE 
in addition to CEE, while SCE was not found to be associated significantly with ROA. 
These results provided sufficient evidence to accept hypotheses H1a and H1c for 
accounting performance that HCE and CEE were related positively to the sampled IFIs’ 
accounting based performance. On the other hand, the results did not support the 
hypothesis H1b for accounting performance that SCE was related significantly to ROA. 
However, the results served the research objectives of examining the impact of sub-
components of VAIC on the sampled IFIs’ accounting-based performance. The 
statistical analysis implied that human capital was the main value driver for IFIs.  This 
meant that this study’s sampled IFIs possessed substantial human IC i.e. higher 
education and knowledge (including Shariah-knowledge) to make better entrepreneurial 
judgments when using these skills to deploy financial capital. This inference found 
support, also, in other literature streams. For instance, human capital theorists (Becker, 
1964; Schultz, 1961), reasoned simply that an increase in worker skills, knowledge, and 
abilities translated most likely into increased organizational performance. In other 
words, human IC i.e. when people possess high levels of knowledge and skills and 
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generate new ideas and techniques which can be embodied in product innovation and, as 
a consequence, improve a firm’s performance (Berg, 1969).  This study’s results lent, 
also, support to the argument of Dakhli and De Clercq (2004) who suggested that a 
firm's stock of human IC would influence its profitability. 
On the other hand, the results of the governance related variables were 
discouraging since none of the governance-specific variable was found to be related 
significantly to the IFIs’ accounting performance, based on ROA. This implied that CG 
features had no impact on the IFIs’ financial performance. Nonetheless, the analysis 
served the purpose of the study which aimed to examine the relationship between CG 
features and the sampled IFIs accounting-based performance. Equally, among firm-
specific variables, listing status and firm complexity (SUB) related positively to ROA at 
the 5% level of significance; this suggested that listed IFIs with complex business 
structure generated higher returns on assets. 
To summarize, the overall results  were in agreement with previous studies  
(e.g., Adams and Santos, 2006; Ting and Lean, 2009; Mondal and Ghosh, 2012), which, 
in the context of conventional financial institutions, documented a positive relationship 
between the banks’ accounting based performance and IC efficiency. Furthermore, the 
results indicated a significant positive relationship between financial performance and 
the variables, CEE and HCE. This suggested that ROA captured the VAIC from both 
CEE and HCE. The results suggested, also, that higher returns on assets were associated 
with IFIs who were listed and followed complex business structures. Overall in the 
context of the sampled IFIs, these findings were consistent with previous research in the 
context of conventional banks (see Mavridis, 2004; Goh, 2005; Murthy and Mouritsen, 
2011), who posited that the best performing banks were those that utilized their human 
intellectual capital and physical capital. 
 
7.4.2 Market-based Performance of IFIs 
Two performance measures: ROA, which is accounting measure; and Tobin’s Q, which 
is market-based performance, were used to measure the sampled IFIs overall 
performance of. In the case of the latter, IC (measured by VAIC) was expected to be 
one the major determinant for the sampled IFIs’ market-based performance. The 
significant positive result supported the hypothesis that, based on Tobin’s Q, there was a 
174 
 
significant positive relationship between VAIC and the sampled IFIs’ market 
performance. 
These findings were in agreement with the earlier research. For instance, the 
results supported the findings of Youndt et al. (2004) who found that the firm 
performance was associated with Tobin’s Q. Similarly, the results agreed with Wang 
(2008) who posited that IC had a strong impact on the competitive advantage and 
market capitalization of the US companies. This implied that the IFIs’ competitive 
advantage laid in the better utilization of their IC resources. An argument supported by 
the RBV. Furthermore,  this study’s results were arguably more encouraging than those 
reported by Zéghal and Maaloul (2010) who examined IC’s impact on 300 UK firms' 
overall performance i.e. financial and stock market. By employing VAIC methodology 
the study revealed that IC had a positive impact on firms' financial performance but the 
relationship between IC and stock market performance was significant only in the case 
of high-tech industries. 
This inferred that the services sector generally and financial institutions in 
particular were undoubtedly high-tech industries which possessed a higher degree of IC 
stock. The banking sector, which IFIs part of, has experienced a dynamic and 
competitive environment due to the globalization of economies and has grown as a 
knowledge concentrated sector (Mavridis, 2004). Furthermore, the basic nature of the 
banking business is knowledge intensive (Chen et al., 2014) and the entire banking 
sector staff is intellectually more identical (Kubo and Saka, 2002) and consistent with 
perhaps any other service or business industry in any economy (Joshi et al., 2013). For 
IFIs, the interpretation of knowledge, embedded in their human capital, is somewhat 
broader when compared to their conventional counterparts. This is because, here, 
knowledge here not limited to conventional knowledge to running a financial system 
but knowledge of Shariah is, also, equally essential for the IFIs’ staff members. The 
market perceives the IC stocks, particularly the IFIs’ human capital, as being competent 
and knowledge rich and the market extends its trust towards these institutions; 
ultimately, this results in higher market values for IFIs. 
This is evident from the results of the HC efficiency; there was a positive 
association with the IFIs’ market-based performance. This supports the hypothesis that 
HCE is an important determinant of the IFIs’ market valuations. The analysis of the 
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other two sub-components of VAIC viz. SCE and CEE suggested the same with varying 
statistical significance. 
Contrary to the accounting-based performance, the IFIs’ market-based 
performance was driven by strong CEE, followed by HCE and, to a lesser statistical 
significance, SCE. Therefore, the results indicate clearly that investors place different 
values on each of the three components of VAIC, since CE efficiency is treated 
differently from the other two components i.e. HC efficiency and SC efficiency. 
The relationship between the IFIs’ market-based performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q and governance-specific variables, was encouraging, also. The results 
indicated that markets tended to  place higher values  on those IFIs which did not follow 
the  CG codes such as having role duality,  having a small size of SSB, and having 
higher than the average board-size e.g. seven members (Jensen, 1993). The analysis 
served the purpose of the study which aimed to examine the relationship between the 
sampled IFIs’ market-based performance and governance-specific variables. Although 
there was a shallow relationship between the sampled IFIs’ governance-specific features 
and accounting-based performance, there were strong relationships between corporate 
governance features and the market-based performance measure. Tobin’s Q could be 
observed with varying degrees of statistical significance. 
 All the board characteristics i.e. board-size, board composition (NED), 
leadership structure (role duality), size of Shariah supervisory board and size of audit 
committee were expected to be the major elements in explaining the sampled IFIs’ 
performance. However, all of the above factors related significantly and solely to the 
sampled IFIs’ market base performance. 
Board-size was found to be associated positively with Tobin’s Q, suggesting that 
the sampled IFIs with large board size tended to have higher market valuations. This 
result was similar to those of Adams and Mehran (2003) and Adams and Mehran (2005) 
who found that, based on Tobin’s Q, larger boards related positively to the commercial 
banks’ market values. Consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005) and Andres and 
Vallelado (2008), this study’s results challenge the widespread belief of the agency 
theory tenants (Provan 1980, Goodstein et al. 1994) that small boards are more efficient 
and that shareholder interests can be compromised if the board is too large (Hoechle et 
al., 2012). Contrarily, the results suggest that for IFIs (both Shariah and finance-related) 
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larger boards might prove more efficient in advising and monitoring functions, creating 
more value and, thus, achieving higher market valuations. 
Another relevant finding to emerge was that board size was a trade-off between 
advantages i.e. more advising and more monitoring to deal with problems and 
disadvantages i.e. control and coordination problems. This finding supported the 
argument extended by Andres and Vallelado (2008). Hence, the central belief shielding 
the ‘‘one-size-fits-all” in corporate governing-boards, particularly the reduction in board 
size, was inappropriate when other functions beyond the disciplinary and specificity of 
the Islamic banking industry were taken into account. Therefore, it is difficult to assume 
that increasingly larger boards create more value. This result challenges the empirical 
evidence in corporate governance literature: large boards encounter problems of 
coordination, control, and decision-making. A plausible explanation for the stated 
results is that it is significantly more complex for IFIs’ boards to monitor and advice on 
simultaneously both Shariah and contemporary finance related activities. Therefore, for 
IFIs, a larger board is justified since more directors are available to assign more people 
to advise and supervise on the managements’ decision. Equally, more advisors and 
supervisors make it easy to detect the managers’ opportunistic behaviours and to reduce 
managers’ discretionary powers. Arguably, for IFIs, larger boards are more efficient 
than small boards. Thus, the inclusion of more directors should benefit the IFI’s 
advisory and monitoring functions and, hence, lead to improved governance and 
increased market valuation. 
The obtained empirical evidence concurred partially with a recommendation 
included usually in the codes of good practices, namely, the advisability of appointing 
outside directors. Board composition (fraction of non-executive directors (NED) on the 
board) was the second governance related variable used in this study. Surprisingly, 
NED was found to be unrelated to the sampled IFIs’ market-base performance. The 
result  was inconsistent with the earlier research that Tobin’s Q increased as the fraction 
of outside directors on the board  rose (Coles et al., 2008).  Also, the result  did not 
support Andres and Vallelado’s (2008) argument that, as predicted by the agency 
theory, the presence of outside directors on banks’ boards would improve the 
supervision of management and reduce the conflict of interest among stakeholders. 
Leadership structure (role duality) was another potential corporate governance 
feature in explaining the sampled IFIs’ market performance. Role duality was found to 
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be related to Tobin’s Q in the predicted direction; this suggested that combining the 
CEO’s authoritative role and chairmanship of the board impacted positively on the 
sampled IFIs’ market performance. 
 The results did not support the proposed hypothesis that there was a positive 
and significant relationship between size of Shariah supervisory board (SSB) and IFIs’ 
market-based performance. The strong statistical significance (at the 1% level) in the 
negative direction suggested that markets did not appreciate a larger sized SSB. As 
established earlier, the employees (human IC), including the board members, were 
expected to have knowledge of Shariah and contemporary economics. Accordingly, the 
members of staff were expected to be in need of less Shariah supervision. Therefore, a 
larger SSB was not essential. The significant negative relationship suggested that a large 
SSB was subject to higher costs and, ultimately, the markets placed lower values  on 
IFIs with a larger sized SSBs. Audit Committee Size (ACS), the fifth CG related 
variable, was not found to affect the sampled IFIs’ market performance and the 
proposed hypothesis was rejected. 
In the case of market-based performance and based on Tobin’s Q at the 1% 
significance level, all firm-related controlled variables were found to have a significant 
relationship with the sampled IFIs’ market performance. 
Firm size, using log of total assets as a proxy, was found to be positively 
significant for Tobin’s Q; this was in line with the previous studies on IFIs (see Bashir, 
1999; Majid et al., 2010; Čihák and Hesse, 2010). This implies that large IFIs differ 
from their smaller counterparts in terms of market valuation. The explanation for the 
significant size effect on market-based performance was that large IFIs possessed 
relatively higher shares of physical and financial capital bases and their operations  were 
often more complex as  were their needs for IC stocks. Such increased access to 
resources influenced the development and level of IC. Therefore, larger IFIs tended to 
have better stocks of IC particularly, human IC, since staff accumulated specialized 
information, skill and know-how. These allowed them to communicate efficiently and 
effectively and, thus, reduce decision-making errors and improve performance (Luthans 
and Youssef 2004). 
Opacity or complexity played a significant role in both the internal (between 
governing body and management) and external (all other stakeholders) interactions. 
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Firm complexity
43
  was related significantly to Tobin’s Q in the negative direction; this 
suggested that the IFIs’ management struggled to manage effectively every aspect of 
their business. A likely explanation for the negative effect of firm-complexity on the 
sampled IFIs’ market performance  was that IFIs, with a greater number of subsidiaries,  
were more complex and, ultimately, needed higher internal controls and greater in-
house capabilities (Zaman et al., 2011). This meant that such IFIs needed higher 
structural IC to operate and higher human IC to run the system like well-oiled machines. 
Acquisition of higher IC resources (i.e. structural and human IC) was costly and, 
therefore, it was reflected negatively in the analysis. However, a positive relationship 
was expected in the long run. 
Furthermore, level of risk was hypothesised to be an important firm-related 
variable in explaining the sampled IFIs’ performance. Although there was a positive 
relationship between the sampled IFIs’ accounting performance and levels of risk, the 
relationship was not statistically significant. On the other hand, based on Tobin’s Q, 
leverage related significantly and negatively with the sampled IFIs’ market 
performance. The result implied that the IFIs’ market valuations declines as leverage 
went up. Simply, the investors perceived highly leveraged IFIs to be more risky and 
tended to place lower values on such IFIs. 
Listing status was hypothesised to be an important firm specific feature in 
explaining the sampled IFIs’ market performance. Contrary to the earlier findings of 
Yudistira (2004) in the field of Islamic finance, the significant and positive relationship 
suggested that listing status had a positive impact on the sampled IFIs’ market values. 
This implied that Islamic finance operated in the global context and the phenomenon of 
Islamic banking and finance was not subject to any geographical limitations. The 
stability of the Islamic finance industry during the recent financial meltdown attracted 
the attention of many players in the financial markets both locally and internationally. 
Listed firms were considered more credible by the investors and, hence, listing provided 
                                                 
43According to Andres and Vallelado (2008) “bank opacity or complexity reflects the idiosyncratic nature 
of the banking business and the difficulties outside stakeholders face when monitoring bank transactions. 
Issues concerning complexity are common in banking, making it difficult for stakeholders to monitor 
their bank. Complexity can take the form of the quality of loans not being clearly perceived, financial 
engineering not being transparent (it is particularly significant for IFIs as all the products must not violate 
the divine guidelines), financial statements proving complicated, investment risk that can be easily 
modified, or perquisites that are easier for managers or insiders to obtain (p. 2571)”. 
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IFIs with additional credibility and visibility in the markets; this enhanced their market 
performance. 
 The type of auditor (BIG4) was found to influence the IFIs’ market-based 
performance and the proposed hypothesis was accepted. The significant results might be 
due to the fact that the majority of the sampled IFIs used one of the big-4 auditors. 
Consistent with Chen and Li (2013), it is argued that high-quality audit reduces the 
likelihood of managerial asset diversion and enhances the IFIs’ market value.  
Furthermore, the results are contrary to the widespread argument that firms with internal 
control problems are less likely to hire a BIG4 auditor because they might be 
constrained financially and consider a BIG4 firm to be expensive. Arguably, the 
sampled IFIs were not suffering from internal control problems because they were 
audited by both external auditors (i.e. BIG4) to ensure the credibility of their financial 
statements and by in-house auditors (Sariah-audit) to ensure their financial statements 
were in accordance with the Shariah guidelines. 
Finally, the operating region was found to influence the sampled IFIs’ market 
performance (in the negative direction) and, hence, the proposed hypothesis was 
rejected. The negative direction of the relationship suggested systematic differences in 
investments in IC stocks and performance outcomes across geographical locations. The 
analysis suggested that the market-based performance of IFIs, operating in regions other 
than the Gulf, tended to be influenced by their locations. This finding is consistent with 
Yudistira’s (2004) earlier research in the field of Islamic finance. Market performance 
differences can be explained also by the fact that this research included 64 IFIs 
operating in ten different countries worldwide. The sample countries ranged from high 
(i.e. Qatar) to relatively low (i.e. Bangladesh) income economies and significant 
differences existed in many characteristics including those related to social structure, 
economics, politics, and geography (Majid et al., 2010). However, the results did not 
support Iqbal and Molyneux’s (2005) argument that countries with high level of 
economic development, i.e. Bahrain, attracted confidence among investors. It is not to 
say that the comprehensive regulatory framework in the Gulf region is an advantage for 
IFIs operating within the region over those IFIs operating in poorly regulated countries, 
such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, which are plagued, also, by the effects of political 
unrest, quite the contrary. Nonetheless, market confidence seems to be high in those 
IFIs operating in regions other than the Gulf. 
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Overall, the analysis suggested that markets placed substantially higher values 
on those IFIs which were large in size; had lower leverage; were listed; adopted less 
complex business structures; were audited by large audit firms (BIG4); and were located 
in regions other than the Gulf. Equally, the results indicated that markets tended to place 
higher values on those IFIs which  did not follow the CG codes and, as such,  had role 
duality; had  a small sized SSB; and  had board-size higher than the average e.g., seven 
members (Jensen, 1993). 
In synthesizing the above discussion and comparing t this study’s results to the 
existing literature, it can be seen that the overall results of the IFIs’ accounting and 
market-based performance  were in agreement with previous studies which, in the 
context of conventional banks, documented a positive relationship between ROA, 
Tobin’s Q and the bank’s performance. Furthermore, the results indicated a significant 
and positive relationship between financial performance and the variables, CEE and 
HCE, suggesting that ROA captured the VAIC from both CEE and HCE. On the other 
hand, the results, based on Tobin’s Q, indicated a positive and significant relationship 
between market performance and the variables, CEE, HCE, and SCE. This suggested 
that the market captured the VAIC from all three sub-components viz. CEE, HCE, and 
SCE. 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
The main contribution of this research was to examine the impact of IC and CG features 
on the accounting and market-based performance of 64 IFIs operating in ten different 
countries worldwide for the period 2007–2011. The results indicated a significant 
positive relationship between VAIC and IFIs’ performance based on ROA and Tobin’s 
Q. 
The results of the accounting-based performance indicated a significant positive 
relationship between financial performance and the variables, CEE and HCE, 
suggesting that ROA captured the VAIC from both CEE and HCE. On the one hand, 
none of the governance related variable was found to explain the IFIs’ accounting 
performance. On the other hand, the IFIs’ market-based performance was found to be 
driven by strong CEE and HCE and, to a lesser statistical significance, SCE, suggesting 
that the market captured the VAIC from CEE, HCE and SCE. Additionally, corporate 
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governance features and firm-related variables played a significant role in determining 
the sampled IFIs’ market performance. The results indicated that markets tended to 
place higher values on those IFIs which did not follow the CG codes such as having role 
duality; having a small sized SSB; and having larger governing boards. Equally, 
markets placed substantially higher values on those IFIs which were large in size; had 
lower leverage; were listed; adopted less complex business structures; were audited by 
large audit firms (BIG4); and were located in regions other than the Gulf. 
As mentioned earlier, one reason to select the time period i.e. 2007-2011 was to 
examine the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the IFIs’ performance. For 
these reasons and consistent with this research’s second objective, the next chapter 
(Chapter 7) analyses the sampled IFIs performance before and after the global financial 
crisis. 
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Chapter 8:  Effects of Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance 
Features on Performance of Islamic Financial Institutions Pre- and 
Post-financial Crisis 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The financial crisis, which started in the US subprime sector in 2007, destroyed the 
equity of many worldwide financial institutions by the end of 2008. The failure of 
financial intermediaries resulted in a freeze of global credit markets and required 
government interventions on a global scale. As a result, many leading conventional 
banks either collapsed or were bailed out (Erkens et al., 2012). Urged by the seriousness 
of the crisis, many studies examined the root causes of the financial crisis. Academic 
researchers, practitioners, policy makers and other related commentators suggested that 
a combination of macroeconomic factors, such as loose monetary policies (Erkens et al., 
2012), complex securitizations (Taylor, 2009), and lax corporate governance (Diamond 
and Rajan, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009) contributed to 
making the financial crisis as serious as it was. While these studies are clearly 
important, they do not explain why some financial institutions performed better than 
others, despite the fact that these institutions were exposed to the same macroeconomic 
factors. Furthermore, these studies measured firm performance using traditional tangible 
financial indicators i.e. profitability ratios and market ratios and ignored the intangible 
aspects i.e. IC. It is not to say that financial and market ratios are key performance 
indicators used to ascertain a firm’s financial health, quite the contrary. Various 
stakeholders i.e. bank managers and investors use these indicators generally to access 
the bank’s current performance, future survival probability and market share. Market 
share is a key issue, suggested by Aghion and Stein (2008), which concerns bank 
management and often banks assess their performance relative to each other on this 
basis (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). 
As argued earlier in Chapters 2 and 4, IC is a strategic asset which helps an 
organization to maintain its profitability and to sustain competitive advantage in the 
market. IC is highly significant to IFIs since the whole phenomenon of Islamic banking 
is based on the intangible ideology of Shariah –the Islamic divine law. Therefore, 
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knowing how IFIs’ IC stock affects a bank’s performance i.e. profitability and market 
valuation, is of paramount importance. 
For instance, Peni and Vähämaa (2012) opined that, to a large extent, the recent 
financial meltdown of 2007–2008 was attributable to excessive risk-taking by banks. 
Likewise, Brunnermeier (2008) suggested that firms’ risk management and financing 
policies had a significant effect on the degree to which firms were  affected by the 
economic crisis. Kashyap et al. (2008) argued that the firms’ financing and risk 
management policies were the ultimate outcomes of ‘cost-benefit trade-offs’ made by 
governing bodies. This suggested that corporate performance had been affected by the 
adopted governance mechanism (Erkens et al., 2012). Correspondingly, academic 
studies emphasized that flaws in bank governance played a key role in the  banks’ 
performance (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009; Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Generally, the 
idea was that banks with poor governance engaged in excessive risk taking which 
caused them to make larger losses during the crisis. Furthermore, the empirical evidence 
showed that poor governance  could lead executives to take fewer risks to protect their 
private benefits from control (Angelides and Thomas, 2011; John et al., 2008). This 
channel argued that better governed banks were risk seeking and, ultimately, this led 
them to poor performance during the financial meltdown. In contrast, Graham and 
Narasimhan (2004), referring to the perspective weathered by firms during the Great 
Depression, posited that, once the crisis had affected banks adversely, banks with strong 
governance mechanisms might have been better at coping more effectively with the 
crisis because of their better decisions. With this channel, banks with better governance 
might have made wiser decisions during the crisis and, hence, they would have had 
sound profitability and better market valuation. An extensive amount of empirical 
literature (Sierra et al., 2006; Caprio et al., 2007;Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009;Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2009; Webb Cooper, 2009) suggested that 
strong corporate governance mechanisms  had positive effects on the financial and 
market-based performance of conventional banks. Whereas there was limited and 
shallow empirical evidence from the Islamic finance industry (Grais and Pellegrini, 
2006; Matoussi and Grassa, 2012). 
Given the divergent views in the literature, the issue of the effects of IC and CG-
features on the performance of financial institutions, the magnitude of these effects, and 
how they might differ across time horizons i.e. pre- and post-financial crisis boils down 
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to an empirical question, one that is confronted in this chapter. In particular, this 
chapter’s goal is to examine empirically the effects of IC and CG-features on two 
dimensions of bank performance –accounting performance based on ROA and market 
performance based on Tobin’s Q, before- and after-financial crisis, while controlling for 
firm-specific characteristics. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
variables employed in the regression models. Section 7.2 presents the results of the 
correlation analysis. Section 7.3 reports the results of the multiple regression models 
followed by discussion of the findings in section 7.4. Finally, section 7.5 presents the 
summary of the chapter. 
 
8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 shows  the descriptive statistics for the selected firm characteristics, including 
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for IFIs before the financial crisis 
(Panel A) and after the financial crisis (Panels B) and for all the dependent and 
independent variables used in the models. Focusing first on the dependent variables, it 
can be seen that, before the crisis, the sampled IFIs’ overall financial performance was 
sound as indicated by ROA with a mean of 1.92. However, it should be noted that after 
the crisis, the mean of -0.05 for ROA, demonstrated the substantial impact of the 
financial crisis on the sampled IFIs’ accounting performance. As can be noted from the 
table, Tobin’s Q on average was steady at all times with a mean of 0.82, suggesting that 
although the sampled IFIs were less profitable after the crisis, investors’ confidence in 
the sampled IFIs remained unshaken. 
As for the continuous independent variables, it can be seen that, before and after 
the crisis, the of VAIC’s average mean is 4.49 and 3.51 respectively, suggesting that the 
sampled IFIs were generally efficient in generating value from their IC and physical 
capital base. The descriptive statistics, related to the independent variables, indicate that 
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HCE, SCE and CEE have positive means of 3.47, 0.70, and 0.22 (before the financial 
crisis) and 2.57, 0.69, and 0.18 (after the financial crisis) respectively. 
Table 7.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures and Continuous Independent Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 Panel A: Before the Financial Crisis 
ROA 1.923 2.066 -3.810 3.809 
Tobin's Q 0.825 0.273 0.245 1.126 
VAIC 4.490 1.854 0.361 7.030 
      HCE 3.471 1.661 -0.281 5.898 
      SCE 0.700 0.191 0.267 1.052 
      CEE 0.220 0.136 -0.094 0.488 
lnBSIZE 2.144 0.283 1.609 2.773 
NED 0.700 0.264 0.100 0.920 
lnSSB 4.117 1.530 2.000 7.000 
lnACS 1.209 0.175 1.099 1.609 
Duality 0.148 0.357 0.000 1.000 
lnFSIZE 14.313 1.447 10.787 16.836 
Risk 39.318 22.325 4.369 77.986 
SUB 5.875 6.799 0.000 20.000 
Listing 0.484 0.502 0.000 1.000 
BIG4 0.813 0.392 0.000 1.000 
Region 0.469 0.501 0.000 1.000 
 Panel b: After the Financial Crisis 
ROA -0.045 2.167558 -3.81 3.809 
Tobin's Q 0.822 0.284 0.245 1.126 
VAIC 3.505 2.082 0.361 7.030 
      HCE 2.565 1.913 -0.281 5.898 
      SCE 0.687 0.244 0.267 1.052 
      CEE 0.176 0.168 -0.094 0.488 
lnBSIZE 2.158 0.270 1.609 2.773 
NED 0.697 0.269 0.100 0.920 
lnSSB 4.141 1.379 2.000 7.000 
lnACS 1.230 0.187 1.099 1.609 
Duality 0.141 0.349 0.000 1.000 
lnFSIZE 14.383 1.676 10.787 16.836 
Risk 47.098 20.903 4.369 77.986 
SUB 6.188 6.980 0.000 20.000 
Listing 0.477 0.501 0.000 1.000 
BIG4 0.813 0.392 0.000 1.000 
Region 0.469 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Notes: See Table 5.3 on page 171 for variable definitions. 
In contrast, for corporate governance features, it can be seen that the sampled IFIs 
average board-size has a steady mean of 2.15 before and after the financial crisis, while 
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the mean of board-composition is 0.70, suggesting that NEDs remain  on the majority of 
IFIs’ boards. Size of Shariah supervisory board and size of audit committees (ACS) 
have means of 4.1 and 1.2 respectively at all times. Role duality has a mean of 0.14, 
suggesting that role duality is not common in the sampled IFIs. 
Turning to the firm-related control variables, firm-size (FSIZE), and dummy 
variables i.e. listing-status, type of auditor (BIG4) and operating region, all are constant 
at all times. In this respect, BIG4 has a mean of 0.81, suggesting that majority of the 
sampled IFIs were audited by BIG4. Similarly, about half of the sampled IFIs (48%) 
had listing status and were operating in the Gulf region.  On the other hand, the level of 
risk (leverage) increased from 39.32 (before the crisis) to 47.10 (after the crisis). 
Likewise, firm-complexity (measured by total number of existing subsidiaries) 
increased, also, from 5.88 before the crisis to 6.19 after the crisis. 
 
8.2 Correlation Analysis 
Two separate correlation analysis were performed on the sampled IFIs, controlling for 
the financial crisis. Table 7.2 (before the financial crisis) and Table 7.3 (after the 
financial crisis) present the correlations results between the dependent variables, ROA 
and Tobin’s Q, and the independent variables. ROA related positively with VAIC 
before and after the crisis, indicating that efficiency in creating corporate value or the 
extent of corporate intellectual ability enhanced a firm’s financial performance. 
Similarly, ROA was found to be related significantly with HCE and CEE in a positive 
direction. As for the market performance measure; Tobin’s Q was associated 
significantly and positively with VAIC and its sub-components at all times with the 
exception of SCE where there was an insignificant relationship after the crisis.  
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Table 7.2 
Correlation Matrix (Before Financial Crisis) 
 ROA Tobin's Q VAIC HCE SCE CEE lnBSIZE NED lnSSB lnACS Duality lnFSIZE Risk SUB Listing BIG4 
Tobin's Q 0.1713                
VAIC 0.4351*** 0.5037***               
HCE 0.5894*** 0.4827*** 0.8694***              
SCE 0.1805 0.4235*** 0.7646*** 0.5531***             
CEE 0.483*** 0.413*** 0.3764*** 0.4333*** 0.155            
lnBSIZE 0.1176 0.1574 0.1043 0.1926 0.0673 0.0824           
NED -0.037 -0.0962 -0.1576 -0.1645 -0.1335 -0.0253 -0.3555***          
lnSSB 0.1246 0.0764 0.1069 0.1436 0.0778 0.0597 0.4795*** -0.1459         
lnACS 0.1283 0.146 0.1393 0.1276 0.1223 0.2027 0.1767 -0.1532 0.0885        
Duality 0.0783 0.1885 0.1046 0.1293 0.0274 0.1061 0.2056 -0.2179 0.1554 -0.0561       
lnFSIZE 0.3698*** 0.4232*** 0.3358*** 0.3904*** 0.1921 0.4554*** 0.2282** -0.0713 0.3283*** 0.1897 0.1964      
Risk 0.0787 -0.014 0.0395 0.0738 -0.1275 0.4463*** 0.1624 -0.0771 0.1179 0.1387 0.2063 0.2731     
SUB 0.2278 0.0873 -0.0538 -0.0025 -0.1063 0.191 0.0415 0.1074 0.1127 -0.1497 0.1764 0.2624** 0.0628    
Listing 0.2 0.277** 0.2219 0.2826** 0.0688 0.1845 0.2947*** -0.1643 0.2435** -0.0518 0.123 0.264** 0.231** 0.3134***   
BIG4 -0.1275 -0.1001 -0.2916*** -0.3193*** -0.278** -0.0739 -0.2465** 0.4744*** -0.1207 -0.0027 -0.2498** -0.1881 -0.0364 0.0532 -0.015  
Region -0.0327 -0.1033 -0.1285 -0.0936 -0.2539** -0.067 0.0298 0.205 -0.0106 -0.2876** -0.0839 -0.1026 -0.0136 -0.0566 0.2173 0.4512*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Table 7.3 
Correlation Matrix (After Financial Crisis) 
 ROA Tobin's Q VAIC HCE SCE CEE lnBSIZE NED lnSSB lnACS Duality lnFSIZE Risk SUB Lisitng BIG4 
Tobin's Q 0.2842**                
VAIC 0.5827*** 0.2629**               
HCE 0.6555*** 0.3709*** 0.9272***              
SCE -0.1566 -0.0471 0.2799 0.1018             
CEE 0.617*** 0.3948*** 0.6579*** 0.6875*** -0.121            
lnBSIZE 0.0887 0.2117 0.1402 0.162 -0.0714 0.1918           
NED -0.2929 -0.0577 -0.3694*** -0.3577*** -0.1142 -0.302*** -0.3913***          
lnSSB 0.1309 -0.0185 0.0956 0.1416 -0.0197 0.0574 0.3804*** -0.1341         
lnACS 0.0163 0.036 -0.019 0.0303 -0.0592 0.0275 0.2033 -0.0594 0.1648        
Duality 0.1799 0.1874 0.1611 0.1946 -0.0331 0.0829 0.2065 -0.2205 0.1386 0.1079       
lnFSIZE 0.4021*** 0.4309*** 0.4151*** 0.4851*** -0.0344 0.4511*** 0.1427 -0.0438 0.2037 0.0516 0.1984      
Risk 0.3527*** 0.0015 0.3084*** 0.3525*** -0.095 0.478*** 0.1952 -0.2026 0.1187 0.1362 0.1042 0.4056***     
SUB 0.1246 0.1214 -0.0902 -0.0752 0.0283 -0.052 0.0151 0.1551 0.147 -0.13 0.1055 0.2176 -0.1852    
Listing 0.3259*** 0.4092*** 0.1029 0.1725 -0.1681 0.1857 0.3521*** -0.2514** 0.2212 -0.0822 0.154 0.2018 0.1567 0.233**   
BIG4 -0.1419 -0.0391 -0.3725*** -0.3918*** -0.2134 -0.1352 -0.214 0.4693*** -0.184 0.0193 -0.2663** -0.1674 -0.0824 0.0878 -0.0225  
Region 0.0561 0.0546 -0.039 -0.0487 -0.3154*** 0.0907 0.0777 0.1283 -0.176 -0.2857** -0.1098 0.0071 -0.0796 -0.0343 0.2008 0.4512*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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None of the governance-specific variables was found to be associated with the sampled 
IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance either before or after the financial 
crisis. As for firm-specific variables, firm-size related positively and significantly with 
both sets of performance measures before and after the crisis whereas level of risk was 
associated significantly with ROA after the crisis. Likewise, listing status was found to 
be associated significantly with both ROA and Tobin’s Q, after the crisis. Hence, no 
multicollinearity could be observed between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
8.3 Multivariate Analysis 
In order to test whether IC and CG features were associated significantly with the 
sampled IFIs’ performance before and after the financial crisis, regression analysis was 
conducted using STATA 13.1. Two sets of regression models, representing two 
measures of firm performance, ROA and Tobin’s Q, and as used in chapter 6, were 
repeated, controlling for the financial crisis
44
. The regression models were run to test 
hypothesis H4 that there existed no significant differences in the sampled IFIs’ IC and 
CG performance before and after the financial crisis. 
 
8.3.1 Accounting and Market Performance of IFIs Before the Financial Crisis 
Equation 1 was replicated in order to examine the impact of VAIC and governance-
specific characteristics on the sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-performance of 
before the financial crisis. 
Table 7.4 reports the results of the regression analysis based on ROA and 
Tobin’s Q before the financial crisis. The association between the sampled IFIs’ 
accounting-based performance of and VAIC and corporate governance and firm-
specific features is discussed first. The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 
1% level for all Models except for Model 1b which was significant at the 5% level. The 
adjusted R
2 
ranged from 11% to 36% for all Models. Focusing first on the results of 
                                                 
44
Regression results for 2009 are provided in Appendix 7.1. The comparative analysis suggested no 
significant differences in the sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance of in years 2009 
and 2010. Therefore, 2009 was excluded from the analysis. 
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Model 1, as reported in the second column of Table 7.4, the estimated coefficients for 
VAIC were positively and statistically significant with ROA at the 1% level, thereby 
suggesting that a higher VAIC improved the sampled IFI’s profitability. 
Model 1a examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ accounting-based 
performance, before the financial crisis and HCE.  Model 1a’s results, as reported in the 
third column of Table 7.4, indicated a positive and significant relationship at the 1% 
level between HCE and ROA. Likewise, Model 1c’s results, as reported in the fifth 
column of Table 7.4, suggested a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level 
between CEE and ROA. Therefore, consistent with the perception, the estimates 
indicated that strong HC and CE efficiency had a positive effect on the sampled IFIs’ 
profitability of before the crisis. 
 
Table 7.4 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA and Tobin’s Q before-crisis 
 Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Constant -5.694* -4.213 -6.328* -3.035 -0.479 -0.364 -0.689* -0.174 
VAIC 0.425***    0.0558***    
        HCE  0.720***    0.0561***   
        SCE   1.389    0.469***  
        CEE    6.926***    0.794*** 
lnBSIZE 0.144 -0.114 -0.0501 0.0571 0.0997 0.0683 0.0780 0.0862 
NED 0.241 0.0621 0.295 0.249 0.00626 -0.00283 0.00582 0.00865 
lnSSB -0.0145 0.00831 -0.0275 0.0375 -0.0252 -0.0241 -0.0270* -0.0194 
lnACS 1.257 1.097 1.620* 0.956 0.0423 0.0527 0.0771 0.0150 
Duality -0.177 -0.196 -0.0969 -0.0139 0.111** 0.114** 0.121*** 0.131*** 
lnFSIZE 0.243 0.138 0.368** 0.182 0.0600** 0.0605** 0.0688*** 0.0557** 
Risk -0.000308 0.000823 -0.00131 -0.0186* -0.00226* -0.00237* -0.00185 -0.00442*** 
SUB 0.0715*** 0.0757*** 0.0578** 0.0340 -0.00199 -0.00282 -0.00214 -0.00665** 
Listing -0.0560 -0.301 0.258 0.317 0.101** 0.105** 0.122** 0.151*** 
BIG4 -0.315 0.0558 -0.682 -0.653 0.118 0.122 0.0923 0.0715 
Region 0.404 0.328 0.462 0.290 -0.0709 -0.0798 -0.0404 -0.0849 
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.364 0.114 0.249 0.346 0.317 0.321 0.338 
R-squared 0.295 0.4238 0.1977 0.3198 0.4082 0.3819 0.3849 0.4007 
F-Value 4.68*** 6.17*** 2.99** 3.06*** 8.10*** 6.26*** 8.65*** 9.09*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Finally, Model 1b’s results, as reported in the fourth column of Table 7.4, showed no 
significant relationship between SCE and the sampled IFIs’ accounting performance of, 
based on ROA. In contrast, before the financial crisis, none of the corporate 
governance-related variables were related to ROA. The impact of VAIC and CG 
characteristics on the sampled IFIs’ market performance was analyzed, also. Table 7.4 
reports the results of the regression analysis based on Tobin’s Q before the financial 
crisis. The F -value was significant for all models at the 1% level while the adjusted R
2 
ranged from 32% to 35%. Consistent with the sampled IFIs’ accounting-based 
performance, the estimates indicated that VAIC was associated positively with the 
sampled IFIs’ market valuations since, in the first regression specifications, the 
coefficient estimates for VAIC were positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
before the crisis. Similar results can be observed for the sub-components of VAIC; 
these showed that, at the 1% level before the crisis, a positive and significant 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and variables HCE, SCE, and CEE respectively. 
Among the governance-related variables, role duality related positively with Tobin’s Q 
at 5% level of statistical significance.  On the other hand, firm-size and listing status, 
which were firm-related variables, related positively with Tobin’s Q at the 5% level. 
 
8.3.2 Accounting and Market Performance of IFIs After the Financial Crisis 
Table 7.5 reports the results of the regression analysis based on ROA and Tobin’s Q 
after the financial crisis. Model 1 examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ 
accounting-based performance and VAIC and CG as well as firm-specific features. The 
F-value was significant at the 1% level for all models while the adjusted R
2 
ranged from 
29% to 50%. 
As before, focusing first on Model 1’s results, as reported in the second column 
of Table 7.5, the estimated coefficients for VAIC were positively and statistically 
significant with ROA at the 1% level, thereby suggesting that higher VAIC improved an 
IFI’s profitability. Model 1a examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ 
accounting-based performance after the financial crisis and HCE. Model 1a’s results, as 
reported in the third column of Table 7.5, indicated a positive and significant 
relationship at the 1% level between HCE and ROA. Likewise, Model 1c’s results, as 
reported in the fifth column of Table 7.5, suggested a positive and significant 
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relationship at the 1% level between CEE and ROA. Therefore, consistent with the 
perception, the estimates indicate that strong HC and CEE had a positive effect on the 
sampled IFIs’ profitability after the financial crisis. Finally, Model 1b’s results, as 
reported in the fourth column of Table 7.5, showed no significant relationship between 
SCE and the accounting-based performance measure, ROA. Among corporate 
governance-related variables board size related to ROA at the 5% level after the 
financial crisis. However, the negative direction suggested that larger boards were 
subject to higher expenses and these were reflected negatively in the financial 
performance. As for firm-related variables, listing status was associated significantly 
with ROA at the 5% level; this suggested that listing had become one of the prominent 
features in explaining the sampled IFIs’ accounting performance after the crisis. 
 
Table 7.5 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA and Tobin’s Q after-crisis 
 Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Constant -2.374 -1.033 -0.767 -0.0568 -0.688*** -0.602*** -0.675** -0.471** 
VAIC 0.506***    0.0259*    
        HCE  0.672***    0.0467***   
        SCE   -1.124    0.00688  
        CEE    6.400***    0.652*** 
lnBSIZE -1.519** -1.342** -1.800** -1.810*** 0.210* 0.228** 0.195* 0.196** 
NED -1.142 -1.172* -2.311*** -1.171* 0.111 0.128 0.0597 0.160* 
lnSSB 0.0684 0.0493 0.0625 0.113 -0.0506*** -0.0520*** -0.0504*** -0.0462*** 
lnACS 0.949 0.598 0.579 0.734 0.0294 0.00803 0.0223 0.0158 
Duality 0.253 0.208 0.204 0.427 0.0681 0.0649 0.0688 0.0855** 
lnFSIZE 0.0771 -0.00317 0.307** 0.0862 0.0797*** 0.0701*** 0.0910*** 0.0695*** 
Risk 0.0184* 0.0163* 0.0226* 0.00798 -0.00462*** -0.00487*** -0.00432*** -0.00597*** 
SUB 0.0513* 0.0559** 0.0415 0.0409 -0.00546* -0.00494 -0.00605* -0.00595* 
Listing 0.867** 0.681* 0.710* 0.784** 0.237*** 0.226*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 
BIG4 0.289 0.552 -0.381 -0.287 0.114* 0.144** 0.0811 0.0885 
Region 0.428 0.358 0.492 0.358 -0.105* -0.115** -0.0920* -0.125** 
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Adjusted R2 0.440 0.499 0.287 0.440 0.391 0.429 0.365 0.467 
R-squared 0.4929 0.5463 0.3543 0.4932 0.4486 0.4833 0.4254 0.5175 
F-Value 11.51*** 15.77*** 8.42*** 13.03*** 12.67*** 13.73*** 9.45*** 17.70*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Table 7.5 reports, also, the results of the regression analysis based on Tobin’s Q after 
the financial crisis. Model 2 examined the association between the sampled IFIs’ 
market-based performance and VAIC and CG as well as firm-specific features after the 
crisis. The F -value for pooled data was significant for all models while the adjusted R
2 
ranged from 37% to 47%. Unlike the results observed before the financial crisis, VAIC 
was found to have a positive (p < 0.10) and significant relationship with market 
performance. Likewise, the analysis suggested a positive and significant relationship 
between HCE (The results are reported in the seventh column of Table 7.5.) and CEE 
(The results are reported in the ninth column of Table 7.5.) at the 1% level.  However, 
Model 2b’s results, as reported in the eighth column of Table 7.5, showed no significant 
relationship between SCE and Tobin’s Q. 
In governance-related variables, size of SSB was related in the negative direction 
to Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. Among firm-specific control variables, firm-size and 
listing status were associated positively with Tobin’s Q at the 1% level while level of 
risk relates negatively with Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. 
 
8.4 Discussion of Findings 
Overall, the results depicted that IC efficiency affected the sampled IFIs’ performance 
at all times. Consistent with the previous literature, this finding indicated that generally 
IC improved profitability and had, also, a positive effect on market valuation. Thus, 
consistent with the research hypothesis, the results suggested that the financial crisis 
might have spurred on IC’s impact on the sampled IFIs’ growth and profitability and 
their potential market share even further. Consequently, hypothesis 4 was supported. As 
for the CG mechanism, the analysis suggested some variations in the directional signs 
of some CG-features before and after the financial crisis for both sets of performance 
measures. However, CG-related variables were not found to be related significantly to 
both sets of performance measures. 
However, it should be noted that this finding was broadly consistent with do 
Rosário Cabrita and Vaz’s (2005) and Yalama and Coskun’s (2007) findings in the pre-
crisis period and with Ting and Lean’s (2009) and Muhammad and Ismail’s (2009) 
findings in the post-crisis period; they documented that IC attributes  were associated 
positively with  the financial performance of conventional banks. Equally,  the sampled 
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IFIs’ sustained market-based performance, before and after the crisis, endorsed Youndt 
et al.’s (2004) and Adams and Santos’ (2006) findings before the crisis whereas the 
observed results  of the aftermath of the market meltdown agreed with Wang (2008) and 
Zéghal and Maaloul (2010) who posited that IC had a strong impact on the competitive 
advantage and market capitalization. 
The analysis of the sampled IFIs’ accounting and market-based performance 
before and after the financial crisis suggested no significant differences. However, it can 
be seen that IC’s effect of IC on the sampled IFIs’ accounting-based performance was 
strong and consistent at all times i.e. before and after the crisis. On the other hand, the 
IC’s effect on the sampled IFIs’ market-based performance was influenced by the recent 
crisis. 
The analysis of sub-components of IC suggested that strong CEE and HCE 
played a pivotal role in determining the sampled IFIs’ financial and market-based 
performance before and after the crisis. Financial and physical capital (measured by 
CEE) is important at all times for IFIs, because, in the event of unanticipated needs, 
they have no access to the financial market. The Islamic banking industry is 
comparatively smaller than their conventional rivals as are the IFIs which engage 
mainly in relationship lending. As suggested by Ongena and Smith (2001), long-term 
bank borrower relationships are crucial for building banking relationships to create 
value
45
. This means that relationship borrowers gravitate toward high-capital banks 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013), because higher capital leads to a higher profitability and 
higher probability  means survival at all times. Likewise, HCE played a pivotal role in 
determining at all times the sampled IFIs’ financial health and market-valuation. The 
results corroborate human IC as being the precursor for  an IFI’s intellectual wealth. In 
other words, with the development of human IC, an IFI’s ability to merchandise and 
improve its IC results in higher profitability and market valuation. These findings  are in 
line with the suggestion of Colombo and Grilli (2005) that firms with greater human IC 
(i.e. higher education or skill)  were likely to have better entrepreneurial judgment at all 
times. Furthermore, this finding  is consistent with the earlier studies in the financial 
sector (Goh, 2005; Mavridis and Kyrmizoglou, 2005; Mention and Bontis, 2013), who 
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Bae et al. (2002) reported similar results after examining the value of durable bank relationships during 
the 1997–1998 Korean banking crisis. 
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reported that human IC contributed both directly and indirectly to business performance 
in the banking sector. 
On the other hand, consistent with earlier research (Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011), there  was observed either no 
significance or even a negative relationship between CG variables and the sampled IFIs’ 
performance at all times i.e. pre- and post- the financial crisis period. However, there 
can be seen interesting changes in the signs and statistical significance. 
Board-size (BSIZE) related negatively and significantly with Tobin’s Q at the 
5% level. This implied that tough large BSIZE associated positively with ROA; 
however, the market perceived larger boards to be expensive. Another significant 
difference can be observed for the size of the Shariah supervisory board; this related 
negatively with ROA at the 1% level of significance after the financial crisis, suggesting 
that the sampled IFIs’ with large board-size received sufficient advisory services and, 
hence, required relatively less Shariah supervision. 
Hence, the results indicated that the standard corporate governance measures, 
suggested by the extent literature on corporate governance and its value effects, might 
fall short in explaining the IFIs’ relevant governance structures. Specifically, the results 
highlighted that the classical model of corporate governance, which is a westernised 
concept, could not be applied to all types of financial intermediaries i.e. Islamic 
financial institutions. 
Turning to the firm-related control variables, it can be noted that some variables 
became significantly more important in determining the IFIs’ profitability and market 
valuation. Specifically, firm-size (FSIZE), and listing status were associated positively, 
while, after the crisis, level of risk related negatively with ROA at the 1% level. This 
suggested that sampled IFIs’ accounting performance increased with FSIZE and listing 
status and declined with higher leverage. These findings are consistent with the earlier 
studies (Peni and Vähämaa 2012), conducted in the context of conventional finance. 
Similarly, after the crisis, listing-status and level of risk related with Tobin’s Q at the 
5% level; this suggested that the sampled IFIs’ market valuations increased after 
becoming listed. 
Given this study’s divergent nature which provided evidence from an ignored, 
yet, potential area of research i.e. Islamic banking and finance, the observed findings 
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have sensible economic interpretations. Firstly, higher IC efficiency helped the sampled 
IFIs to improve their odds of survival at all times i.e. before and after the crisis. 
Secondly, higher IC efficiency helped the sampled IFIs to maintain their profitability 
i.e. ROA and market valuation at all times. Arguably, IC is the main line of defence for 
IFIs against negative shocks. In contrast, the insignificant results for CG mechanisms 
suggest that the westernised concept of CG does not fit with the ideology upon which 
Islamic finance is grounded. Consistent with the results observed in chapter 6, it is 
argued that IFIs are based on trust and, hence, such institutions require relatively less 
monitoring. This argument is in line with the stewardship theory literature (Donaldson, 
1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997) which assumes that managers are 
good stewards of corporations by acting in the best interests of their principals and  
which, ultimately, results in boosting a firm’s performance. 
 
8.5 Chapter Summary 
Empirically, this chapter examined the effects of IC and CG features on the sampled 
IFIs’ performance of before and after the financial crisis. In order to ensure that the 
analysis captured in a comparable way the effects of IC- and CG-efficiencies on the 
sampled IFIs’ performance of , two different time periods, referred as pre-crisis (2007-
2008) and post-crisis (2010-2011) were used. The IC efficiency and CG-mechanism of 
the sampled IFIs were measured before the financial crisis because it was unknown a 
priori when a crisis would strike. The interesting question was whether going into a 
crisis IFIs, which possessed higher stock of IC and strong CG-features, would benefit 
from these higher IC stocks and strong CG-mechanism during a crisis. Likewise,  the IC 
efficiency and CG-features of  the sampled IFIs   were measured after the financial 
crisis to benchmark the observed results. 
Overall, the results depicted a positive relationship between IC (measured by 
VAIC) and the sampled IFIs’ accounting performance based on ROA. Likewise, a 
positive relationship between IC and the sampled IFIs’ market performance, based on 
Tobin’s Q, was observed at all times. However, a reduction in statistical significance 
implied that the relationship between the sampled IFIs’ IC and market-based 
performance had weakened after the crisis. However, the analysis suggested that 
although the financial crisis did hit the sampled IFIs hard and shook the foundations of 
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the centuries old conventional financial system across the globe, specifically, IFIs with 
strong IC did not perform equally poorly. In other words, higher IC efficiency helped 
IFIs to maintain their profitability i.e. ROA and market valuation at all times i.e. before 
and after the financial crisis. Arguably, IC is the main line of defence for IFIs against 
negative shocks. As for CG measures, the analysis suggested some variations in the 
directional signs of some CG-features before and after the financial crisis for both sets 
of performance measures. However, in general, CG-related variables were not found to 
be related significantly to both sets of performance measures,. 
Despite, shallow statistical evidence being observed for corporate governance-
related variables, the overall results suggested that the financial crisis might have 
spurred on IC’s impact on the sampled IFIs’ growth and profitability of and their 
potential market share even further. These results supported generally the hypothesis 
that IC helped IFIs’ to survive. Equally, the results suggested that the classical model of 
corporate governance, grounded on the westernised concept of monitoring, did not fit 
necessarily with all sorts of financial intermediaries. Specifically, Islamic finance is 
based on trust and, hence, requires less monitoring. Therefore, a radical departure from 
existing orthodox corporate governance model is suggested, particularly for IFIs. 
As argued earlier in Chapter 4, the Islamic finance industry is not homogeneous 
and not all banks offering Shariah-compliant products are FFIBs. Hence, these banks 
possess different resources both IC and physical resources. Equally, these banks follow 
different models of corporate governance and, consequently, pursue different objectives 
and achieve different levels of performance. Against this background, the next chapter 
(Chapter 8) performs a comparative analysis by dividing the sample IFIs into FFIBs and 
Windows.  
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Chapter 9:  Effects of Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance 
Features on Performance of Full-fledged Islamic Banks vs. Islamic 
Shariah-windows 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings for this study’s third research objective which was to 
investigate, for the period 2007-2011, the effects of IC efficiency and CG characteristics 
on the performance of FFIBs and Windows, while controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 explains the banking function process.  
Section 8.2 performs the Homogeneity Analysis of IFIs. Section 8.3 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the regression models. Section 8.4 
presents the results of the correlation analysis for both sets of IFIs. Section 8.5 reports 
the results of the multiple regression models followed by a discussion of the findings in 
section 8.6. Finally, section 8.7 presents the summary of the chapter. 
 
 
9.1 Banking Function Process 
Before performing the comparative analysis of FFIBs against Windows, it is imperative 
to delineate clearly the approaches to explaining the banking function process. The 
economic production approach and intermediation approach are two approaches which 
are widely used to clarify the banking function process. 
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The former refers to the production of services provided to depositors and 
borrowers by the financial institutions. The classical production factors which are, 
namely, land, labour and capital, are used as inputs to produce desired outputs. In the 
economic production
46
 approach, a bank is viewed as the producer of loan and deposit 
services using the said economic resources, labour and capital. Whereas the modern 
empirical research on the banking efficiency is based on the latter –the intermediation 
approach was suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977). 
In fact, the intermediation approach complements the economic production 
approach. In the intermediation approach, a bank is viewed as an intermediary financial 
institution which offers financial services. It collects funds from depositors and 
purchases funds with the assistance of labour (human IC) and capital and transforms 
these generated funds into loans and other financial assets. In other words, deposits, 
held by the bank, labour and capital are all treated as inputs while the volumes of 
earning assets are defined as measures of output. 
The intermediation approach is suggested by the extant literature to be more 
appropriate for evaluating financial institutions; the reasoning is that the approach may 
be superior for evaluating the importance of frontier efficiency for the profitability of 
financial institutions since the minimisation of total costs and not only production costs 
are needed to maximise profits (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Moreover, the 
intermediation approach is inclusive of interest and/or funding expenses; often these 
account for between one-half and two-thirds of total costs (Mohamad et al., 2008). 
The basic assumption, underlying the conventional banking theories, is that 
banks accept deposits at a lower interest rate and resell those deposited funds to those 
seeking funds for economic activities at a higher interest rate. Therefore, the banks earn 
profit based on their competitive advantage at gathering information and underwriting 
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Sealey and Lindley (1977, p. 1252), defined the technical process of production as “the process of 
transformation, directed by human capital, which is considered desirable by some individuals. 
Transformation means that certain goods and/or services (inputs) enter into a process in which they ‘lose 
their identity, i.e., cease to exist in the original form,’ while other goods or services (outputs) are 
generated. The transformation process for a financial firm involves the borrowing of funds from surplus 
spending units and lending those funds to deficit spending units, i.e., financial intermediation. The 
depository financial firm's output in a technical sense is, thus, a set of financial services to the firm's 
depositors (creditors) and borrowers”. 
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risk (Santos 2001). Hence, in conventional banking system, profits are derived mainly 
from the spread between the interest rates i.e. the interest rate received from the capital 
borrowers and the interest rate paid to depositors. 
 Here, the contention is that IFIs perform the same intermediary function with 
the exception of a predetermined interest rate. In other words, IFIs do not receive or pay 
a predetermined or prefixed interest rate. Instead, profits are earned through investments 
in different projects and shared on the basis of agreements between depositors and 
borrowers. Based on similar assumptions, the removal of pre-fixed interest payment or 
receipt in the financial transactions, IFIs offer a range of fee-based baking services 
which are similar to those of conventional banks. 
 Consequently, Islamic banking is considered to be a different banking stream 
since the whole phenomenon of Islamic banking is based on the intellectual ideology of 
Shariah, the Islamic religious law which guides Islamic Economics. Under Shariah, IFIs 
are duty-bound: 1) not to charge interest payments; 2) not allowed speculating; and 3) 
are prohibited from financing specific illicit activities. Furthermore the risk sharing 
principle and real economic transactions, backed by tangible assets, suggest clear 
differences in the funding and activity structures of Islamic and conventional financial 
institutions (Kettell, 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Nawaz, 2013a; Nawaz, 2013b). 
Carvallo and Kasman (2005) noted that the liberalisation of financial markets 
was on a global scale. The IT revolution and an upward trend in using advanced 
technologies are all factors which have put competitive pressure on financial institutions 
and banks in particular. Banks, operating, in the emerging economies, are facing this 
pressure particularly since they constitute the main financial intermediaries to 
channelling savings and investments. In this context, the competitive advantage is 
enhanced if banks can function efficiently (Mohamad et al. 2008). 
Parenthetically, conventional financial institutions (hereafter referred to as CFIs) 
are enjoying several advantages over the IFIs. For instance, CFIs have a proven track in 
offering banking solutions on a global scale; enjoying huge sums of capital; and have 
more expertise along with advanced technologies when compared to IFIs. Despite the 
odds, Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments in contemporary finance 
(Schoon, 2010; Ernst and Young, 2013). Given the robust growth of the Islamic finance 
industry, many leading conventional banking groups i.e. Citibank, HSBC, Standard 
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Chartered bank etc. have made their way to the Islamic way of banking. As a 
consequence, the number of financial institutions, offering Shariah-compliant products,   
has increased causing competition within the Islamic finance industry. Correspondingly, 
many empirical studies examined the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks and 
documented that IFIs were more efficient than their conventional counterparts. 
Nonetheless, the evidence in this regard remains inconclusive. 
The existing literature seemed to establish substantial differences in performance 
efficiency between conventional and IFIs (see Chapter 3). Some studies compared the 
efficiency of conventional banks in one country while others made a across border 
comparative analysis between the conventional banking sectors. Similarly, some 
researchers continued to focus on the IFIs’ performance of alone while others made a 
comparative analysis between conventional and IFIs as well among the IFIs. Studies, 
which compared the conventional and Islamic banks, tried to highlight the differences in 
the efficiency of both banking models. However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive 
to establishing these differences and, consequently, there is still a lively debate in the 
literature. 
An interesting element, missing in these studies and particularly those 
concerning IFIs is that, so far, none of these studies verified the homogeneity of the 
Islamic finance industry.  This study contributes to the existing body of literature by: 1) 
analysing the homogeneity of the Islamic finance industry; and 2) examining and 
comparing the performance of different Islamic banks operating within the Islamic 
finance industry. In the following section, the homogeneity test is performed firstly on 
the sample IFIs. It is established that the Islamic finance industry is not homogeneous as 
such since there exists a distinction among the sample IFIs. Secondly, regression 
analysis is performed on the newly classified sets of Islamic banks in order to determine 
the differences in performance within the industry. 
 
9.2 Homogeneity Analysis of Islamic Financial Institutions 
There were 64 IFIs used as sample in this study. The data for this study was derived 
mainly from BankScope, a global database with data on both listed and non-listed banks 
being conventional or Islamic. The selected IFIs were identified as “Islamic Banks” in 
the BankScope database; this meant that all these IFIs’ operations of were Shariah-
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compliant. However, a cursory look at the selected sample indicates some differences, 
suggesting that the Islamic finance industry is not homogeneous and, as such, there lies 
a distinction within the industry. In other words, all the sampled IFIs were perceived 
wrongly to be FFIBs on the BankScope database. 
In order to support the extended argument with empirical evidence, the sampled 
IFIs were sub-classified into FFIBs and Windows
47
. The former refers to a full service 
intermediary financial institution which conducts its business in accordance with the 
Shariah and, as such, does not deal simultaneously in conventional banking business. 
Whereas, subsumed under the latter, are all those extended hands of various 
conventional banking groups which offer Islamic finance services alongside 
conventional banking as their core business. 
The classification was developed after examining carefully the profile of each of 
the sampled IFIs. Each IFI’s core business activity was verified by using annual reports, 
BankScope database, respective websites, social contacts, and several other publically 
available resources. Under the new classification, the total number of sampled IFIs 
remained unchanged; however, 39 banks were sorted as FFIBs and 27 banks were 
sorted as Windows. 
As established earlier, the business model of the Islamic way of banking is based 
on Shariah (the legal code of Islamic jurisdiction). This guides Islamic Economics 
whereas the traditional conventional banking model is based on different ideologies and 
pursues different goals i.e. profit maximization. Simplifying and relating the argument 
to the present classification of IFIs, it was reasoned that the FFIBs came into being to 
offer Shariah-compliant financial solutions to those looking for investment 
opportunities while not violating their religious beliefs. Another factor, which emerges 
here, is that the prominent conventional banking groups came into this business through 
their extended hands i.e. Shariah-windows after realizing the fact that they were on the 
verge of losing their clients in certain regions, such as the Gulf, where these 
conventional banks had track records of providing banking services for more than a 
century, way before the birth of Islamic banking. 
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Citi-Islamic, HSBC-Amanah, and Standard Chartered-Saadiq are some of the prominent examples of 
Windows; these are wholly owned subsidiaries of Citi Group, HSBC, and Standard Charted Bank 
respectively. 
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Moreover, significant differences in the controlling and monitoring (governance) 
mechanisms of both sets of IFIs are apparent, also, and worth analysing. Additionally, 
from an Islamic standpoint, governance is to achieve social equality and to create more 
value for the society at large, while the conventional governance model focuses on the 
maximization of wealth for shareholders. In other words, borrowing from the agency 
theory of the firm, it is argued that the conventional banking model is based on the 
central assumption of self-interests of individuals who tend to maximize their own 
returns by all means available to the firm. This might result in conflicts between both 
parties, known as the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989; Baiman, 1990; Kunz and 
Pfaff, 2002).  However, FFIBs are not expected to suffer to the same extent due to the 
trust factors among the parties involved in business. In summary, the operating 
mechanism of conventional and Islamic banking system is significantly different from 
one another. Accordingly, the IC stock including human capital, structural capital and 
capital employed is, also, somewhat different in nature for both sets of IFIs. 
Taken the significance of the arguments together, both sets of IFIs are expected 
to utilize their resource bases i.e. IC, physical, and financial resources differently and, as 
a consequence, to achieve different levels of performance. Hence, the performance of 
all the resources of these institutions (i.e. FFIBs and Windows) was measured and 
compared to ascertain the existence of performance differences between the two sets of 
IFIs. Therefore, the hypothesis, to be tested here, is that there exists a significant 
difference in the IC and CG performance of FFIBs and Windows. 
Since the classification of the sampled IFIs into FFIBs and Windows was 
established, the next step was to apply various statistical techniques to analyse the data 
in order to collect empirical evidence in support of the research hypothesis. Therefore, 
the following section provides the empirical results and analysis of the data.  The main 
elements, discussed in the following sections, are the descriptive statistics, the 
correlation analysis and the regression analysis. 
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9.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8.1 presents the descriptive statistics for selected firm characteristics including 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for FFIBs (Panel A) and Windows 
(Panels B) for all the dependent and independent variables used in the model for the five 
year pooled data. 
 
Table 8.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures and Continuous Independent Variables 
 
Panel A: Full-fledged Islamic Banks (FFIBs) Panel B: Shariah Windows (Windows) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
N 185 185 185 185 135 135 135 135 
ROA 0.413 2.492 -3.810 3.809 1.013 2.164 -3.810 3.809 
Tobin's Q 0.804 0.284 0.245 1.126 0.865 0.258 0.245 1.126 
VAIC 3.961 1.938 0.361 7.030 3.876 2.130 0.361 7.030 
     HCE 2.949 1.804 -0.281 5.898 2.929 1.917 -0.281 5.898 
     SCE 0.706 0.210 0.267 1.052 0.688 0.231 0.267 1.052 
     CEE 0.193 0.162 -0.094 0.488 0.188 0.148 -0.094 0.488 
lnBSIZE 2.231 0.284 1.609 2.773 2.038 0.233 1.609 2.565 
NED 0.657 0.279 0.1 0.92 0.751 0.238 0.1 0.92 
lnSSB 4.611 1.489 2 7 3.452 1.084 2 6 
lnACS 1.207 0.162 1.099 1.609 1.241 0.203 1.099 1.609 
Duality 0.114 0.318 0 1 0.185 0.390 0 1 
lnFSIZE 14.424 1.519 10.787 16.836 14.276 1.611 10.787 16.836 
Risk 43.951 21.589 4.369 77.986 40.520 22.147 4.369 77.986 
SUB 5.292 6.653 0 20 7.044 7.069 0 20 
Listing 0.454 0.499 0 1 0.519 0.502 0 1 
BIG4 0.811 0.393 0 1 0.815 0.390 0 1 
Region 0.568 0.497 0 1 0.333 0.473 0 1 
Notes: See Table 5.3 on page 171 for variable definitions. 
Focusing first on the dependent variables, it can be seen that the overall financial 
performance of the sampled FFIBs was sound as indicated by ROA with a mean of 
0.41. However, the mean accounting performance of Windows was far higher (1.01) 
than FFIBs. This implied that Windows outperformed FFIBs in accounting based 
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performance and, on average, offered higher returns on assets during the period under 
study. Equally, for FFIBs and Windows, the market based performance measure, 
Tobin’s Q, had a means of 0.80 and 0.87 respectively; this indicated that generally 
investors valued the sampled IFIs in excess of the book value of net assets as reported in 
the financial statements with Windows having slightly higher scores of Q-ratio than 
FFIBs. 
As for the continuous independent variables, it can be seen that the average 
means of 3.96 and 3.88 for VAIC) suggests that during the period 2007~2011 both 
FFIBs and Windows were generally efficient in generating value from their IC and 
physical capital base. The descriptive statistics, related to the independent variables, 
indicate that HCE, SCE and CEE have positive means with FFIBs having a slightly 
higher average. The analysis reveals that, although Windows offered higher return on 
assets and maintained slightly higher market valuation, FFIBs were still more efficient 
in creating value by utilizing their IC and financial capital during the study period. 
As for the governance-specific variables, it can be observed that the board 
characteristics of FFIBs and Windows are not identical. For instance, the average 
BSIZE for FFIBs was 2.23 and, for Windows, BSIZE was 2.04. Similarly, the average 
size of the Shariah supervisory board had means of 4.61 and 3.45 for FFIBs and 
Windows respectively. This implies that, on average, FFIBs have larger boards than 
Windows. Role duality had means, also, of 11% for FFIBs against 19% for Windows. 
In terms of board composition, the mean percentages of NEDs on the boards of FFIBs 
was 66% while, for Windows, the average stood at 75%; this indicated that, 
comparatively, Windows tended to have higher fraction of NEDs on their boards. The 
average size of audit committee for Windows was higher with a score of 1.24 than a 
mean of 1.21 for FFIBs. 
As for the firm-specific control variables, on average, firm size and type of 
auditor had similar results for both sets of IFIs. FFIBs had a higher average of leverage 
and lower number of existing subsidiaries than Windows. More than 50% of the 
sampled Windows were listed while only 45% of FFIBs were found to have listing 
status; this suggested that listing was a more important element for Windows. Lastly, 
the analysis indicated that most of the FFIBs were based in the Gulf region while 
Windows operated mainly in regions other than the Gulf. 
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9.4 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis for both sets of IFIs i.e. FFIBs and Windows is performed 
separately in the following section. 
 
9.4.1 Correlation Analysis of Full-fledged Islamic Banks 
Firstly, the results of the correlation analysis of FFIBs are summarised in Table 8.2. The 
correlation analysis showed that for accounting performance measures under the 
Pearson’s correlation; ROA related positively with VAIC with a value of 0.62. 
Similarly, ROA related positively with HCE (0.72) and CEE (0.60). Whereas, for the 
market performance measure; Tobin’s Q associated positively with VAIC (0.48), HCE 
(0.50), and CEE (0.49) respectively. Similar to the ROA for accounting-based 
performance measure; SCE was not correlated significantly with Tobin’s Q. 
A cursory look at Table 8.2 reveals, also, that there were significant interactions 
between performance measures and governance-specific variables. Board-size related 
positively to both measures of performance while size of the Shariah supervisory board 
and role duality related only significantly to FFIBs’ accounting performance of at the 
1% and the 5% level respectively. Firm size, which was measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, was the only firm-specific variable associated with both 
measures of performance. Likewise, listing status correlated with both performance 
measures.  
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Table 8.2 
Correlation Analysis of Full-fledged Islamic Banks 
 ROA Tobin's Q VAIC HCE SCE CEE lnBSIZE NED lnSSB lnACS Duality lnFSIZE Risk SUB Listing BIG4 
Tobin's Q 0.2617***               
VAIC 0.617*** 0.481***               
HCE 0.7133*** 0.5023*** 0.8966***             
SCE -0.079 0.086 0.3682*** 0.137             
CEE 0.5995*** 0.4882*** 0.571*** 0.6167*** -0.089            
lnBSIZE 0.2426*** 0.3292*** 0.2745*** 0.3594*** -0.0447 0.2632***          
NED -0.1546 -0.0918 -0.1391 -0.1535 -0.0507 -0.1749 -0.3703***          
lnSSB 0.2583*** 0.0816 0.2365** 0.3055*** -0.0397 0.1124 0.3521*** -0.1311         
lnACS 0.1025 0.1637 0.1631 0.1742 0.0198 0.2236** 0.3051*** -0.0921 0.0558        
Duality 0.2157** 0.1214 0.2211** 0.2564*** 0.0237 0.0139 0.3392*** -0.203** 0.2888*** 0.1578       
lnFSIZE 0.4055*** 0.5605*** 0.4696*** 0.5458*** -0.0281 0.4082*** 0.2614*** -0.0603 0.3258*** 0.1343 0.2071**      
Risk 0.1578 0.0168 0.1753 0.2308** -0.218** 0.4184*** 0.2539*** -0.14 -0.0084 0.0761 0.1534 0.1374     
SUB 0.2247 0.1591 0.0508 0.0924 0.111 0.0129 -0.0126 0.0258 0.2024** -0.0371 0.1563 0.2634*** -0.0953    
Listing 0.2751*** 0.2164** 0.1005 0.1766 -0.1635 0.1419 0.5228*** -0.34 0.2902*** 0.0359 0.187 0.3366*** 0.286*** 0.2593***  
BIG4 -0.1169 -0.0819 -0.29*** -0.3104*** -0.2677*** -0.0862 -0.4435*** 0.6145** -0.3125*** -0.0097 -0.2622*** -0.0596 -0.0501 -0.0037 -0.1139  
Region 0.0147 0.0466 -0.1369 -0.0778 -0.3829 -0.039 -0.0157 0.3685*** -0.1259 -0.1384 -0.0316 0.2172** 0.016 -0.08 0.1386 0.5534*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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9.4.2 Correlation Analysis of Shariah-windows 
Secondly, the correlation analysis of Windows was performed separately. The results of 
the correlation analysis are summarised in Table 8.3. The correlation analysis showed 
that, for accounting performance measures under the Pearson’s correlation, ROA related 
positively with VAIC with the value of 0.50. Similarly, ROA related positively with 
HCE (0.59) and CEE (0.53). In contrast, HCE related with Tobin’s Q at the 5% level of 
significance. Strikingly, unlike the results observed for FFIBs, the relationship between 
SCE and Tobin’s Q was significant at the 1% level for Windows. 
On the other hand, among corporate governance-features, role duality was the 
stand alone variable  which was significant with Windows’ market-based performance 
of at the 5% level;  suggesting that the sampled Windows’ market value of increased by 
combining the authoritative roles of CEO and board’s chairperson. In firm related 
characteristics, firm size was associated significantly with both performance measures.  
The level of risk related significantly with ROA and listing status correlated with 
Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. The relationships between the variables under study changed 
when controlling for bank type, being FFIBs or Windows. However, more statistic 
evidence was needed to establish these differences. Therefore, regression analysis on 
both sets of IFIs is performed in the following sections.  
209 
 
 
Table 8.3 
Correlation Analysis of Shariah-windows 
 ROA Tobin's Q VAIC HCE SCE CEE lnBSIZE NED lnSSB lnACS Duality lnFSIZE Risk SUB Listing BIG4 
Tobin's Q 0.0619                
VAIC 0.4993*** 0.1257               
HCE 0.5934*** 0.2323** 0.9186***             
SCE 0.0519 0.2412*** 0.459*** 0.3061***            
CEE 0.5259*** 0.1968 0.5502*** 0.599*** -0.0121            
lnBSIZE -0.1006 0.0085 -0.1698 -0.1593 -0.0383 -0.1185           
ned5 -0.1517 -0.0341 -0.4312*** -0.4062*** -0.204 -0.1294 -0.2297**          
lnSSB 0.0514 0.1499 -0.1104 -0.0987 0.06 -0.0037 0.3076*** 0.0222         
lnACS -0.017 -0.021 -0.0086 0.0239 0.0495 -0.0054 0.065 -0.1606 0.2739**        
Duality 0.0277 0.2241** 0.0688 0.0813 -0.0041 0.2165 0.14 -0.2948*** 0.136 -0.1026       
lnFSIZE 0.263** 0.2416** 0.2572** 0.311*** 0.1089 0.5158*** 0.0478 -0.0295 0.2717** 0.1081 0.203      
Risk 0.2445** -0.1002 0.158 0.1708 -0.0546 0.5178*** 0.0259 -0.0551 0.3331*** 0.2289** 0.2083 0.5901***    
SUB 0.0052 0.0022 -0.1822 -0.2057 -0.0953 0.1029 0.2217** 0.2299** 0.2165 -0.2849*** 0.127 0.235** 0.0602    
Listing 0.1922 0.5067*** 0.1635 0.2074 0.1006 0.1846 0.0745 -0.0421 0.2796** -0.2131 0.0777 0.0921 0.0556 0.2839***  
BIG4 -0.1442 -0.0217 -0.3749*** -0.4023*** -0.1698 -0.1388 0.1067 0.2476 0.1288 0.0395 -0.2636** -0.3558*** -0.0814 0.1601 0.1131  
Region 0.0208 -0.0692 -0.0631 -0.1101 -0.2 0.0571 -0.0279 -0.0665 -0.3686*** -0.4067*** -0.1348 -0.4552*** -0.2225** 0.0535 0.3669*** 0.3371*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
210 
 
9.5 Multivariate Analysis 
Similar to the correlation analysis, regression analysis was performed separately on 
FFIBs and Windows. Regression models, developed and used in Chapter 6, were 
repeated in the multivariate analysis with the exception of controlling for type of IFI, 
being FFIB or Window. The regression models were run to test hypothesis H5. 
 
9.5.1 Accounting and Market Performance of FFIBs 
Equation 1 was replicated to examine the impact of VAIC and governance-specific 
characteristics on the accounting and market-performance of the sampled FFIBs and 
Windows. 
Table 8.4 reports the results of the regression analysis based on the sampled 
FFIBs accounting and market-performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q 
respectively. Firstly, the sampled FFIBs’ accounting performance is discussed; the 
results are reported in panel A of Table 8.4. The F -value for pooled data was significant 
at the 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
combined five-year period was 44%. It can be seen 
that VAIC had a significant positive relationship with ROA at the 1% level, suggesting 
that the sampled FFIBs were efficient in creating value through their IC and financial 
capital resource base and, consequently, tended to offer higher returns on assets. 
The impact of VAIC’s sub-components on the sampled FFIBs’ accounting 
performance of is analysed separately. Model 1a examined the sampled FFIBs’ 
association between accounting-based performance and human capital efficiency. The F 
–value, for the five year pooled data, was positive while the adjusted R2 was 55%. 
Model 1a’s results indicated a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level 
between HCE and ROA. Likewise, Model 1b examined the association between the 
sampled FFIBs’ accounting-based performance and SCE. The F -value for pooled data 
was significant at the 1% level while the adjusted R
2
 was 18%. Model 1b’s results 
showed no significant relationship between SCE and the accounting-based performance 
measure. Finally, Model 1c examined the association between the sampled FFIBs 
accounting-based performance of and capital employed efficiency (CEE). The F -value 
for pooled data was significant at 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
is 45%. These results 
were similar to those of Model 1a but with a slightly higher coefficient. The results 
suggested a significant positive relationship at the 1% level between CEE and ROA. 
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Table 8.4 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA and Tobin’s Q for FFIBs 
 
Panel A: Accounting Performance 
 Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Constant -3.931 0.0740 -8.477*** -0.592 
VAIC 0.781***    
      HCE  1.091***   
      SCE   -0.893  
      CEE    9.957*** 
lnBSIZE 0.00989 -0.467 0.541 -0.611 
NED -1.300** -1.447** -0.719 0.198 
lnSSB 0.148 0.0877 0.128 0.121 
lnACS -0.0657 -0.216 0.229 -0.591 
Duality 0.184 0.198 0.506 1.399*** 
lnFSIZE -0.0142 -0.183* 0.497*** 0.0455 
Risk 0.00281 -0.00355 0.00813 -0.0187** 
SUB 0.0612** 0.0527** 0.0480 0.0403* 
Listing 0.466 0.580 0.115 0.851** 
BIG4 0.950 1.315** 0.201 -0.322 
Region 0.409 0.228 -0.236 0.250 
N 185 185 185 185 
Adjusted R
2
 0.435 0.554 0.180 0.449 
R-squared 0.4716 0.583 0.2333 0.4849 
F-Value 25.69*** 47.68*** 6.96*** 18.21*** 
 Panel B: Market Performance 
 Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Constant -1.086*** -0.966*** -1.430*** -0.785*** 
VAIC 0.0428***    
      HCE  0.0480***   
      SCE   0.0745  
      CEE    0.683*** 
lnBSIZE 0.349*** 0.334*** 0.377*** 0.299*** 
NED -0.0341 -0.0356 -0.0181 0.0621 
lnSSB -0.0418*** -0.0445*** -0.0396*** -0.0438*** 
lnACS -0.0691 -0.0724 -0.0509 -0.109 
Duality -0.0264 -0.0226 -0.0125 0.0528 
lnFSIZE 0.0874*** 0.0853*** 0.113*** 0.0847*** 
Risk -0.00215** -0.00235** -0.00160* -0.00372*** 
SUB 0.00236 0.00182 0.00138 0.00114 
Listing -0.0128 -0.0114 -0.0300 0.0182 
BIG4 0.136* 0.145* 0.110 0.0576 
Region -0.0714 -0.0849* -0.0881* -0.0753 
N 185 185 185 185 
Adjusted R
2
 0.435 0.432 0.378 0.474 
R-squared 0.472 0.4688 0.4185 0.5085 
F-Value 17.29*** 16.62*** 11.97*** 22.95*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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In the governance-specific variables, board composition, measured by the 
fraction of NEDs on the board, was found to be associated significantly with ROA in 
the negative direction. As for firm-specific control variables, firm complexity was 
associated positively with ROA at the 1% level, suggesting that a complex business 
model was affiliated with higher returns on assets. Firm complexity was associated 
significantly, also, with HCE at the 1% level;  however, type of auditor positively and 
firm size negatively were related to HCE at the 5% level. Firm size was related 
significantly to SCE at the 1% level, suggesting that, as size increased, the SC 
efficiency in the total value added increased, also. 
Similar to the accounting-based performance measure, the sampled FFIBs’ 
market performance was analysed, also; the results are reported in panel B of Table 8.4. 
The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
for the 
combined five-year period was 44%. It can be seen that VAIC had a positive and 
significant relationship with Tobin’s Q at the 1% level, suggesting that the sampled 
FFIBs’ market values was higher than their book values. 
As before, the effects of VAIC’s sub-components of on the FFIBs’ market based 
performance were analysed separately. Model 2a examined the association between the 
sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance and HCE. The F -value for five year pooled 
data was significant at the 1% level while the adjusted R
2 
was 43%. Model 2a’s results 
indicated a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level between HCE and 
Tobin’s Q. Likewise, Model 2b examined the association between SCE and Tobin’s Q. 
The F -value for pooled data was significant at 1% level while the adjusted R
2 
was 38%. 
Model 2b’s results showed no significant relationship between SCE and Tobin’s Q. 
Finally, Model 2c’s results, which examined the association between the sampled 
FFIBs’ market-based performance and CEE, are reported in panel B of Table 8.4. The F 
-value for pooled data was significant at the 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
was 47%. 
These results were similar to those of Model 2a but with a slightly higher coefficient. 
The results suggested a significant positive relationship at the 1% level between CEE 
and the sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance. 
In CG characteristics, board size was associated positively while size of Shariah 
supervisory board was associated negatively with Tobin’s Q, suggesting that the 
sampled FFIBs with large governing boards and small SSB tended to have higher 
market valuations. Similar results can be observed for the VAIC sub-components. As 
for firm-specific control variables, firm-size was associated positively and level of risk 
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was associated negatively with the sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance at the 
1% level. This implies that that FFIBs’ market values of increase as firm size goes up 
and reduces as the level of risk goes up. 
 
9.5.2 Accounting and Market Performance of Windows 
Like above, Model 1 was repeated to measure the Windows’ accounting performance 
of. The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
was 
24%. Focusing first on the results of pooled data as reported in the second column of 
Table 8.5, it can be seen that VAIC had a positive and significant relationship with 
ROA at the 1% level. This suggests that Windows are efficient in creating value through 
their IC and financial capital resource base and, consequently, tend to offer higher 
returns on assets. 
Similar to the analysis of FFIBs, Model 1a examined the association between 
Windows’ accounting-based performance of and HCE. The F -value for five year 
pooled data was positive while the adjusted R
2 
was 37%. Model 1a’s results indicated a 
positive and significant relationship at the 1% level between HCE and ROA. Likewise, 
Model 1b examined the association between Windows’ accounting-based performance 
and SCE. The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 5% level while the 
adjusted R
2 
was 9%. Model 1b’s results showed no significant relationship between 
SCE and the accounting-based performance measure. Finally, Model 1c’s results, which 
examined the association between Windows’ accounting-based performance and CEE, 
are reported in Panel A of Table 8.5. The F -value for pooled data was significant at 1% 
level and the adjusted R
2 
was 27%. These results were similar to those of Model 1a but 
with a slightly higher coefficient. The results suggested a positive and significant 
relationship at the 1% level between CEE and ROA. 
The results of the governance-related variables were less encouraging for 
Windows than FFIBs. None of the governance-related variable was found to explain the 
Windows’ accounting-based performance. As for firm-related control variables, the 
operating region was found to have positive association with HCE at the 1% level of 
statistical significance, suggesting that staff, employed by the Windows operating in the 
Gulf region, were more efficient in creating value.  
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Table 8.5 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA and Tobin’s Q for Windows 
  Panel A: Accounting Performance 
  Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
  ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Constant -4.593 -4.883 1.333 3.970 
VAIC 0.509***    
      HCE  0.796***   
      SCE   -0.175  
      CEE    8.234*** 
lnBSIZE -0.401 -0.296 -1.317 -0.533 
NED 0.548 1.018 -1.647* -1.215 
lnSSB 0.218 0.374* 0.0390 0.193 
lnACS 0.108 0.0868 -0.554 -0.851 
Duality -0.124 -0.0397 -0.576 -0.935* 
lnFSIZE 0.172 0.0842 0.259 -0.108 
Risk 0.00954 0.00911 0.0148 -0.00165 
SUB 0.00872 0.0284 -0.00592 -0.00776 
Listing 2.4405 -0.574 0.658 0.499 
BIG4 0.0170 0.175 -0.386 -0.489 
Region 0.795 1.184** 0.289 -0.427 
N 135 135 135 135 
Adjusted R
2
 0.243 0.373 0.086 0.265 
R-squared 0.3108 0.4291 0.1681 0.3312 
F-Value 5.38*** 7.88*** 2.89** 4.75*** 
 Panel B: Market Performance of Windows 
 Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Constant -0.187 -0.272 -0.356 -0.112 
VAIC -0.00333    
      HCE  0.00636   
      SCE   0.110  
      CEE    0.324** 
lnBSIZE -0.0133 0.000622 0.00133 0.0229 
NED 0.0632 0.0981 0.107 0.0924 
lnSSB -0.0291 -0.0252 -0.0270 -0.0219 
lnACS 0.0632 0.0724 0.0787 0.0551 
Duality 0.185*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.173*** 
lnFSIZE 0.0748*** 0.0728*** 0.0735*** 0.0598*** 
Risk -0.00528*** -0.00536*** -0.00516*** -0.00597*** 
SUB -0.0111*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0111*** 
Listing 0.346*** 0.333*** 0.329*** 0.337*** 
BIG4 0.151*** 0.158*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 
Region -0.137** -0.127** -0.113* -0.163** 
N 135 135 135 135 
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.504 0.512 0.523 
R-squared 0.548 0.5487 0.5554 0.5653 
F-Value 12.61*** 13.34*** 15.81*** 14.46*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
The results of the Windows’ market-based performance are reported in Panel B of Table 
8.5. The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
for 
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the combined five-year period was 50%. It can be seen that VAIC had no significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
Similar to the accounting-based performance measure, Model 2a examined the 
association between Windows’ market-based performance of and HCE. The F -value 
for the five year pooled data was significant at the 1% level while the adjusted R
2 
was 
50%. Model 2a’s results indicated no significant relationship between HCE and Tobin’s 
Q. Model 2b examined the association between SCE and Tobin’s Q. The F -value for 
pooled data was significant at the 1% level while the adjusted R
2 
was 51%. Model 2b’s 
results showed no significant relationship between SCE and Tobin’s Q. Finally, in 
Model 2c’s results are reported. The F -value for pooled data was significant at the 1% 
level and the adjusted R
2 
was 52%. The results suggested a positive and significant 
relationship at the 5% level between CEE and Windows’ market-based performance. 
In CG characteristics, role duality was the only standalone variable which had a 
significant relationship with the sampled Windows market-based performance of at the 
1% level. The relationship was consistent with the VAIC’s sub-components. 
As for firm-specific control variables, the results were more encouraging than 
those observed for the FFIBs. All of the firm-specific control variables related 
significantly to the sampled Windows’ market-based performance at the 1% level, 
except for operating region which was significant at the 5% level. The results suggested 
that, although strong CEE was the main determinant of Windows’ market value, 
nonetheless firm-specific variables played, also, a pivotal role in explaining the sampled 
Windows’ market-based performance. 
 
9.6 Discussion of Findings 
The findings depicted a positive relationship between IC (measured by VAIC) and 
financial performance of both sets of IFIs being FFIBs) and Windows. The result 
implied that both the sampled FFIBs and Windows remained efficient in creating value 
through their IC and financial capital resource base and, consequently, offered higher 
returns on assets during the period under study. 
On the other hand, none of the governance related variables related to 
accounting performance. Despite the strong relationship between IC and FFIBs’ and 
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Windows’ accounting-based performance, the differences in the corporate governance 
features indicated some differences between both sets of sampled IFIs. 
On the other hand, the FFIBs’ and Windows’ market-based performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) of suggested significant differences between both sets of  
sampled IFIs whereby, in  the case of the sampled FFIBs, VAIC related significantly 
only with Tobin’s Q. In this case, strong financial and physical CEE and HCE played a 
significant role in determining the sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance of. The 
analysis suggested, also, that strong market valuation was driven by larger board size 
and smaller SSB size. On the other hand, the sampled Windows’ market value was 
driven mainly by strong financial and physical CEE alone. Unlike the accounting-based 
performance, none of the governance related variables seemed to explain the Windows’ 
market-based performance of. However, strong firm characteristics seemed to play a 
significant role in determining the sampled Windows’ market-based performance. 
The overall results supported the main research hypothesis (H5) that there were 
significance differences in the FFIBs’ and Windows’ IC and CG performance. The 
results fulfilled, also, this study’s third objective of comparing the effects of IC and CG-
features on FFIBs’ and Windows’ performance. 
 
9.6.1 Accounting-based Performance of FFIBs and Windows 
Although IC (measured by VAIC) was expected to be one of the major determinants for 
the sampled FFIBs’ and Windows’ accounting-based performance, IC was expected to 
affect the accounting-based performance of both sets of the sampled IFIs differently. 
The significant positive result suggested a positive relationship between VAIC and the 
FFIBs’ and Windows’ accounting performance of. Therefore, these results did not 
support the assumption that there were significant differences in the sampled FFIBs’ 
and Windows’ IC performance. 
The results, observed in this study, endorse the findings of the previous studies 
conducted in the context of the Islamic finance industry. For instance, the results agree 
with the findings of Samad and Hassan (1999) who reported that there were no 
significant differences in the financial performance, based on ROA and ROE, of Islamic 
and conventional banks operating in Malaysia. The results agree, also, with Hussein’s 
(2004) and Bader et al.’s (2008) findings; they reported no significant differences in the 
profit efficiencies of conventional and Islamic banks. Likewise, the results lend support 
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to the argument of Beck et al. (2013) who suggested that there were no significant 
differences between the business models of conventional and Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, the results of the analysis of VAIC’s sub-components were similar 
to those observed for Model 1 in Chapter 6. In summary, the sampled FFIBs and 
Windows accounting based performance was driven mainly by CEE in addition to HCE, 
while SCE was found not to be associated significantly with both sets of the sampled 
IFIs’ accounting-based performance. The statistical analysis implied that human capital 
was the main value driver for both sets of the sampled IFIs.  This meant that this study’s 
sampled IFIs possessed substantial human IC i.e. higher education, and knowledge 
(including Shariah-knowledge) to make better entrepreneurial judgment using these 
skills (Colombo and Grilli, 2005) when deploying financial capital. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the sampled FFIBs’ and Windows’ accounting-based 
performance of for the five year period of study. Identical trends in both sets of IFIs’ the 
accounting-based performance can be observed in the graph. Windows remained, on 
average, financially more profitable and offered higher returns on assets than FFIBs 
during the period under study. The average financial performance for both sets of IFIs 
declined from 2008to2010. The decline could be explained as the impact of financial 
crisis; however, an upward trend in the graph from 2010 onwards indicated market 
adjustments. 
Figure 8.1 
Average accounting performance of FFIBs and Windows 
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The analysis offered no significant differences between both sets of IFIs in utilizing 
their IC and financial resources and, hence, suggested that IC had a similar impact on 
the accounting performance of IFIs being either FFIBs or Windows.. 
  In summary, the results of the corporate governance mechanism suggested that 
there were significant differences in both sets of IFIs. The results of the accounting 
based performance measure lent some support to the argument that FFIBs are managed 
differently than their counterparts –the Windows. However, more evidence was needed 
to support this claim; this was the analysis of the sampled IFIs’ market-based 
performance. 
 
9.6.2 Market-based Performance of FFIBs and Windows 
Two performance measures, namely: accounting-based performance (measured by 
ROA); and market-based performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) were employed to 
determine the effects of IC and CG on performance of the sampled IFIs being either 
FFIBs or Windows. In the case of latter, IC (measured by VAIC) was expected to be 
one of the major determinants of the sampled FFIBs’ and Windows’ market-based 
performance. However, IC was expected to affect the market-based performance of both 
sets of IFIs differently. VAIC was found to be associated positively with the FFIBs’ 
market-based performance of, whereas there was found an insignificant (negative) 
relationship between VAIC and Windows’ market-based performance. This implied that 
IC impacted differently on the FFIBs’ and Windows’ market-based performance and, 
hence, supported the assumption. 
 
9.6.2.1 Market-based Performance of FFIBs 
The analysis showed a positive and significant relationship between FFIBs’ market 
performance and the variables, CEE and HCE, suggesting that the market captured 
VAIC from strong financial and physical capital (CEE) and HCE. These results were 
consistent with the earlier findings in the context of conventional banking. The analysis 
suggested that an increase in the capital base impacted positively on the FFIBs’ market 
valuation and profitability of. Hassan and Bashir (2003) reported similar results from 
their analysis  of the performance of Islamic banks operating in 21 countries worldwide 
for the period 1994-2001. The results agreed, also, with the findings of Abdul-Majid et 
al. (2010) and Ayesha K Khan (2010) who submitted that Islamic banks enjoyed 
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substantially higher deposit growth rates than conventional banks which, ultimately, 
increased the capital base (CE) for Islamic banks. Islamic banks possess competent 
human resource base which has expertise in Shariah-knowledge and knowledge of 
contemporary finance. Hence, the human capital employees these funds in Shariah-
compliant projects to create value for its stakeholders. Thus, value is created through 
efficient HC and strong physical and financial capital (CEE. Ultimately, higher ratios of 
total value added impacts positively on the market-based performance which, as a 
consequence boosts investors’ confidence in the FFIBs. 
Among CG related variables, board-size (positively) and size of SSB 
(negatively) were related significantly to Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. Similar trends 
could be observed for the VAIC sub-components viz. HCE, SCE, and CEE. This 
implied that FFIBs with large board size tended to have higher market valuations. This 
finding was consistent with those of Adams and Mehran (2003) and Adams and Mehran 
(2005) who found larger boards to be related positively to the market value of 
commercial banks based on Tobin’s Q. Consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005) and 
Andres and Vallelado (2008),  this study’s result challenged the widespread belief in the 
agency theory tenants (Provan 1980, Goodstein et al. 1994) that small boards were more 
efficient and that shareholder interests could be compromised if the board  was too large 
(Hoechle et al., 2012). Contrarily, the results suggested that larger boards might prove 
more efficient in advising and monitoring the sampled FFIBs ‘functions and might 
create more value and, thus, higher market valuation. The analysis suggested, also, that 
there was  a significant negative relationship between SSB size and the sampled FFIBs’ 
market-based performance. The strong statistical significance in the negative direction 
suggested that a large SSB was subject to higher cost and, ultimately, markets placed a 
lower value on a FFIB with larger SSB size. 
As for firm-specific control variables, firm-size and type of auditor related 
positively with the FFIBs’ market-based performance at 1% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. On the other hand, the level of risk related negatively with the 
sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance at the 1% level. 
The positive significant relationship between firm-size and Tobin’s Q suggested 
that Islamic banks became more profitable and were perceived to be financially strong 
in the market as they grew in size. This result was in line with the previous studies in 
the context of conventional and Islamic finance (Bashir, 1999; Majid et al., 2010; Čihák 
and Hesse, 2010). The explanation for the significant size effect on market-based 
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performance  was that large FFIBs possessed relatively higher shares of physical and 
financial capital base and their operations  were often more complex  as was their need 
for IC stocks. Such increased access to resources influenced the development and level 
of IC. Therefore, larger FFIBs tended to have better stocks of IC particularly, human IC 
since staff accumulated specialized information, skill and know-how. This allowed 
them to communicate efficiently and effectively and, thus, reduced decision-making 
errors and  improved performance (Luthans and Youssef, 2004). Likewise, the type of 
auditor (BIG4) was yet another firm-specific variable which had a positive impact on 
the sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance of. Having a BIG4 auditor added value 
to the credibility of the sampled FFIBs and suggested that the sampled FFIBs were not 
suffering from internal control problems because they were audited by both in-house 
auditors (Shariah-audit) to ensure the IFIs’ financial statements were in accordance with 
the Shariah guidelines and by the external auditors (i.e. BIG4) to ensure the credibility 
of the financial statements. As expected, the level of risk related negatively with both 
set of IFIs’ market-based performance of. Highly leveraged IFIs are perceived risky by 
the market. 
The overall analysis suggested that IC impacted positively on the sampled 
FFIBs’ market-based performance of. The market value was captured mainly by strong 
CEE and HCE. Additionally, the analysis suggested that markets placed substantially 
higher values on those FFIBs which were large in size (i.e. total assets); had lower 
leverage and a lesser statistical significance; and were audited by large audit firms 
(BIG4). Equally, the results indicated that markets tended to place higher values on 
those FFIBs which had a board-size higher than the average e.g., seven members 
(Jensen, 1993) and  had a small size of SSB. 
 
9.6.2.2 Market-based Performance of Windows 
On the other hand, the analysis revealed no significant relationship between Windows’ 
market-based performance and IC (measured by VAIC).  Furthermore, the negative 
direction of the relationship suggested that, unlike the FFIBs, IC was not the main value 
driver for the sampled Windows. The result supported strongly the assumption that, in 
determining the market-based performance, there were significant differences in the 
FFIBs’ and Windows’ IC performance. The results of the VAIC sub-components 
suggested that CEE was the standalone VAIC sub-component which was related 
significantly to the Windows’ market-based performance. 
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As argued earlier, the fundamental groundings of conventional and Islamic 
finance were entirely different from one another. Leading conventional banking groups 
came into Shariah-compliant business fearful of losing their existing high-net-worth 
individual and corporate clients in certain regions i.e. the Arabian Peninsula. 
Furthermore, conventional banking was striving to restore investors’ confidence due to 
the vital role which they played in bringing about the recent financial crisis. On the 
other hand, the level of trust in Islamic banking was at an all-time high, given the IFIs’ 
stability and profitability during the recent financial turbulence. Additionally, although 
the IFIs’ total assets i.e. $2 trillion, reported in Ernst and Young (2013) were only a 
fraction of those held by conventional financial institutions, the  conventional giants 
lusted for those assets and tried to attract these sums via Shariah-windows in order to 
fulfil their immediate liquidity needs. The argument was supported by this study’s 
results whereby the Windows’ market-based performance was explained merely by 
strong CEE. 
On the other hand, none of the governance-specific variables were associated 
with the Windows ‘market-based performance of, except for leadership structure (role 
duality); this was significant at the 1% level. As for firm-related characteristics, firm 
size, level of risk, firm complexity, listing status, BIG4, and operating region, all were 
found to have significant relationships with Windows’ market performance of based on 
Tobin’s Q at the 1% level.  The exception was operating region which was significant at 
the 5% level. In this case, firm size, listing status and type of auditor were in the 
positive direction while level of risk, firm complexity and operating region were in the 
negative direction. In summary, the sampled Windows’ market-based performance was 
driven mainly by CEE and strong firm-related characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 
 
Figure 8.2 
Average market performance of FFIBs and Windows 
 
Figure 8.2 illustrates the FFIBs’ and Windows’ market-based performance of for the 
years 2007-2011. The analysis suggested that the market value for both sets of IFIs was 
highest at the start of study period. However, a downward trend can be observed from 
2008 as the financial crisis hampered the financial markets worldwide. Unlike the trends 
observed for accounting-based performance measure, ROA; the sampled Windows’ 
market-based performance was still in decline, suggesting that Windows continued to 
struggle to gain market confidence. On the other hand, the sampled FFIBs’ market 
confidence seemed to be restored as indicated by the results for the year 2010 onwards. 
Strong support for the argument that the sampled FFIBs and Windows were 
governed differently can be observed in the market-based analysis. The proponents of 
good corporate governance codes argued for board size to be small; their reasoning was 
that large boards  were less effective Jensen (1993).  The negative relationship between 
board-size and the sampled Windows’ market-based performance of lent some support 
to the above argument. However, the strong positive (significant at 1% level) 
relationship between board size and the sampled FFIBs market-based performance of 
contradicted these claims. Similar results can be observed for board-composition (NED) 
and ACS, both variables related positively with the sampled Windows’ market-based 
performance of while the relationship was negative for the sampled FFIBs. Surprisingly, 
role duality was found to be related significantly with the sampled Windows’ market-
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based performance of. A possible explanation of the said relationship was that higher 
authoritative roles (i.e. CEO and Chairman) were subject to higher compensation and, 
hence, the market did not appreciate such expenditures. 
The statistical analysis on the sampled combined IFIs’ market-based 
performance, using data from both FFIBs and Windows, showed a significant negative 
relationship between firm complexity and Tobin’s Q (see chapter 6). However, the 
results of the separate analysis suggested that firm opacity related significantly only in 
the negative direction with the sampled Windows’ market-based performance of,. 
Furthermore, there was found to be a positive relationship between firm-complexity and 
the sampled FFIBs’ market-based performance. 
The contradiction in the results suggested that the Windows management was 
struggling to tackle the complexity at present and this could aggravate the governance 
problem which might lead Windows to encounter agency problems. Another 
explanation for the contradictory results was that the sampled Windows were the 
extended hands of conventional banking groups; these groups were involved in various 
businesses and, hence, had complex business structures. Research suggested that firms 
with greater numbers of subsidiaries  were more complex and needed higher internal 
controls and greater in-house capabilities (Zaman et al., 2011); in the case of Windows, 
such supporting mechanism  was provided by IC, especially, human IC. As observed in 
the results of market-based performance, the sampled Windows were lacking 
intellectual resources, particularly, the human capital. Therefore, these Windows needed 
to overcome the shortage of human capital well-versed in Shariah-knowledge in order to 
gain market confidence. 
Likewise, the statistical analysis on the market-based performance of the 
combined IFIs (FFIBs and Windows) conducted in chapter 6, suggested a significant 
positive relationship between listing status and Tobin’s Q. However, the analysis 
performed separately on both sets of IFIs suggested that only listing status was 
associated strongly (at 1% level) with the sampled Windows’ market-based 
performance. Whereas listing status was found to be associated negatively with the 
sampled FFIBs market-based performance of; however, the relationship was 
insignificant. Nonetheless, the analysis implied that Windows was new in Shariah-
compliant business adopting such techniques (i.e. getting listed) in order to gain 
investors’ confidence. It is not to say that listed firms are considered more credible and 
are more visible to a wider range of investors in the global financial markets. 
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Nevertheless, given this study’s results whereby the sampled Windows seemed to have 
lower levels of confidence among market players, listing might help them to improve 
their level of trust. 
Type of auditor (BIG4) was found to influence the sampled Windows’ market-
based performance. BIG4 was associated significantly with the sampled Windows’ and 
FFIBs’ market-based performance of at the 1% and 10% levels. Differences in the 
statistical significance indicated that the market trusted the internal audit (SSB-audit) 
system adopted by the sampled FFIBs, while the sampled Windows did not enjoy the 
same level of confidence and, in order to mitigate these concerns, Windows tended to 
hire BIG4 auditors. 
Finally, operating region was found to influence the sampled Windows’ market-
based performance; however, the negative direction of the relationship suggested 
systematic differences in investments in IC stocks and performance outcomes across 
geographical locations. The analysis suggested that Windows, operating in regions other 
than the Gulf, tended to have higher market valuations. This finding  is consistent with 
the earlier research of Yudistira (2004) in the field of Islamic finance. 
The overall results suggested that the sampled Windows, being the extended 
hands of conventional financial institutions, tended to follow good corporate 
governance codes, while this western concept of corporate governance was a misfit for 
the sampled FFIBs. Islamic banking is based on trust and pursues the betterment of the 
society as whole (this is as per the theoretical assertions and may not be found in 
Islamic banking practice) whereas profit maximization is the ultimate goal for the 
extended hands of conventional banks –the Windows. Hence, the classical corporate 
governance model is unsuitable for those financial institutions (i.e. FFIBs), which are 
based purely on the fundamental divine guidelines provided by Shariah. 
 
9.7 Chapter Summary 
A significant contribution of this research was to verify the homogeneity of the Islamic 
finance industry. The study argued that the Islamic finance industry was not 
homogeneous since not all the financial institutions, offering Shariah-compliant 
products, were FFIBs. Therefore, these institutions followed different pursuits and 
deployed their stocks of human and financial capital differently. Furthermore, these 
institutions were governed differently and, thus, achieved different levels of accounting 
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and market-based performance. In order to find empirical evidence on the said 
argument, the study examined the impact of IC and (CG features on the accounting and 
market-based performance of 64 IFIs operating in ten different countries worldwide for 
the period 2007–2011 by dividing them into FFIBs and Windows. 
 The results indicated no significant differences in the IFIs’ accounting-based 
performance being either FFIBs or Windows. Furthermore, the analysis suggested a 
significant positive relationship between the FFIBs’ and Windows’ financial 
performance of and the variables, CEE and HCE, suggesting that ROA captured the 
VAIC from both CEE and HCE. On the other hand, the results, based on Tobin’s Q, 
indicated a positive and significant relationship between the sampled FFIBs market-
based performance of and the variables, CEE and HCE, suggesting that the market 
captured the VAIC from two main sub-components viz. CEE and HCE. In the case of 
the sampled Windows, the market captured the VAIC from CEE alone. 
Furthermore, the analysis suggested that the so-called classical model of 
corporate governance was not a good fit for the ideology upon which Islamic banking 
was based. The analysis of (CG related variables suggested diversified relationships 
between CG-features and performance of both sets of  IFIs in which the results of the 
market performance, based on Tobin’s Q, are more encouraging. Arguably, Islamic 
banking is based on trust and Islamic values are more of ethos and, hence, such 
institutions (i.e. FFIBs) require relatively less monitoring. On the other hand, Windows, 
backed solely by the conventional banking groups are suffering from trust issues in the 
market and in order to mitigate these concerns such institutions tend to adopt the 
westernised corporate governance model. In doing so, they keep a higher fraction of 
NEDs on governing boards; separate the role of CEO and chairman; and have large 
ACS. Additionally, such institutions tend to hire BIG4 as their external auditors and 
become listed in order to be more credible and visible in the market. Despite putting all 
these safeguards in place, the Windows’ market value of is far from challenging the 
FFIBs’ market value. 
With this chapter, all three research objectives have been achieved. Therefore, 
the next and final chapter of the thesis summarises the research. 
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Chapter 10:  Summary and Conclusions 
 
9.0 Introduction 
This research study aimed to examine the effects of intellectual capital (IC) and 
corporate governance (CG) features on performance (i.e. accounting performance based 
on ROA and market performance based on Tobin’s Q) of Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) for the period 2007-2011 while controlling for firm-specific variables. This 
study’s findings are of interest beyond the IC performance literature since Islamic 
banking and finance regulators may use the insights provided by this study as a basis for 
further discussion in determining the role of IC and CG-features in the Shariah-
complaint banking model. The main research question scrutinised to what extent  did IC 
efficiency (human capital, structural capital and capital employed) and  CG features 
affect accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of IFIs for the 
period 2007-2011? 
Based on resource-based view (RVB) of the firm, this research reports that IC is 
the main strategic source of competitive advantage for IFIs. In contrast, following the 
concepts of agency theory, this study suggests that the classical CG model does seem to 
explain the IFIs’ performance. Hence, the study calls for a departure from the 
westernized concept of CG for the Islamic banking model. Both IC and Islamic finance 
are young concepts and striving with many challenges. In the field of IC, there is no one 
agreed method for measuring IC. Likewise, there is no study to date that measures the 
effects of IC on IFIs’ performance. Against this background, it was fairly challenging to 
marry these two concepts along with CG and to analyse their effects on performance 
while using the theoretical lens of RBV and agency theory. However, an in-depth 
review of the literature suggested that VAIC was the most appropriate method for 
measuring IC while using secondary data. Accordingly, bearing in mind the research 
objective, VAIC methodology was selected to measure the effects of IC on IFIs’ 
performance. 
There were three main research hypotheses tested in relation to the effects of IC, 
CG and firm-specific characteristics on IFIs’ performance of in achieving the first 
research objective. The fourth research hypothesis related to the effects of IC, CG and 
firm-specific characteristics on IFIs’ performance of before and after the financial crisis, 
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thus addressing the second research objective. The fifth research hypothesis related to 
the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific characteristics on performance of FFIBs and 
Windows; this was the third research objective. 
The study was structured into three empirical research projects. The first 
research project examined to what extent IC and CG features affected performance 
(accounting and market) of 64 IFIs operating in ten different geographical locations for 
the period 2007-2011, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics. The findings 
of the first research project suggested some variations in the results observed for the five 
year period under study. Also it indicated that the Islamic finance industry was not 
homogenous. Therefore, it provided bases for projects two and three. In this regard, the 
research’s second objective was to analyse the effects of IC and CG features on the 
IFIs’ performance o before and after the financial crisis. Finally, the research aimed to 
explore the effects of IC, CG and firm-specific characteristics on the performance of 
FFIBs and Windows and. Each project comprised of two distinct performance measures 
namely ROA and Tobin’s Q. The results showed that RBV better explained better IC’s 
impact on performance. However, the effects of CG-features, examined via lens of 
agency theory, did not offer any insight into the Shariah-compliant business model. 
Lastly, the effects of firm-related variables on the IFIs’ performance were examined 
using agency theory lens; this offered interesting insights. 
This concluding chapter presents a summary of the research study, an overview 
of the key findings, the contribution of this study, limitations and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
The chapter is structure as follows. Section 9.1 summarises the research objectives of 
this study and section 9.2 consolidates the overall research findings with explanations 
for each project and an outline of the dataset. The key contributions are discussed for 
each of the three empirical research projects in section 9.3. Then, the limitations and 
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suggestions for future research, which emerged in the course of this study, are outlined 
in section 9.4. Finally section 9.5 submits the concluding remarks. 
 
10.1 Summary and Discussion 
The overall research objective was to examine to what extent IC and CG features 
affected the performance of 64 IFIs operating in ten different geographical locations for 
the period 2007-2011, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics, as presented in 
Chapters 1 and 4.  In order to achieve the overall objective, this study inferred potential 
motivations for IC performance from resource-based view of the firm and CG plus firm-
specific variables from agency theory. Both RBV and agency theory were introduced in 
the main research objective of this study. The main research objective was to test 
whether IC and CG-features effected IFIs’ performance (i.e. accounting performance 
based on ROA and market performance based on Tobin’s Q) of while controlling for 
firm-specific variables. In order to examine such relationships, methodological issues 
arose of how to measure IC value. VAIC methodology was employed to measure IC 
value. This study bridges the gaps in previous IC literature in the area of Islamic 
banking and finance, as identified in Chapters 2 and 3. The subordinate research 
objectives were introduced to measure the effects of IC-efficiency and CG-features in 
the pre- and post-financial crisis period and the effects of IC-efficiency and CG-features 
on FFIBs’ and Windows’ performance. The three research objectives were raised to 
address gaps in the literature; these were identified in the reviews of IC literature in 
Chapter 2 and Islamic banking literature in Chapter 3 respectively. 
 
10.2 Summary of Key Findings 
In order to achieve the overall research aim of examining the effects of IC and CG-
features on IFIs’ performance, three research questions were introduced in Chapter 1 at 
the beginning of this study. This study addressed the three research questions in three 
individual research projects. The sequence of the three research projects was to achieve 
the overall research aim as outlined in Chapter 4. In order to answer the research 
questions, different theories were reviewed critically since there was no single theory 
related to IC. However, the literature considered resource-based view of the firm and 
agency theory to be applicable when discussing IC. These theories were suggested in 
the IC performance literature to explain the effects of IC on performance, as discussed 
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in Chapter 4. Based on the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, this study 
hypothesised a positive relationship between IC (measured by VAIC and its sub-
components) and firm performance. Likewise, based on agency theory, this study 
hypothesised a positive relationship between CG-features, firm-related variables and 
firm performance. 
 
10.2.1 Project one: Effects of IC and CG-features on performance of IFIs 
The effects of IC and CG-features on IFIs’ overall performance were estimated in 
project one while controlling for firm-specific variables. The project comprised of two 
distinct performance measures in regression analysis: ROA and Tobin’s Q. Specifically, 
the project answered the following research question; 
Research Question 1: To what extent do IC efficiency (human capital, structural 
capital and capital employed) and corporate governance features affect 
accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of IFIs for the 
period 2007-2011? 
 Previous literature focused on measuring the impact of IC alone and ignored CG-
features. In a departure from the existing literature, this research included, also, the 
potential effects of CG-features on the IFIs’ performance. Therefore, this research 
applied innovatively the CG-features to the area of IC research.  The results indicated a 
significant positive relationship between VAIC and the IFIs’ performance. The results 
of the accounting-based performance indicated a positive and significant relationship 
between financial performance and the variables, CEE and HCE, suggesting that ROA 
captured the VAIC from both CEE and HCE.  However, none of the governance related 
variables were found to explain the IFIs’ accounting performance. On the other hand, 
the IFIs’ market-based performance was found to be driven by strong CEE, HCE and, to 
a lesser statistical significance, SCE. This suggested that the market captured the VAIC 
from CEE, HCE and SCE. Additionally, CG features and firm-related variables played, 
also, a significant role in determining the sampled IFIs’ market performance of. The 
results indicated that markets tended to place higher values on those IFIs which did not 
follow the CG codes as such as having role duality, having small size of SSB, having 
larger governing boards and, to a lesser degree of statistical significance, having higher 
fraction of NED’s on the boards. Equally, markets placed substantially higher values on 
those IFIs which were large in size (i.e. total assets), had lower leverage, were listed, 
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adopted less complex business structures, were audited by large audit firms (BIG4), and 
were located in regions other than the Gulf. 
The relationship between IC-efficiency, CG-features and firm performance in 
the context of Islamic banking and finance was untested previously. The findings of this 
analysis contribute to the literature of IC management, as relevant determinants can be 
considered for developing IC value in the IC management process concerning IFIs. 
 
10.2.2 Project two: Effects of IC and CG-features on performance of IFIs in pre- and 
post-financial crisis 
The effects of IC and CG-features on IFIs’ overall performance of in the pre- and post-
financial crisis period were analysed in project two. Specifically, the project answered 
the following research question; 
Research Question 2: To what extent do IC efficiency (human capital, structural 
capital and capital employed) and corporate governance features affect 
accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of IFIs before 
and after the financial crisis? 
The main results were as follows. Firstly, IC helped to sustain IFIs’ profitability of, as 
measured by ROA at all times. The effects of pre-crisis IC (measured by VAIC) on 
IFIs’ accounting-based performance of appeared to be manifested through strong CEE, 
HCE, and firm-opacity.  However, the listing status appeared to be a significant factor 
in determining the IFIs’ financial stability in the post-crisis effect of IC. Likewise, the 
market captured the VAIC from all three sub-components viz. CEE, HCE, and SCE in 
addition to firm-size, listing status and lower leverage in the pre-crisis period. The same 
variables were used to determine the IFIs’ market value in the post-crisis period with 
relatively higher statistical significance, except for SCE. Secondly, CG features lent 
little help to the sampled IFIs sustaining profitability and market valuation. This 
suggested that the classical model of CG did not seem to fit with the ideology upon 
which Islamic banking was grounded. Arguably, these findings are generally robust 
since the empirical evidence was collected for 64 IFIs operating in ten different 
geographical locations worldwide. Thus, this research study calls for a radical departure 
from the existing orthodox corporate governance model, particularly for IFIs, which are 
based on trust. 
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10.2.3 Project three: Effects of IC and CG-features on performance of Full-fledged 
Islamic Banks (FFIBs) and Shariah-Windows (Windows) 
The effects of IC and CG-features on FFIBs’ and Windows’ overall performance were 
analysed in project three. Specifically, the project answered the following research 
question; 
Research Question 3: To what extent do IC efficiency (human capital, structural 
capital and capital employed) and corporate governance features affect 
accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance of full-fledged 
Islamic banks and Shariah-windows for the period 2007-2011? 
The study argued that the Islamic finance industry was not homogeneous since not all 
the financial institutions, offering Shariah-compliant products, were FFIBs. Therefore, 
these institutions followed different pursuits and deployed their stocks of human and 
financial capital differently. Furthermore, these institutions were governed differently 
and, thus, achieving different levels of accounting and market-based performance. 
The results indicated no significant difference in the IFIs’ accounting-based 
performance of being either FFIBs or Windows. Furthermore, the analysis suggested a 
positive and significant relationship between the FFIBs’ and Windows’ financial 
performance of and the variables, CEE and HCE. This suggested that ROA captured the 
VAIC from both CEE and HCE. On the other hand, the results, based on Tobin’s Q, 
indicated a positive and significant relationship between FFIBs’ market-based 
performance and the variables, CEE and HCE, suggesting that the market captured the 
VAIC from two of its main sub-components viz. CEE and HCE. In the case of 
Windows, the market captured the VAIC from CEE alone. 
 
10.3 Contributions and Implications for Policy and Practice 
The main contribution of this research study was to examine the impact of IC and CG 
features on  the accounting and market-based performance of 64 IFIs operating in ten 
different countries worldwide for the period 2007–2011, while controlling for firm-
specific features. Hence, the study makes a contribution to the existing literature on IC, 
precisely to IC performance literature, by providing the evidence about IC’s role of in 
determining the performance of the ethical banking model. Equally, the study 
contributes to the literature on Islamic banking and finance and the IFIs’ performance of 
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by measuring the effects of intangible resources on performance. Likewise, the study 
contributes to the literature on IC and CG by combining both concepts in one study. 
Another contribution of  this study is that it considered IC and CG performance in the 
pre- and post-financial crisis period; this provided a novel insight into the role 
knowledge resources i.e. IC in times of financial meltdown. Finally, it is to point out 
that the Islamic finance industry is not homogeneous as such since not all IFIs are 
FFIBs institutions. Instead, there exists a distinction within the industry. Sampled IFIs 
were sub-classified into FFIBs and Shariah-Windows (Windows) in order to verify the 
performance differences between the two sets of IFIs. The analysis showed that FFIBs 
had relatively strong financial and human capital bases and, as a consequence, 
outperformed Windows, during the period under study. Furthermore, analysis suggested 
that Windows were suffering from agency problem and to mitigate this concern such 
institutions tended to erect safeguards such as becoming listed, having BIG4 auditors, 
and keeping higher fractions of NEDs on their boards. However, the effect of such 
safeguard measures was not reflected positively in their performance indicators. Also, 
the study revealed that both IC and CG-features had different effects on performance 
measures i.e. ROA and Tobin’s Q. Besides the contribution to the literature, this 
research is of interest to policy makers and, on a practical level, rating agencies may use 
this information when evaluating an IFI’s real value. Likewise, IFIs can use this 
information to identify and have a better understanding of their competitive advantage 
in the market. Finally, investors may consider this information while making their 
investment decisions. 
 
10.4 Limitations and Suggested Areas for Future Research 
10.4.1 Limitations 
As stated earlier (see Chapter 1), the main objective of the study was to analyse the 
impact of IC and CG-features on IFIs’ performance. As suggested by the extent 
literature (see Chapter 2), there was no one agreed upon method of measuring 
intellectual capital. Therefore, this study’s first and foremost limitation lay in the 
methodological tool (VAIC) employed in the study for measuring IC. The VAIC model 
of efficiency measurement was challenged, also, by many studies. Andriessen (2004) 
opined that, although the VAIC methodology depicted clearly how much each sub-
components of VAIC (i.e. human capital, structural capital, and capital employed) 
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contributed to value-added, the dilemma was that the model might fall short in 
identifying the synergistic effects for value creation from interactions of different forms 
of capital. Consistently, Bontis et al. (2000) were concerned that “there may be 
interactions among the components of IC and so it may not be possible to calculate 
exactly the contribution to value creation from each resource. For instance, advances in 
IT or computer automation (which is an element of structural capital) could sometimes 
enhance labour productivity (which might then be interpreted as an increase in human 
capital efficiency). Therefore, one may not be able to isolate the weighting of each 
factor in facilitating an increase in HCE, SCE, or CEE”. In a similar vein, Chang (2007) 
modified the VAIC methodology and added R&D expenditure and Intellectual Property 
(IP) components to VAIC for measuring IC. Their reasoning was that the sub-
component of VAIC –SCE was incomplete since it did not include R&D expenses and 
intellectual property. R&D expenditures and intellectual property assets (Brooking, 
1996) play important roles in business and, therefore, those R&D expenses and 
intellectual property assets should be viewed as asset-like investments (Chang, 2007). 
Likewise, Ståhle et al. (2011) contended that  the VAIC approach involved an unsettled 
conception of IC capitalization via its components of human and structural capital. 
In defending the use of VAIC, it is argued that the VAIC method uses 
quantitative data and, therefore, the use of VAIC is justified because this study used 
secondary data and, hence, quantitative in nature. Arguably, this was reliable and 
validated since it was drawn from the audited data disclosed in annual reports/financial 
statements of the selected financial institutions. Despite the inherent limitations of 
VAIC, it is an ideal measure for the context of the present research since this study 
makes an original contribution to the existing IC literature by analysing the effects of IC 
on the performance of 64 IFIs operating in ten different countries. 
The second limitation was the composition of the sample IFIs; these were based 
in ten different countries located in three geographical regions namely Asia, Europe, 
and the Middle East. One of the potential problems with an international composition of 
sample IFIs is the distribution of the sample which is concentrated towards some 
countries i.e. Bahrain and Malaysia. For instance, a total of 28 IFIs were selected from 
these two countries (14 from each county); this constituted about twenty-three per cent 
of the whole sample. Therefore, given the differences in the macroeconomic features of 
these countries and the rest of the sample, the observed results might be biased towards 
some country’s effects. 
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Inclusion of individual socio-economic country-specific variables i.e. GDP 
growth, reporting standards, into the empirical estimations, was one of the common 
techniques, suggested by the extent literature, to mitigate such bias. Given the divergent 
nature of the sample used in this study, it was impossible to use such a technique. 
Firstly, it would have resulted in many country-specific variables with a very small 
number of IFIs in each group. Secondly, disclosure practices across the sample were 
different and, therefore, it was impossible to collect the required variables from all 
countries included in the sample. 
 
10.4.2 Suggested Areas for Future Research 
The suggested areas for future research emerged in two ways over the course of this 
study: from previous literature and from the results of this research study. Several 
unanswered questions were identified in the review of IC literature in Chapter 2 and the 
Islamic banking and finance literature in Chapter 3. Three of these unanswered 
questions were approached in this study. The remaining unanswered questions 
constitute potential interesting research questions for future research in the area of IC as 
well as Islamic finance. The findings of this research study indicate possible ways 
forward for the research area of IC and Islamic finance. 
Similar to other exploratory research, some themes for further research are 
highlighted. This study used mainly numerical secondary data present study and, 
therefore, it is thought that this study’s findings would have attained a higher 
confidence level if the value of IC in Islamic finance industry was calculated by 
employing any of the methods available, such as the balanced scorecard (BSc). The 
proposed research objective can be achieved through case-study approach focusing on a 
few IFIs. Besides, the study could include, also, key management personnel 
representing divergent departments i.e. operations, marketing, and human resource 
management. This will provide the researcher with an opportunity to assess how far the 
IFIs’ staff members are aware of the significant importance of IC resources as the 
strategic assets in attaining profitability and market valuation in today’s knowledge 
intensive economy. 
Potential research may include all such institutions offering Shariah-compliant 
products and services such as Takaful companies. This will allow the researcher to 
compare the impact of IC across Shariah compliant business. 
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Another area of potential research is to determine the perception of the users 
(clients/customers) of Shariah-compliant products and services. Previous research (Hsu 
and Wang, 2012) included relational/customer capital while assessing IC’s impact on 
performance. R&D expenses are used as proxy to measure relational capital. Since most 
financial institutions (including IFIs used in  this study) do not disclose R&D expenses 
in their financial statements, it would be helpful, therefore, to determine if, when 
selecting an IFI, customers took into consideration IC factors particularly, human 
capital (including member of SSB) and executive members sitting on the governing 
boards. 
The same research can be replicated using a broader sample, including both 
conventional and Islamic financial institutions operating in the same financial markets. 
This will allow the researchers to make a comparative analysis between both sets of 
banking being either conventional or Islamic. Additionally, inclusion of firm-specific 
features such as accounting standards, credit ratings etc. could assist potentially in 
explaining the effects of IC on firm performance. 
 
10.5 Concluding Remarks 
As mentioned earlier, this study is one of a kind. There exists no study as such that 
examines the impact of and corporate governance features on performance of Islamic 
financial institutions. Furthermore, Islamic finance industry is still in its infancy and 
striving with many challenges and, therefore, more empirical research in the field is 
needed. 
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